

What explains people's migration aspirations?

Experimental evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa

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WORK IN PROGRESS. COMMENTS HIGHLY WELCOME.

Migration aspirations lie at the heart of self-selection into migration. In this paper, we study three questions: How do individual, household, origin-country, and destination-country characteristics interact? What factors are most influential? Who wants to leave in what context? We develop a new stylized model which integrates insights from the recently established aspirations-capabilities framework into standard utility maximization. We jointly investigate destination country factors (income and legal status), journey factors (costs and risks involved), and origin country factors (income, economic trends, and quality of public goods) using a conjoint choice experiment with 2708 participants in Uganda and Senegal. Our results show that all these dimensions significantly affect migration decision-making. However, the most important dimensions are the legal status and the risk of dying on the journey. Legal migration opportunities are even more influential for individuals that are content with their income situation at home. In line with the aspirations-capabilities framework, we show that higher life aspirations come with a higher willingness to migrate.

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I. Introduction

South-North migration can vastly increase individual incomes, yet most people never leave their country of origin. In some cases, people do not have the capabilities to pursue migration, e.g., lack the funds to finance it, but in other cases, people simply do not aspire to migrate. While the world population and number of international migrants (an estimated 280.6 million in 2020, see United Nations and Social Affairs, 2020) grow, how people form migration aspirations remains poorly understood.

In this study, we focus on the formation of migration aspirations and seek to answer the following questions: (1) What is the relative importance of origin-country (income, economic prospects, and quality of public goods), migration journey (costs and risks), and destination-country characteristics (income and legal status) for the formation of migration aspirations? (2) Who self-selects into migration and under which circumstances? (3) What role do individual life aspirations play in migration decision-making? These research questions are motivated by recent theoretical developments in qualitative migration research (the aspirations-capabilities framework, Carling, 2002; Carling and Schewel, 2018; De Haas, 2021), the ongoing debate on the drivers of international migration (e.g. Bertoli, Moraga and Ortega, 2013; Docquier, Peri and Ruysen, 2014; Clemens, 2020) and recent experimental evidence on the decision-making process of potential migrants (e.g. Hager, 2021).

We first develop a new model that integrates insights from the recently established aspirations-capabilities framework into standard utility maximization. In particular, we add life aspirations to the utility maximization framework, thus giving the expectations and wishes a person has center stage in forming migration aspirations. Individuals receive extra utility if living conditions and opportunities are sufficient to satisfy their life aspirations. In consequence, the relationship between life aspirations and living conditions (at home and abroad) is a crucial determinant for the attractiveness of migration in our model. Our model thereby builds on literature in development economics and economics of education (see La Ferrara, 2019, for an overview) where life aspirations have been widely discussed as a source for e.g., poverty and adapt these to have a quantitative model that accounts for the wealth of qualitative evidence suggesting that life aspirations matter for migration decisions. Second, to test the model empirically, we collected new data. We conducted a household survey and ran a conjoint experiment in two African countries, Senegal and Uganda, with 2708 potential migrants aged 18 to 40. These data allow us, among other things, to disentangle the effects of origin-country, migration journey, and destination-country characteristics, as well as their interactions, on migration decision-making. Conjoint experiments are a promising method that has only recently begun to be more widely adopted in economics and political science, building on a clearer understanding of the causal nature of the estimates (e.g. Hainmueller, Hangartner and Yamamoto, 2015; Egami and Imai, 2018). The approach allows studying the

relative quantitative importance of specific factors.

Participants were presented with hypothetical migration scenarios and asked to select their preferred ones from pairs (forced-choice conjoint design) and rate these hypothetical migration scenarios (additional rating-based conjoint design). In migration research, conjoint experiments have so far mainly been used to study attitudes towards migration (e.g. Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2016) or migration policies (e.g. Jeannet, Heidland and Ruhs, 2021; Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014). Using them to study migration decisions is novel. Being able to vary the context and conditions the experimental participants consider in their decision, both within their country of origin, on the journey, and in the destination country, helps to understand differences in preferences of individuals. Implementing the study not in a lab setting but in the context of two extensive countrywide surveys means that the background and characteristics of participants are more varied, improving our study's external validity.

Our paper contributes to the literature in four dimensions. We first make a theoretical contribution by combining two theories, the aspiration-capability framework (Carling, 2002; Carling and Schewel, 2018; De Haas, 2021) and the neoclassical migration model, into one model. With the inclusion of life aspirations into our utility maximization model, we derive implications that are testable with our experimental conjoint data. In particular, we hypothesize and empirically establish a non-monotonous impact of origin (and migration) conditions on the respondent's willingness to migrate. In support of a utility premium, our experiment reveals that each dimension's impact positively depends on the overall level of origin (or migration) conditions. That supports the way migration decisions are conceptualized in the aspirations-capabilities framework. Additionally, in line with our theoretical model, we can show empirically that life aspirations influence migration decision-making.

Second, we make a methodological contribution by designing an experiment that helps us overcome the limitations of purely observational data and allows us to actively vary specific explanatory factors to establish causal relationships and determine their relative importance (see also Czaika, Bijak and Prike, 2021). Thereby, we contribute to the debate whether income levels are one major determinant for the destination choice (e.g. Langella and Manning, 2021)) and that pull factors (destination country characteristics) outweigh push factors (origin country characteristics), see, for example, Hager (2021). We also contribute to a growing number of studies using experimental approaches (e.g. Bah and Batista, 2019; Batista and McKenzie, 2021) that mainly focus on journey or destination country characteristics (e.g. Bah and Batista, 2019; Ferwerda and Gest, 2021), neglecting origin country characteristics like income or amenities, which have been shown to impact migration decision as well (e.g. Dustmann and Okatenko, 2014; Lanati and Thiele, 2018). Our conjoint experiment reveals that legal status and the risk of dying on the journey are the most important dimensions. While all factors studied influence the attractiveness to migrate in the expected directions,

legality and death risks are much more important than the monetary dimensions (earnings at home and abroad, costs to migrate, economic trajectories) or the quality of local amenities. These results are particularly insightful since income levels are typically seen as the most important determinant of destination choice. This relationship does not vary with individual and demographic characteristics.

Third, our study allows us to exploratively detect further individual and contextual characteristics that govern the relative importance of different dimensions of migration decisions. As, for example, age, gender, and risk can impact migration aspirations, recent literature has emphasized the importance of incorporating these individual and contextual factors into the analysis (see Aslany et al. (2021) for an overview). We find that age, gender, self-assessed income, and behavioral preferences impact migration decision-making. While gender and income have no direct effect on the stated willingness to migrate in our experiment, age, risk aversion, and impatience are all negatively associated with the willingness to migrate in our migration scenarios. Additionally, female respondents put more weight on the safe journey, and we detect that individuals increasingly value legal migration opportunities with a positive assessment of their living conditions. Risk-averse participants value a safe journey more and a negative economic outlook less than more risk-tolerant respondents. Patience increases the importance of high income at home.

Lastly, we document that there are participants who fundamentally oppose/embrace migration, i.e. people who will either never migrate or always migrate under realistic circumstances. In our experiment, these individuals rate all scenarios with the lowest/highest score possible. This behavior, which can also be found for policy choices (see Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit, 2017) reduces the relevance and significance of origin characteristics as a determinant of migration. This finding is relevant for policy-making because it means that many policies will not affect a substantial part of the population, resulting in lower policy effectiveness if not incorporated in the policy design phase.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II develops our theoretical framework, Section III outlines the experimental set-up and the data collection, Section IV discusses our descriptive evidence, Section V explains our empirical strategy, Section VI discusses our results, followed by a conclusion in Section VII.

II. Theoretical Framework: Migration Aspirations

With this study, we want to shed further light on the formation of migration aspirations. How people form migration aspirations is poorly understood, and we want to expand current models and derive implications that are testable with our experimental conjoint data. We build on a utility maximization framework and expand it to incorporate recent theoretical developments in qualitative migration research. The most influential recent conceptual innovation has been the aspirations-capabilities framework (henceforth ACF, Carling, 2002; Carling and Schewel, 2018; De Haas, 2021). It suggests that aspirations should be viewed

separately from capabilities enabling or impeding their realization. In economic parlance: preferences are best understood when we ignore the budget constraint for a moment, but for the actual choice, we need both preferences and constraints, i.e., aspirations and capabilities. ACF assumes that individuals compare their life aspirations with local circumstances and prospects and only develop a desire for change if their life aspirations cannot be locally fulfilled. Hence, if life aspirations are fulfilled locally, they do not necessarily result in migration aspirations. By contrast, the neoclassical migration model that is still standard in quantitative migration research assumes that migration is driven only by utility differentials. Migration costs (financial and a rather little-understood psychological cost) stand in the way of moving. Removing these costs would make most people worldwide migrate since incomes differ substantially across countries. While gravity models micro-founded in a neoclassical framework at times correlate strongly with actual migration flows, the neoclassical approaches' performance in explaining individual migration decisions is particularly weak (Clemens, 2022).

