Journal Article
Political Pressures and Exchange Rate Stability in Emerging Market Economies
This paper presents a political economy model of exchange rate policy. The theory is based
on a common agency approach with rational expectations. Financial and exporter lobbies exert
political pressures to influence the government's choice of exchange rate policy, before shocks
to the economy are realized. The model shows that political pressures a¤ect exchange rate
policy and create an over-commitment to exchange rate stability. This helps to rationalize the
empirical evidence on fear of large currency swings that characterizes exchange rate policy of
many emerging market economies. Moreover, the model suggests that the e¤ects of political
pressures on the exchange rate are lower if the quality of institutions is higher. Empirical
evidence for a large sample of emerging market economies is consistent with these ndings.
Key Words
- exchange rate stability
- exporters and nancial lobbies