Journal Article

Central Bank Forecasts and Disclosure Policy: Why It Pays to be Optimistic

Authors

  • Sylvester Eijffinger
  • Mewael Tesfaselassie
Publication Date

In a model with forward-looking behavior, we study disclosure policy when a central bank has private information on the future state of the economy. We find that the effects of advance disclosure depends on the presence of uncertainty about policy targets when the shock occurs. With uncertainty about policy targets, disclosure is harmless to current outcomes, owing to the strong dependence of inflation expectations on policy actions, which induces the central bank to focus exclusively on price stability. If the central bank's targets are common knowledge, disclosure of future shocks impairs stabilization of current inflation and output.

Info

JEL Classification
E42, E43, E52, E58

Key Words

  • central bank disclosure
  • central bank forecasts
  • central bank transparency
  • Forward-looking expectations
  • private information