There is a stark contrast between the main assumptions of the neoclassical migration model and more recent conceptual frameworks like *AC*. While the standard migration model in economics would treat migration as the norm (emphasizing the role of income differentials and migration costs), we can make predictions based on the aspirations-capabilities framework that are more nuanced. For example, shocks abroad or policy changes may be irrelevant for some individuals because they will not consider migrating at all if they are content that they can fulfill their life aspirations in their origin country.

While life aspirations play a major role in the aspiration capability framework, scholars in migration economics have not yet adopted them in their models. By contrast, in development economics and economics of education, life aspirations have been incorporated into the utility maximization framework (see La Ferrara (2019) for an overview). We will build our model on these theoretical foundations on aspirations (e.g. Ray, 2006) to provide the first quantitative model of the ACF. We aim to unite the neoclassical approach and the AC framework, kickstarting a broader adoption in quantitative research that can lead to more rigorous empirical tests of the new theories.

A. Model

STARTING POINT: A NEOCLASSICAL MIGRATION MODEL WITH MONETARY AND NON-MONETARY COSTS

We build our model on the utility maximization framework, assuming that an individual i develops migration aspirations if she perceives the net present value of migrating to be higher than the net present value of staying. The individual thus maximizes

$$(1) \quad \max_{m \in \{0,1\}} m \, NPV^d + (1 - m) \, NPV^o.$$


where NPV^d and NPV^o are the net present values of utility at the destination (d) and the origin (o), respectively. Migration (m) is thus preferred whenever $NPV^d > NPV^o$.

The optimal decision can be described by the simple expression

$$(2) \quad m^* = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } NPV^o > NPV^d \\ 0 & \text{if } NPV^d \leq NPV^o \end{cases}$$

where we assume that utility at origin or destination is a function of location-specific costs and benefits, which will be introduced in the following.

Figure 1. : Comparing Utility in origin and destination country



We assume that individuals derive utility from their living conditions x_i . People have a standard utility function $U(x_i)$, which monotonously increases with decreasing returns to scale. We assume that the utility function is identical for all individuals i , and the utility in a given place depends on various determinants of living conditions. These determinants include, for example, socio-economic factors, e.g., income and employment status, and community and country effects, e.g., local amenities like public services. Generally, *improved living conditions* (x_i) in a given place, e.g., *better amenities and higher income*, always lead to more utility.

In Figure 1 Panel (a), we plot the utility function of an individual i for three values of x_i with corresponding $U(x_i)$. All three points could be x_i values in the origin or the destination country. Panel (b) of Figure 1 depicts the utility difference ($U(x^d) - U(x^o)$) between destination and origin country for a given level x_i in the origin country. If the difference is larger than zero, the individual will gain utility from migrating. Within the model framework, this would mean that an individual has migration aspirations. Whether the individual actually migrates depends on the capabilities of a migrant. Comparing three hypothetical living conditions abroad, x_1^d , x_2^d and x_3^d , we can see that the difference between

the utility in the destination country and the country of origin is only positive to the right of x_1^d . Hence, to the left of x_1^d , the individual would lose utility from migrating. To the right of it, she would gain utility.

We now assume that there are migration costs in various forms that can vary between individuals. Costs include monetary costs to reach the destination (C^M) and psychological costs (C^P), such as the costs of leaving family and friends behind. Psychological costs are particularly dependent on demographic factors (e.g., age, gender, number of children), and evidence suggests that also monetary costs depend on these factors (for gender, see World Bank, 2017). In addition, inspired by Batista and McKenzie (2021) and De Haas (2021), we add an intrinsic location preference term (C^{ILP}). It captures that individuals may have intrinsic preferences for a specific location, such as home bias (Batista and McKenzie, 2021), independent of living conditions. Such preferences can favor staying or leaving, resulting in either a positive or negative cost term. If the intrinsic location preferences are strong, they can potentially dominate the other utility parameters. Consequently, individuals with strong intrinsic location preferences will aspire to migrate or stay despite objectively better living conditions in the respective alternative location. In sum, *migration costs decrease migration aspirations (monetary and psychological costs), while the direction of intrinsic costs is ex-ante undetermined.*

We thus define costs as

$$(3) \quad C_i = C_i^M + C_i^P + C_i^{ILP}$$

Including costs in to our model leads to the following equations:


$$(4) \quad NPV^o = \sum_{t=0}^{t=T} [U(x^o)]$$

and

$$(5) \quad NPV^d = \sum_{t=0}^{t=T} [U(x^d) - C]$$


In Figure 2 we now add costs to the utility difference function in Figure 1 Panel B. We depict costs by the horizontal line C . Migration only increases the utility if the utility difference is above the cost line. In all three cases shown in the graph $U(x^d) - U(x^o) < C$. Hence, at cost C migrating is not attractive for any x^d .

Figure 2. : Comparing Utility in origin and destination country with costs



Additional migration costs are risks of migration. We follow Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970) and model risk associated with migrating by including a probability term $p \in (0, 1]$, which captures migration-related risks. Examples of migration-related risks are the probability of dying and getting injured on the journey, the probability of being deported, and the probability of not finding employment at the destination. Including a probability accounting for migration risks reduces the net present value of migration and shifts the utility function as depicted in Figure 3. This leads to lower utility levels in x_1 , x_2 and x_3 .

Figure 3. : Comparing Utility in origin and destination country with risks of migration



Including the probability term in the model yields the following net present values for staying and migrating:

$$(6) \quad NPV^o = \sum_{t=0}^{t=T} [U(x^o)]$$

and

$$(7) \quad NPV^d = \sum_{t=0}^{t=T} [p\gamma(p)U(x^d) - C]$$

ADDING LIFE ASPIRATIONS TO THE NEOCLASSICAL MODEL

To model the basic mechanisms of life aspirations as a determinant of migration aspirations (e.g. Carling, 2002; Carling and Schewel, 2018; De Haas, 2021), let us first briefly summarize the main mechanism: According to the AC framework, individuals compare their living conditions and prospects at home to their life aspirations and develop a desire for change if local conditions fall short of their aspirations. If they judge local opportunity structures to be insufficient to bridge the gap between aspirations and local conditions eventually, they develop migration aspirations.

In our quantitative model, we build on models of life aspirations by Genicot and Ray (2017) and Genicot and Ray (2020) by assuming that individuals gain a utility bonus once a threshold x_{LA} is reached¹:

$$(8) \quad U_{LA} = \begin{cases} u_{LA} & \text{if } x > x_{LA} \\ 0 & \text{if } x \leq x_{LA} \end{cases}$$

Yielding the following combined utility function:

$$(9) \quad NPV^o = \sum_{t=0}^{t=T} [U(x^o) + U_{LA}]$$

and


$$(10) \quad NPV^d = \sum_{t=0}^{t=T} [U(x^d) + U_{LA} - C]$$

The resulting utility function is depicted in Figure 4 (a). As before, with improved

¹In contrast to Genicot and Ray (2017) and Genicot and Ray (2020), we decided to model the utility bonus as a jump discontinuity at x_{LA} instead of a steeper slope of the utility function for $x > x_{LA}$ ("celebration" period in their model). An instant increase in utility once life aspirations are fulfilled better resembles the theoretical reasoning by De Haas (2021).

living conditions (x), the derived utility monotonously increases with decreasing margins. When individuals reach their life aspirations x_{LA} , they gain a utility bonus, which results in a discontinuous upward jump in the utility function. In this case, the utility difference between $U(x_2)$ and $U(x_3)$ is larger than without assuming a jump in the utility function.

Figure 4. : Utility function and Utility differences with jump discontinuity




Implication 1

Individuals receive a utility bonus when their living conditions satisfy their life aspirations.

