Working Paper

How Global Rules are established and stabilized

Author

  • Horst Siebert
Publication Date

This paper analyzes how international rules are established and stabilized, i.e. how an international institutional order develops. Rules emerge mainly through learning from negative experience and serve to reduce transaction costs. The paper looks at mechanisms that stabilize rule systems, at bargaining procedures for cooperation gains, dispute settlement, sanctions, side payments, self-enforcing contracts, waivers and regional integrations within a multilateral order. In addition it analyzes the prevention of negative spillovers, international courts and global public goods.

Info

JEL Classification
A12, F15, F02, K00, N00, P00

Key Words

  • bargaining for cooperation gains
  • dispute settlement
  • gains from cooperation
  • global public goods
  • institutional competition
  • international courts
  • International relations
  • negative spillovers
  • positive mechanisms
  • Sanctions
  • Sanktionen
  • self-enforcing contracts
  • side payments
  • transaction costs