Assuming a utility level $U(x_1^o)$ in the country of origin, we can calculate the utility differences function for every x_i^d depicted in Figure 4 (b). We can see that utility differences under living conditions x_2^d in the destination are identical to the situation before, but that in x_3^d the utility differences between origin and destination are now larger than the assumed costs C . Due to the discontinuity in the utility, the utility difference between x_3^d and x_3^d is larger than it would have been without the discontinuity. Our stylized example in Figure 4 (b) shows that $U(x_3^d) - U(x_1^o) > C$, implying that individual i now aspires to migrate.

However, if we assume that the x_i in the country of origin is higher than the life aspirations ($x_i^o > x_{LA}$), the discontinuity introduced by the utility bonus has no impact on the migration decision process. This can be seen if we allow for heterogeneity in individual life aspirations. Figure 5 (a) depicts utility functions for two individuals with different life aspirations. Individual i has higher life aspirations than individual j : $x_i^{LA} > x_j^{LA}$. For individuals with lower life aspirations, the utility bonus emerges already at lower levels of living conditions (x). In Figure 5 (a) we see that for x_1 both individuals have the same utility $U_i(x_1) = U_j(x_1)$. However, due to the differences in life aspiration, the utility increases already earlier for individual j , leading to $U_i(x_2) < U_j(x_2)$. At x_3 life

Figure 5. : Utility function and Utility differences with jump discontinuity: Low living conditions at home




aspirations of both individuals are satisfied and consequently their utility is again identical $U_i(x_3) = U_j(x_3)$.

Assuming low living conditions in the country of origin ($x^o = x_1$) again, we can see in Figure 5 (b) that due to the differences in life aspirations, individual j already has migration intentions with x_2^d , while this is only the case for individual i for x_3^d . For two individuals (i and j) with different life aspirations ($LA_i > LA_j$), there exists a set of living conditions $x \in (x_j^{LA}, x_i^{LA})$, which provides individual j with higher utility than individual i (as illustrated in Figure 5), leading to different migration aspirations.

If we now assume better living conditions in the country of origin ($x^o = x_2$), which are above the life aspirations of individual j , we can see in Figure 6 b) that due to the differences in life aspirations individual j now has no interest to migrate in x_2^d or x_3^d , as $U_j(x_3^d) - U_j(x_2^o) < C$, while individual i still has an interest to migrate if $x^d = x_3^d$.

Figure 6. : Utility function and Utility differences with jump discontinuity: High living conditions at home



Implication 2

Migration is most attractive if life aspirations are not fulfilled at home but can be fulfilled abroad. Hence, for individuals with high life aspirations leaving is more attractive, but they also require better living conditions at the destination.

ADDING BEHAVIORAL PARAMETERS

Behavioral parameters, such as individual risk perception and utility discounting, are an often-overlooked source of heterogeneity that influences an individual's decision-making and self-selection (e.g. Goldbach and Schlüter, 2018; Huber and Nowotny, 2020). To account for risk preferences, we assume an exponential utility function exhibiting constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), where individual risk aversion is captured by the parameter α (for $\alpha \neq 0$; with $\alpha = 0$ implying risk neutrality). We model time preferences with a discount factor $\delta \in (0, 1]$. The term determines the present value of future utility and induces differences between individuals in how expectations about the future affect the formation of migration aspirations and self-selection into migration.

Putting these behavioral parameters into the model yields the following net present values for living at origin (=staying) and migrating and living at destination²:

$$(11) \quad NPV^o = \sum_{t=0}^{t=T} \frac{1 - e^{\alpha(\delta^t(U(x^o) + U_{LA}))}}{\alpha}$$

and

$$(12) \quad NPV^d = \sum_{t=0}^{t=T} \frac{1 - e^{\alpha(\delta^t p(U(x^d) + U_{LA}) - C)}}{\alpha}$$

Implication 3

More risk-averse individuals put greater weight on risks, leading to a larger utility reduction and even lower attractiveness of risky migration.

²The main hypothesis based on the basic utility model have been pre-registered before the data collection. The pre-analysis plan has been submitted to OSF on November 10, 2021.

Implication 4

More patient individuals receive a higher present value from future per-period-utility, which can increase the benefits of investing in migration.

III. Experimental Set-up and Data collection

A. Conjoint experiment

The aims of our empirical analysis are threefold. We want to shed light on (1) how people make migration decisions depending on origin, journey, and destination characteristics, (2) who self-selects into migration and under which circumstances, and (3) the role of life aspirations in the decision process. To answer these questions, we combine conjoint experiments and household surveys. Conjoint experiments have only recently been adopted more widely in political science and economics, building on a clearer understanding of the causal nature of the estimates (e.g. Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014; Hainmueller, Hangartner and Yamamoto, 2015; Egami and Imai, 2018). Three strengths of the approach are particularly relevant for our study.

First, in the case of migration decision-making, conjoint experiments have the advantage that they allow us to capture the multidimensional nature of migration decision-making. Varying important migration characteristics, like destination, journey, and origin country characteristics, we can identify the effects of these characteristics on the decision to move or stay simultaneously and estimate the causal effects. As the resulting estimates represent effects on the same outcome, they can be compared on the same scale to evaluate the relative influence of each migration aspect.

Second, while we vary the attributes of the dimensions in the migration scenarios with the help of the within-subject component of our design, characteristics of individuals, like gender, age, and life aspirations, are exogenous in our set-up. These can be compared with the between-subject component of the experiment. This feature of the conjoint experiment allows investigating the interaction of exogenous individual heterogeneity (gender, age, life aspirations) with important migration characteristics (origin, journey, destination) in the context of migration decision-making. This is only possible with experimental data. In the context of life aspirations, this helps us to investigate whether fulfilled or non-fulfilled life aspirations at home or abroad change migration decision-making.

Third, studies relying on revealed preferences, in our context revealed migration behavior, can only investigate differences between migrants and non-migrants. The conjoint experiment also allows us to analyze the migration decision-making of non-migrants and whether they differ in their decision-making regarding our conjoint dimensions. That also helps to shed light on whether people make cost-benefit analyses or whether other things play a role, adding to a growing literature on the decision-making of non-migrants (e.g. Schewel and Fransen, 2022). Although conjoint experiments only rely on hypothetical scenarios, Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014) shows that revealed behavior correlates with decision-making in conjoint experiments. The same has been shown for other experimental studies in the migration context (e.g., Bah et al., 2022).

We presented participants in the conjoint experiments with multiple sets, each

with two hypothetical migration scenarios. They were asked to choose between (i.e., forced-choice conjoint design) and rate (i.e., rating-based conjoint design) these migration scenarios. The hypothetical migration scenarios vary along seven attributes that capture three main dimensions, each of which can take several values. Table 1 details the conjoint dimensions, attributes and values.

The migration scenarios consisted of a bundle of fully randomized attributes. Moreover, to ease the cognitive burden while minimizing primacy effects (where respondents only pay attention to attributes at the top of the conjoint table), the order of the attributes was also randomized for each respondent and then remained fixed across the conjoint tasks. Enumerators first read out a short introduction to the participant. At the start of each conjoint task, participants received the following instruction:

If you decide about migrating abroad, you will need to think about life at home, the expected life abroad, and the risks and costs of the move itself. In the following, we will present you with different hypothetical migration scenarios.

Each migration scenario includes:

- *information about the destination: [Enumerator put magnet on white-board]*
 - *legal status*
 - *monthly income at the destination country*
- *information about the journey: [Enumerator put magnet on whiteboard]*
 - *travel expenses*
 - *risks involved in the journey*
- *information about your home: [Enumerator put magnet on whiteboard]*
 - *monthly income*
 - *economic prospects*
 - *situation of health and education facilities*

We will ask you how attractive it is for you to migrate abroad in each migration scenario. Even though the scenarios may not apply to your current personal situation, please make every choice as if the scenarios were real. These scenarios will differ in some but not necessarily in all parts. Please take your time and consider the descriptions carefully.

There are no right or wrong answers as we are interested in your personal decisions. So even if you are not entirely sure, please still select your preferred scenario.

Table 1—: Experimental dimensions and attributes

Dimensions	Attribute	Texts for Interviewer	Visualizations
At destination	No legal status	You won't get a legal right of residence, and have no access to public services	
	Legal status	You receive legal right of residence, and have access to all public service and you can bring your family with you.	
	Low income	Your monthly income at destination is 2,500,000 UGX / 400,000 XOF per month.	2,500,000 UGX / 400,000 XOF
	High income	Your monthly income at destination is 4,500,000 UGX / 700,000 XOF per month.	4,500,000 UGX / 700,000 XOF
Journey	Low travel costs	Travel expenses are 1,500,000 UGX / 50,000 XOF.	1,500,000 UGX / 50,000 XOF
	High travel costs	Travel expenses are 15,000,000 UGX/ 2,500,000 XOF	15,000,000 UGX / 2,500,000 XOF
	Safe journey	You will reach your destination safely.	
	Risky journey	One out of six migrants die on this route.	
At home	Low income	Your monthly income is 200,000 UGX / 40,000 XOF.	200,000 UGX / 40,000 XOF
	High income	Your monthly income is 600,000 UGX.	600,000 UGX / 120,000 XOF
	Positive economic prospects	In the future the economic situation in your region improves so that your income (slowly) increases.	
	Stable economic prospects	In the future the economic situation in your region is stable so that your income stagnates.	
	Bad economic prospects	In the future the economic situation in your region worsens so that your income decreases.	
	Good amenities	Free schools and health centers function well.	
	Bad amenities	Free schools and health centers function badly.	

Then, in each conjoint task, we showed each respondent a whiteboard on which two hypothetical migration scenarios were depicted with magnets. On the magnets, the attributes were shown using matching pictures. The migration options were thus displayed side-by-side. For each pair of scenarios, magnets were updated. The enumerator explained the attributes using the conjoint wording displayed on their tablets. After explaining both scenarios, the enumerator asked four questions about the migration scenarios. First, they were asked to rate their willingness to migrate in the given migration scenario on a scale from 1 (low) to 6 (high).³ Then, they were asked to choose in which of the two migration scenarios they would prefer to migrate and to state whether their willingness to migrate is rather similar or very different between the two scenarios. The questions were as follows:

- *" Just considering scenario X, please rate your willingness to migrate on a 1-6 scale."*
- *" Comparing these two scenarios, in which setting would you be more willing to migrate? "(Scenario 1, Scenario 2)*
- *" Is your willingness to migrate rather similar or very different between the two scenarios?" (Very different, Somewhat different, Hardly any difference)*

In the following, our unit of analysis is the migration scenario. The research design yields 192 possible migration scenarios. We designed attributes and dimensions such that no resulting migration scenario is unrealistic and that completely identical scenarios are excluded from the comparison. In total, each participant rated eight migration scenarios. With 2,704 participants, we observed 21,821 hypothetical migration scenarios. As usual for conjoint experiments, our setup combines between- and, through repetition of the conjoint task, within-subject design.

B. Household survey

The conjoint experiment was embedded in a household survey carried out in the national and local languages. The household survey gives us important background information on the participants and the corresponding household. This is necessary to analyze individual characteristics, life aspirations, and real-life behavior. The survey started with questions regarding the income situation of the household and expectations over migration. Then the hypothetical conjoint was played out. Afterward, additional questions about migration, gender discrimina-

³In our further analysis we coded the willingness to migrate variable from 0 to 5.

tion, etc., were asked. At the end of the survey, we asked questions regarding risk preferences, time preferences, and altruism. The questions are based on the questions used in the Global Preferences Survey (Falk et al., 2016, 2018)

C. Sampling and data collection

We collected original individual-level survey data in Uganda and Senegal for our analysis. Senegal was chosen because it is one of the most important Sub-Saharan origin countries of regular and irregular migrants to Europe. Among all migrants, the percentage of Western African migrants in Europe grew from 12 percent in the mid-1990 to 19 percent in the mid-2020, and the share in North America increased from 3 percent to 10 percent over the same period. Hereby, the destination choice of Western African migrants is driven strongly by common languages and residual colonial ties (United Nations and Social Affairs, 2020). Although Uganda and Senegal both share migration-related characteristics such as a common language with a former colonizer and widespread grievances in the population that might be considered push factors, Uganda was chosen for its very different migration patterns. Despite being poorer than Senegal, Uganda has a lower share of emigration and, in particular, very few irregular migrants but increasingly legal migration to the Gulf countries. The variation in context and conditions both within and between countries helps understand differences in preferences of individuals and improves our study's external validity.

In Uganda, we surveyed 1,204 individuals in October and November 2021. In Senegal, we surveyed 1,504 individuals in February and March 2022. Our sample aims at being representative of the respective country's mobile population. Together with our local partners, we identified suitable enumeration areas from different regions with a potentially high share of the mobile population. In Uganda, we interviewed individuals from 36 different enumeration areas in Kampala, Mbale, Gulu, Wakiso, Masaka, and Mbarara. In Senegal, we interviewed individuals from 60 different enumeration areas in Dakar, Diourbel, Matam, Saint Louis, Tambacounda, and Ziguinchor. Figure A1 in the Appendix shows the regions in both countries. After a complete household listing in each enumeration area, we randomly sampled individuals aged between 18 and 40 years for the main interview. The response rate for the main interview in Uganda was a remarkable 99% and in Senegal ca. 75%. Including our experiment, each survey took roughly 90 to 150 minutes.⁴

⁴Due to errors in the survey program in Uganda, 500 experiments had to be partially repeated. Out of the 500 respondents who had to be re-visited, 33 (6.6%) had to be replaced, either because they refused to re-do parts of the questionnaire ($N = 4$) or because they could not be re-contacted ($N = 29$).

IV. Descriptive Evidence

Table 2 presents the descriptive sample statistics and shows the differences in the sample between Uganda and Senegal. Overall, the mean age in our sample was 27.7 years, with participants being slightly older in Senegal. 57.8 % were women, and participants had on average 1.8 children. 27% of our sample were illiterate, driven by our Senegalese sample, and 23.4% had no education while 38.3% had secondary and 15.5% tertiary education. Generally, our Senegalese sample is less educated than our Uganda sample. The general average individual monthly income was 138\$ and 277 \$ for the average monthly income per adult equivalent corrected for purchasing power parity (PPP). Both were lower in Senegal compared to Uganda. However, more people in Uganda did not have enough food in the last 12 months (55 % compared to 38 % in Senegal). Generally, participants are between getting by with their current income and finding it difficult with their current income. They see themselves in the middle of a life ladder, with zero being the worst possible life and ten the best possible life. However, participants expect a positive change in life in the next five years. Here the picture of the current life position and the life prospects is generally more positive in Senegal compared to Uganda.

Looking at migration indicators, a clear majority in our sample showed intentions to migrate. This means ideally if they had the opportunity, a majority would like to move, also internationally, but temporarily. However, only 23 % of the participants had plans to migrate, thus are actually planning to move within the next 12 months. While Ugandan participants showed, on average, higher migration intentions, Senegalese participants showed higher migration plans. 40% of our participants had contacts abroad, with Senegalese participants having more contacts abroad than Ugandan participants. The average rating of our migration scenarios was 2.37 on a scale from 0 to 5, with higher ratings from Ugandan participants compared to Senegalese participants.

Table 2—: Summary Statistics and Country Differences

		Country differences		
	Total	Senegal	Uganda	p-value
Demographics				
Age	27.7 (6.67)	28.5 (6.88)	26.7 (6.26)	< 0.001
Female	1561 (57.8%)	807 (53.9%)	754 (62.7%)	< 0.001
Number children	1.80 (2.04)	1.94 (2.17)	1.62 (1.87)	< 0.001
Illiterate	0.27 (0.44)	0.42 (0.49)	0.08 (0.27)	< 0.001
<i>Education</i>				< 0.001
no education	631 (23.4%)	605 (40.5%)	26 (2.16%)	
primary	616 (22.8%)	324 (21.7%)	292 (24.3%)	
secondary	1033 (38.3%)	398 (26.6%)	635 (52.8%)	
tertiary	418 (15.5%)	168 (11.2%)	250 (20.8%)	
Economic status				
HH income, nominal USD	138 (232)	92.9 (162)	177 (273)	< 0.001
HH income, PAA PPP	277 (513)	256 (496)	296 (528)	0.063
Income self-assessment	2.57 (0.83)	2.75 (0.77)	2.35 (0.84)	< 0.001
Life prospects	2.81 (0.51)	2.79 (0.52)	2.83 (0.49)	0.057
Life ladder	4.29 (1.92)	4.43 (1.97)	4.12 (1.85)	< 0.001
Not enough food (last 12 month)	0.45 (0.50)	0.38 (0.49)	0.55 (0.50)	< 0.001
Migration				
Any Intentions	0.71 (0.45)	0.63 (0.48)	0.82 (0.38)	< 0.001
Intentions internally	0.67 (0.47)	0.52 (0.50)	0.87 (0.34)	< 0.001
Intentions temporarily	0.56 (0.50)	0.46 (0.50)	0.69 (0.46)	< 0.001
Intentions permanently	0.14 (0.35)	0.16 (0.36)	0.13 (0.33)	0.026
Plans next 12 months	0.23 (0.42)	0.30 (0.46)	0.16 (0.37)	< 0.001
Contact abroad	0.40 (0.49)	0.47 (0.50)	0.30 (0.46)	< 0.001
Scenario rating				
Average scenario rating	2.37 (1.28)	2.11 (1.36)	2.70 (1.08)	< 0.001


Note: Self-assessed income ranges from 4-Living comfortably on present income to 1-Finding it very difficult on present income; life prospects range from 1-worse to 3-better; life ladder ranges from 1-bottom to 10-top.

A. Beliefs

Before conducting our conjoint experiment, we asked our participants for their knowledge and beliefs regarding international migration. The assessment of the beliefs is crucial as it allows us to validate the information given in the conjoint scenarios. Important hereby is, that the information given by us is varying enough to be meaningful for our participants and is not only at the lower/upper end of the distribution.

We asked our participants to estimate the probability of obtaining legal status, the expected income at the destination, the travel costs, and travel risks for migration to Europe and the Gulf countries. Figure 7 depicts a histogram of the respondent's beliefs and the scenario characteristics provided in our conjoint task.

Figure 7. : Histograms of the expected probabilities and values of the conjoint dimensions: (a) legal Status, (b) earnings at destination, (c) migration costs, (d) risk of dying en route, (e) income at home



Notes: Expected earnings, income and migration costs are given as nominal values in US \$. Income is income per adult equivalent. The solid lines indicate the values given in the conjoint scenarios.

Overall, our scenarios are within the range of beliefs. Generally, our participants expect a high probability of legal status and high travel risks. These findings are in line with Bah et al. (2022) and Beber and Scacco (2020). Participants in Senegal expect a higher probability of obtaining legal status, higher incomes at the destination, higher travel costs, and higher travel risks. Our results for the beliefs of travel risk of Senegal fit the findings of Beber and Scacco (2020), with many participants stating the midpoint. We also compare our scenario incomes at home to the actual average income per adult equivalent per household. Subfigure (e) reveals that the incomes given match the middle and top of the income distribution in Uganda and belong to high incomes in Senegal. Generally, the selection of conjoint scenario dimensions shows a realistic set of beliefs and a


picture of a more positive situation of incomes at home.

B. Scenario rating

In the next step, we examine whether variation in scenario dimension translated into a variation in respondent's choices. Moreover, we check whether individual characteristics are correlated with the rating of the conjoint scenarios. Literature has shown that individuals tend to fundamentally embrace or oppose specific policy packages in foreign policy conjoint experiments. This behavior can be linked to specific individual attributes, like political orientation and education (see Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit, 2017). This could also be the case in our conjoint setting. Based on our theoretical framework, given in Section II, individuals with either high psychological costs or intrinsic location preferences could always oppose migration, while people whose life aspirations can never be fulfilled in the country of origin or have negative intrinsic location-specific costs, would always embrace migration.

We can identify characteristics of those people that are least likely to react to changes to changes in our dimensions and are either willing or not willing to migrate independently of our dimensions. In our sample, 4% of participants fundamentally embrace migration regardless of the scenarios while 8 % fundamentally opposed it (13 % in Senegal compared to 2 % in Uganda). Figure 8 depicts the relation between standard normalized individual characteristics and the average scenario rating. Specifically, fundamental opposition (average rating of 0) and fundamental embrace (average rating of 5) are of interest here. The Figure reveals that people who fundamentally embrace our migration scenarios are generally younger and are more often male, have fewer children, lower incomes, and higher life aspirations. People who fundamentally oppose our migration scenarios, are older, more often female, have lower incomes, more children, and lower life aspirations. These patterns match our theoretical considerations and are reassuring by showing that respondents did not choose scenarios randomly (e.g. due to survey fatigue). In the following, we will concentrate mainly on individuals who show variation in their scenario responses because including people fundamentally embracing or opposing migration dilutes the experimental results about the relative importance of different dimensions.

Figure 8. : Individual characteristics by average scenario rating



Notes: All variables are standardized. Income PA PPP is income per adult equivalent and in purchasing power parities. Life aspirations are calculated by dividing the household's actual income (per adult equivalent and in purchasing power parities) by the respondent's economic self-assessment (for a detailed explanation see VI.C).

V. Estimation strategy

In order to analyze how the destination, journey, and origin characteristics jointly affect (1) the probability of choosing a migration scenario and (2) the willingness to migrate in a given migration scenario, we regress our conjoint dimensions on the respective outcome (Equation 13). We cluster the standard errors at the level of the individual respondent.

$$(13) \quad Y_{ijk} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 D_{ijk} + \beta_2 J_{ijk} + \beta_3 O_{ijk} + \beta_4 X_{ir} + \epsilon_{ijk}$$

where Y_{ijk} is individual i 's response to our migration experiment in task j for scenario k , D_{ijk} is a vector of the destination conditions including the income at the destination country (\$750 vs \$1250) and the mode of migration (legal vs. not legal); J_{ijk} is the vector of journey characteristics, which comprise monetary migration costs (\$400 vs \$5000) and the migration risk (no risk vs 1/6 risk of dying on route), O is a vector collecting the origin country conditions containing the income at home (\$60 vs. \$165), the economic trend (good / stable / bad) and the quality of local schools and health centers (good vs. poor). X_{ir} is an optional vector of individual and regional (r) control variables such as actual exposure to migration, expectations, and perceptions. ϵ_{ijk} is the error term.

In our main analysis, we use the stated willingness to migrate in a given scenario as the main dependent variable. The willingness to migrate variable was collected as a rating on a 6-point scale for each scenario before participants made the binary choice. The rating is more granular than the binary choice, allowing us to exploit more variation. As choices and ratings are generally consistent, the scenario

choices can be directly derived from the ratings.

To estimate the effects of the different conjoint dimensions, we estimate Equation 13 using OLS. In a second step, we interact our conjoint dimensions with regional and individual characteristics (I), derived from our household surveys. In doing so, we can study how different characteristics affect migration preferences and test specific implications of our model. Specifically, we interact the individual characteristics of interest (I) with each of our conjoint dimensions, which leads to the following estimation:

$$(14) \quad Y_{ijk} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 D_{ijk} + \beta_1 I_i \times D_{ijk} + \beta_2 J_{ijk} + \beta_2 I_i \times J_{ijk} + \beta_3 O_{ijk} + \beta_3 I_i \times O_{ijk} + \beta_4 I_i + \epsilon_i$$

Our model posits a non-linear relationship between the quality of living conditions and the derived utility, and hence the willingness to migrate. To investigate the existence of jump discontinuities, we aggregate our scenario dimensions into an origin and a migration conditions index and examine in a similar regression framework if better conditions are associated with a utility bonus. As the last step, we interact these indices with our measures for life aspirations to investigate if and how individual life aspirations shape migration decisions and a potential utility bonus.⁵

VI. Results

Our result section follows our theoretical framework from Section II. We begin by estimating equation 13 and thereby investigating the willingness to migrate in our conjoint scenarios (Subsection VI.A). Building on this, in Section VI.B, we examine whether we find differences in the willingness to migrate based on participants' characteristics. Then, we turn to an empirical investigation of life aspirations' role in migration decision-making. Section VI.C investigates the evidence for the existence of utility discontinuities that could, in line with our model, point to life aspirations playing an essential role in migration decision-making. Section VI.C then follows this up empirically by estimating the impact of life aspirations on the willingness to migrate.

⁵As is usual practice, throughout this study we use $\alpha = 0.05$ (two-sided) as the threshold for significance level.

A. Main results: Willingness to migrate


Figure 9 and Table 3 column (1) show the main regression results obtained by estimating Equation 13.⁶ Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients and shows that our results are robust to the inclusion of controls, like age and gender, country fixed effects, and migration beliefs. In the following discussion, we will hence focus on the simplest specification that only relies on the experimental variation.

In our main specifications, the outcome variable is the stated willingness to migrate in a given scenario. For robustness, we also use the binary choice between conjoint tasks. Using the 6-point scale willingness to migrate as the outcome has the advantage that we get a clearer idea of the strength of differences in choices compared to relying only on the binary task. An advantage of the conjoint setup is that we can compare the relative importance of specific migration dimensions for the willingness to migrate - at least for the specific values used in the experiment. In Section IV.A, we have shown that the values we chose for our dimensions' attributes are within the beliefs and realities of our participants and show enough variation to be meaningful. In the case of journey risks, the chosen risk is even at the lower end of the risk belief distribution. Figure 9 shows the coefficient estimates relative to a baseline attribute for each dimension. A positive coefficient indicates how much the stated willingness to migrate increases on average when a scenario contains this value compared to the baseline value, and if the confidence interval does not touch the zero line, the effect is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. Looking at Figure 9, one can immediately see that all tested dimensions yield statistically significant treatment effects. In the destination country dimensions, both legal status and high income at the destination increase the willingness to migrate. Obtaining legal status in the destination country increases the willingness to migrate in a given scenario by 1.307, while high income (1250 USD per month compared to low income of 750 USD per month) in the destination country increases the willingness to migrate by 0.257. The legal status is thus about five times as important as the 500 USD difference in monthly income. The 1.307 increase on the six-point scale is a 0.67 standard deviation effect, i.e. a very sizeable effect.

Turning to the journey dimensions, we find that low travel costs of 500 USD increase the willingness to migrate in a given scenario by 0.165 compared to the baseline category of a travel cost of 5,000 USD (both are one-time costs). Safe journeys, i.e., no death risk instead of a death risk of a sixth, increase the willingness to migrate by 1.243. If the journey is safe, that is about seven times more important than our scenarios' travel cost difference. That suggests a high willingness to pay for safer journeys, with a back-of-the-envelope calculation giving a 33,900 USD willingness to pay to reduce the death risk from 1/6 to zero.

⁶Figure B1 in the Appendix B also depicts our regression results using the forced-choice variable (probability to migrate) as the dependent variable instead of the rating variable in the conjoint setting. All our results also hold when using the forced-choice variable (probability to migrate) as the dependent variable instead of the rating variable in the conjoint setting.

Figure 9. : Conjoint experiment: Determinants of the willingness to migrate



Notes: OLS-Regression. Dependent variable is the willingness to migrate in a conjoint migration scenario. Baseline categories are given in brackets. The whiskers indicate the 95% confidence interval. Individuals that rate all scenarios with either the highest or the lowest rating and inconsistent responses are excluded from the analysis. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

This may sound relatively low by American or European standards, but it is 246 monthly incomes for the average respondent. Potential migrants in both countries thus have a very high willingness to pay to reduce the risk of migration.

Regarding the country of origin dimension, Figure 9 shows four treatment effects. First, a relatively high income in the origin country compared to a low income (about 195 USD versus 95 USD in local currencies at current prices). Second, positive or negative income trends are compared to a stable income trend. Furthermore, third, free schools and health facilities perform well instead of poorly. The estimated coefficients for the high income (-0.241), the positive income trend (-0.222), and good schools (-0.231) are all negative, indicating that each of these aspects reduces the willingness to migrate. Likewise, compared to stability, a negative income trend increases the willingness to migrate by 0.177. Hence, the (perceived) local trend matters a lot. Expecting a positive instead of a negative trend decreases the willingness to migrate by 0.399 points, a larger effect than that of the income difference. Trends are thus more important than moving from about 70 percent of the nominal mean per capita income to about

140 percent, i.e. a substantial step up the income distribution (cf. Figure 7).

Table 3—: Conjoint experiment: Determinants of the willingness to migrate: Average effects

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Willingness to migrate (0-5)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
legal migration (0/1)	1.307*** (0.025)	1.307*** (0.025)	1.229*** (0.029)	1.226*** (0.029)
high income abroad (1250 vs. 750 USD)	0.257*** (0.025)	0.252*** (0.025)	0.308*** (0.029)	0.301*** (0.029)
low travel costs (400 vs. 5000 USD)	0.165*** (0.025)	0.169*** (0.025)	0.194*** (0.029)	0.202*** (0.029)
safe journey (vs. 1/6 death risk)	1.243*** (0.025)	1.244*** (0.025)	1.250*** (0.029)	1.252*** (0.029)
high income at home (165 vs. 60 USD)	-0.241*** (0.025)	-0.240*** (0.025)	-0.284*** (0.029)	-0.288*** (0.029)
econ. trend at home positive (0/1)	-0.222*** (0.031)	-0.231*** (0.030)	-0.309*** (0.036)	-0.310*** (0.036)
econ. trend at home negative (0/1)	0.177*** (0.031)	0.177*** (0.030)	0.211*** (0.035)	0.215*** (0.035)
good schools and health centers (0/1)	-0.231*** (0.025)	-0.241*** (0.025)	-0.297*** (0.029)	-0.302*** (0.029)
Constant	1.149*** (0.037)	1.837*** (0.081)	1.448*** (0.052)	1.600*** (0.106)
Controls	no	yes	no	yes
Country FE	no	yes	no	yes
Migration expectations	no	no	yes	yes
Observations	20,440	20,254	13,207	13,171
R ²	0.219	0.252	0.248	0.265

Note: OLS-Regression. Dependent variable is the willingness to migrate in a conjoint migration scenario. Baseline categories are given in brackets. Control variables comprise age, gender, number of children, education, and networks abroad. 'Migration expectations' refers to individual expectations about earnings, legal status, death risks and costs associated with migrating to their favourite destination. Individuals that rate all scenarios with either the highest or the lowest rating are excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Our main results are in line with our theoretical model. Improved living conditions in the destination country increase the willingness to migrate, while higher costs, higher death probability, and improved living conditions at home decrease the willingness to migrate. The importance of destination country characteristics has been highlighted already by other studies (e.g. Hager, 2021), but often the discussion turns on destination income and cost-benefit analysis of potential migrants (e.g. Langella and Manning, 2021). Our results suggest that individuals do cost-benefit analyses when forming migration aspirations, but importantly, these

go beyond mere income maximization.

Factors like legal status and a safe journey play a potentially even larger role. Beyond underlining the importance of the risk of the migration journey that was already shown by Bah et al. (2022), that getting a permit and the risk of journey impact migration decision-making significantly, our finding fits other studies that also found evidence of non-income maximization behaviour (Batista and McKenzie, 2021).

Our experimental approach enables us to separately assess the importance of factors that were previously studied together in observational data. Additionally, finding a negative association between a positive income trend and the willingness to migrate is in line with recent evidence that individuals who expect the local economy to improve are less likely to have migration aspirations and to actively prepare for migration (Schneiderheinze and Tohoff, 2021; Heidland et al., 2021). Finally, our finding with regard to local public services highlights the importance of amenities as shown by Dustmann and Okatenko (2014) and Lanati and Thiele (2018).

B. Individual characteristics

Individual characteristics are important determinants of the willingness to migrate (e.g. Aslany et al., 2021). With our experimental setup, we can distinguish the effects of individual characteristics on the intercept - whether certain individuals have higher or lower migration aspirations - and differences in the slope - whether specific individual characteristics affect how people evaluate destination, journey, and origin characteristics. Table 4 depicts our results for age, gender, income, self-assessed income, and risk and time preferences. Table 4 reports estimation results for the variables of interest, as well as the results of the interaction with our conjoint attributes.

Gender and income have no direct effect on the stated willingness to migrate in our experiment. Men and women thus find migration in the different scenarios similarly attractive. By contrast, the existing literature based on observational data often highlights that women have lower migration aspirations than men. Our results suggest that when facing forming migration aspirations in an identical situation, women do not behave significantly differently from men in our study countries. Hence, gender differences in migration aspirations outside of our experiment are not due to gender, but rather they result from genders living in different conditions and facing different options. In observational studies, the decision-making environment is not comparable, so one cannot distinguish whether gender differences directly result from gender or due to gender differences in other determinants. Finding no evidence of a direct income difference also matters, but this point has a more technical implication. Since the scenarios give the respondents an income to consider, the absence of a difference between richer and poorer respondents suggests that they indeed consider those incomes and not their actual incomes in real life when reporting their migration aspirations. That

Table 4—: Conjoint experiment: Determinants of the willingness to migrate by individual characteristics

	<i>Dependent variable: Willingness to migrate (0-5)</i>					
	Female	Age	Income	Self-as. income	Risk	Patience
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
legal migration	1.369*** (0.039)	1.173*** (0.108)	1.330*** (0.031)	0.840*** (0.080)	1.462*** (0.049)	1.441*** (0.063)
high income abroad	0.297*** (0.039)	0.249** (0.108)	0.274*** (0.031)	0.377*** (0.080)	0.232*** (0.049)	0.216*** (0.063)
low travel costs	0.239*** (0.039)	0.276** (0.108)	0.245*** (0.031)	0.396*** (0.080)	0.136*** (0.049)	0.136** (0.062)
safe journey	1.261*** (0.039)	1.331*** (0.108)	1.298*** (0.031)	1.250*** (0.081)	1.628*** (0.049)	1.373*** (0.063)
high income at home	-0.261*** (0.039)	-0.098 (0.108)	-0.247*** (0.031)	-0.356*** (0.080)	-0.216*** (0.049)	-0.129** (0.062)
econ. trend at home pos.	-0.298*** (0.047)	-0.277** (0.132)	-0.275*** (0.038)	-0.488*** (0.097)	-0.305*** (0.059)	-0.304*** (0.076)
econ. trend at home neg.	0.171*** (0.047)	0.217* (0.131)	0.195*** (0.038)	0.109 (0.097)	0.035 (0.059)	0.058 (0.077)
good schools and health	-0.284*** (0.039)	-0.262** (0.108)	-0.311*** (0.031)	-0.535*** (0.080)	-0.218*** (0.049)	-0.312*** (0.063)
variable of interest (<i>i</i>)	-0.118 (0.074)	-0.013** (0.006)	0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.262*** (0.044)	0.086*** (0.011)	0.037*** (0.012)
<i>i</i> :legal migration	0.023 (0.051)	0.008** (0.004)	-0.00004 (0.0001)	0.211*** (0.030)	-0.015* (0.008)	-0.009 (0.009)
<i>i</i> :high income abroad	-0.047 (0.051)	0.001 (0.004)	0.00002 (0.0001)	-0.043 (0.030)	0.007 (0.008)	0.008 (0.008)
<i>i</i> :low travel costs	-0.057 (0.051)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.073** (0.030)	0.013* (0.008)	0.010 (0.008)
<i>i</i> :safe journey	0.105** (0.051)	-0.0003 (0.004)	-0.00000 (0.0001)	0.028 (0.030)	-0.058*** (0.008)	-0.008 (0.009)
<i>i</i> :high income at home	0.001 (0.051)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.0001* (0.0001)	0.039 (0.030)	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.020** (0.008)
<i>i</i> :econ. trend at home pos.	0.032 (0.062)	-0.0001 (0.005)	-0.0001* (0.0001)	0.081** (0.036)	0.005 (0.010)	0.004 (0.010)
<i>i</i> :econ. trend at home neg.	-0.001 (0.062)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.00001 (0.0001)	0.024 (0.036)	0.024** (0.010)	0.017 (0.010)
<i>i</i> :good schools and health	0.026 (0.051)	-0.0002 (0.004)	0.00004 (0.0001)	0.104*** (0.030)	-0.010 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)
Constant	1.259*** (0.057)	1.535*** (0.159)	1.225*** (0.046)	1.863*** (0.119)	0.731*** (0.069)	0.943*** (0.090)
Observations	17,804	17,804	14,742	17,782	17,764	17,774
R ²	0.272	0.274	0.267	0.276	0.284	0.275

Note: OLS-Regression. Dependent variable is the willingness to migrate in a conjoint migration scenario. Variable of interest *i* is the variable given at the top of the row (female, age, income, self-assessed income, risk and patience) and *i*:dimension gives the interactions effects of the variable of interest with each dimension. Individuals that rate all scenarios with either the highest or the lowest rating are excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

does not mean that income does not matter. As we have seen in Figure 9, improved living conditions reduce migration aspirations. Table 4 furthermore shows that self-assessed income is negatively associated with the general willingness to migrate in our migration scenarios. In other words, living comfortably at one's current income level reduces the willingness to migrate in addition to the direct effect of a higher income - precisely as we would expect if life aspirations play a role for migration aspirations.

Age, risk aversion, and impatience are all negatively associated with the willingness to migrate. So, being older, more risk averse, and less patient leads to a lower rating in our migration scenarios. These results for age and economic preferences match the collection of empirical findings in the systematic review by Aslany et al. (2021). The results for patience also fit our theoretical model. More patient individuals receive a higher present value from future utility, which increases utility differences between destination and origin country if the destination country is richer than the origin country. Patient individuals thus become more willing to invest in migrating. Migration aspirations are thus not only high for individuals who are young and more willing to take risks. Self-selection also happens in the dimension of patience as with any important investment decision.

Next, we look at the interaction effects and investigate whether individual characteristics change the evaluation of our conjoint attributes. The results on gender are particularly interesting. We find that women weigh the risk of the journey differently. They put more weight on the safe journey than men. All other characteristics are weighted similarly.

Age has no significant effect on the evaluation of our attributes. All interaction effects are small and not significant. This is an interesting finding because it suggests that the lower migration aspiration of older people cannot be explained by origin, destination, or journey characteristics. Hence, other explanations might be important, such as mobility, flexibility, responsibilities, or the remaining working-life.

Higher current income has only a weakly significant effect on the evaluation of migration scenarios with high income at home or a positive economic trend at home. This relationship becomes stronger for higher actual income. In our study, self-assessed income is more important than actual income. Our results reveal that people who assess their income more positively put more weight on the legal status in the destination country and less on travel costs, economic prospects at home, and amenities at home. This highlights that if people already earn well in the country of origin, only legal migration is of interest. Origin factors do not play a significant role. Meanwhile, if people perceive their economic situation as bad, legal migration is less important and origin factors are influential. This suggests that individuals who do well are mainly affected by migration barriers. Improving their incomes would not significantly change their migration aspirations. By contrast, poor individuals' migration aspirations can be decreased by improving their economic situation.

Not only demographic and socio-economic factors might play a role, but also behavioral preferences can impact migration decision-making. In line with our model, more risk-averse participants value a safe journey higher. Additionally, a negative economic outlook at home is less important for them. Less willing to take risks, these individuals are thus less likely to take the risk of migrating in response to a worsening economic outlook. Patience increases the importance of high income at home.⁷

Individual characteristics' role in aspiration formation is important because it shows that those characteristics are vital ingredients in the process of self-selection into migration. Our paper's focus on migration aspirations helps us understand which variables are relevant drivers of self-selection and which are only correlated with those variables, either as third factors creating a spurious correlation or because they play a role in determining capabilities, i.e. the crucial link between aspirations and actual migration. While factors like age and income lead to higher willingness to migrate across migration scenarios, they do not alter the evaluation between dimensions. By contrast, factors like gender, self-assessed income, risk, and time preferences change self-selection into migration.

C. Aggregate effects, utility discontinuities, and the role of life aspirations

In this subsection, we investigate whether the empirical data from our conjoint experiment supports the existence of jump discontinuities in the underlying utility functions. In line with the aspirations-capabilities framework, our model assumes that reaching certain utility thresholds provides individuals with extra utility. In each scenario of our conjoint experiment, respondents are confronted with several factors that are relevant for either the utility of staying at home or the utility of migrating. If utility discontinuities exist, four situations are possible for each conjoint task for a given individual:

- 1) Only the set of origin conditions generate the utility bonus.
- 2) Only the migration conditions generate the utility bonus.
- 3) Both options generate the utility bonus.
- 4) Neither option generates the utility bonus.

Since we assume that the size of the potential utility bonus is the same across locations,⁸ the existence of a utility bonus is not relevant to the attractiveness of migration in scenarios 3 and 4. Moreover, scenario 4 is identical to a standard model without bonus utility. Compared to scenario 4, the utility bonus would decrease the willingness to migrate in scenario 1 and increase it in scenario 2.

⁷Patience is a highly complex variable that is correlated with other variables such as risk, education, and other factors. We are therefore cautious to interpret this causally.

⁸The current version of the model assumes only one agent. Adding heterogeneity to her preference parameters does not affect the overall implications for the following section.

Hence, to generate empirical data that can inform about the existence of utility discontinuities in migration decision-making, the relevant thresholds must lie within the set of conditions that we present to the participants. Then, a non-linear relationship between these conditions and the willingness to migrate will result. Specifically, on average, better origin conditions will decrease the willingness to migrate. Yet, that relationship would be subject to one or multiple jumps (since the threshold position may differ across individuals), creating a non-linearity in the aggregate data. The same would be true for migration conditions, albeit with the opposite slope.

To empirically investigate the existence of such discontinuities, we aggregate our conjoint dimensions into two distinct indices:

- 1) The origin conditions index consists of the dimensions that determine the utility of staying at home, i.e., local amenities, income at home, and the economic trajectory.
- 2) The migration conditions index aggregates the dimensions that drive the utility of migrating, i.e., income abroad, legal status, death risks, and travel costs.

We compute both measures as the normalized mean over the respective dimensions. Since the economic trajectory has three levels and all other factors have two, both the origin and the migration condition index can assume five distinct values. These indices enable us to rank all scenarios by the quality of their origin and migration conditions. Higher values indicate better conditions.

Table 5 depicts regressions showcasing the relationship between these indices and the willingness to migrate. In line with the model and our previous analysis, the origin conditions are negatively related to the willingness to migrate, while the migration conditions are positively related. This relationship holds for each country separately, regardless of treating the index as a numerical (columns 1-3) or ordinal variable (columns 4-6). In Table 5 (columns 4-6) we see that for both origin and migration conditions the indices' impact on the willingness to migrate increases over-proportionally. The difference in the willingness to migrate between the poorest and the second poorest conditions in our experiment is much smaller than the difference between the best and the second-best conditions.⁹ Hence, the marginal effect of an improvement in one dimension positively depends on the index level. In Figures 10 and 11 we use the estimates from Table 5, column 4, to illustrate graphically the non-linearities in impact of origin and migration conditions on the willingness to migrate.

⁹The difference between the best conditions is about twice as large as the difference between the worst conditions.


Table 5—: Aggregating origin and migration conditions

	<i>Dependent variable: Willingness to migrate (0-5)</i>					
	Full sample	Uganda	Senegal	Full sample	Uganda	Senegal
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
origin index (num.)	-0.975*** (0.050)	-1.504*** (0.062)	-0.471*** (0.076)			
migration index (num.)	3.196*** (0.047)	2.869*** (0.061)	3.497*** (0.070)			
origin index = 0.25				-0.154*** (0.053)	-0.161*** (0.062)	-0.115 (0.082)
origin index = 0.5				-0.335*** (0.051)	-0.503*** (0.060)	-0.159** (0.080)
origin index = 0.75				-0.624*** (0.053)	-0.889*** (0.063)	-0.359*** (0.082)
origin index = 1				-1.003*** (0.066)	-1.555*** (0.082)	-0.460*** (0.102)
migration index = 0.25				0.509*** (0.051)	0.499*** (0.069)	0.483*** (0.073)
migration index = 0.5				1.218*** (0.050)	1.117*** (0.067)	1.272*** (0.072)
migration index = 0.75				2.125*** (0.052)	1.947*** (0.069)	2.263*** (0.075)
migration index = 1				3.123*** (0.058)	2.803*** (0.078)	3.396*** (0.082)
Constant	1.381*** (0.038)	1.999*** (0.048)	0.797*** (0.056)	1.568*** (0.063)	2.035*** (0.079)	1.137*** (0.094)
Observations	17,804	8,769	9,035	17,804	8,769	9,035
R ²	0.190	0.220	0.184	0.194	0.226	0.189

Note: OLS-Regression. Dependent variable is the willingness to migrate in a conjoint migration scenario. We compute the origin and the migration conditions measures as the normalized mean over the respective dimensions. Individuals that rate all scenarios with either the highest or the lowest rating and inconsistent responses are excluded from the analysis. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.


*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 10. : How origin factors shape the willingness to migrate



Notes: OLS-Regression. Dependent variable is the willingness to migrate in a conjoint migration scenario. We compute the origin condition measures as the normalized mean over the respective dimensions. Individuals that rate all scenarios with either the highest or the lowest rating and inconsistent responses are excluded from the analysis. The whiskers indicate the 95% confidence interval. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Figure 11. : How migration factors shape the willingness to migrate



Notes: OLS-Regression. Dependent variable is the willingness to migrate in a conjoint migration scenario. We compute the migration condition measures as the normalized mean over the respective dimensions. Individuals that rate all scenarios with either the highest or the lowest rating and inconsistent responses are excluded from the analysis. The whiskers indicate the 95% confidence interval. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

How much marginal changes depend on the specific conditions becomes even more evident if we investigate concrete dimensions from our conjoint experiment. For that purpose, we focus on each domain's most influential dimension (cf. Figure 9): the economic trajectory at home and the legal status at the destination. We now compute new index measures for origin and migration conditions without these two dimensions. That allows us to estimate a new set of regressions where we interact the dummy for a positive economic trend at home with the index for the remaining origin conditions and the dummy for the legal status with the index for the other migration conditions (see Table 6). This interaction setup allows us to identify how these specific dimensions' impact depends on the other dimensions' level. In line with the analysis above, the interaction terms are large and highly significant. The better the other origin conditions, the larger the impact of a positive economic trend on the willingness to migrate. A legal migration opportunity appears more attractive when the other dimensions are also favorable. These results are in line with the existence of a utility premium that individuals derive from reaching certain utility thresholds and cannot be explained under

standard assumptions of continuous, monotonically increasing utility functions.

Table 6—: Interacting economic trends and legal status with origin and migration conditions

	<i>Dependent variable: Willingness to migrate (0-5)</i>		
	Full sample	Uganda	Senegal
	(1)	(2)	(3)
origin index (without trend)	-0.444*** (0.044)	-0.659*** (0.055)	-0.224*** (0.066)
positive econ. trend (0/1)	-0.242*** (0.047)	-0.375*** (0.059)	-0.112 (0.070)
origin idx:pos. trend	-0.253*** (0.078)	-0.416*** (0.101)	-0.112 (0.116)
migration index (without legal)	1.282*** (0.063)	1.522*** (0.080)	1.021*** (0.090)
legal status (0/1)	0.888*** (0.051)	0.578*** (0.065)	1.198*** (0.075)
migration idx:legal	0.994*** (0.086)	0.741*** (0.109)	1.254*** (0.127)
Constant	1.493*** (0.042)	1.965*** (0.054)	1.030*** (0.060)
Observations	17,804	8,769	9,035
R ²	0.225	0.228	0.258

Note: OLS-Regression. Dependent variable is the willingness to migrate in a conjoint migration scenario. We compute the origin and the migration condition measures as the normalized mean over the respective dimensions. Individuals that rate all scenarios with either the highest or the lowest rating and inconsistent responses are excluded from the analysis. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

THE IMPACT OF LIFE ASPIRATIONS

Echoing the aspirations capabilities framework (Carling, 2002; Carling and Schewel, 2018; De Haas, 2021), our model suggests that individual life aspirations play a vital role in migration decision-making. Migration is most attractive if life aspirations are not fulfilled at home but can be fulfilled abroad. Hence, for individuals with high life aspirations leaving is more attractive, but they also require better conditions for the migrant in the destination country.

To analyze the role of differences in life aspirations, we employ the economic life aspiration measure (LAM). We proxy life aspirations by the normalized relationship between the respondent's economic self-assessment and the household's actual income (per adult equivalent and in purchasing power parities). Respondents were asked to rate their household income on a five-point scale between one, "Finding it very difficult to get by" and five, "Living comfortably". The rationale for this measure is simple: If two households have similar real incomes but rate them differently, they exhibit different economic life aspirations. Our individual

life aspiration measure (LAM) is computed the following way:

$$(15) \quad LAM_i = \frac{\text{household income}}{\text{income self-assessment}}$$

$$(16) \quad \overline{LAM}_i = \frac{LAM_i - \min(LAM)}{\max(LAM) - \min(LAM)} \in (0, 1)$$

Higher values indicate higher life aspirations.


We use this measure to test whether life aspirations matter for the impact of the origin and migration conditions. Specifically, we compute life aspiration quartiles across our full sample and interact these with the origin and migration conditions index measures from above.

Figure 12 reports the estimated impact of origin conditions by life aspiration quartiles. Across all groups, better origin conditions come with a lower willingness to migrate. Still, significant differences between the life aspirations quartiles become apparent. In line with the predictions from our model, higher life aspirations come, on average, with a higher willingness to migrate, especially if origin conditions are poor. The better the origin conditions, the smaller the differences between respondents with high and low life aspirations. These differences disappear entirely in conjoint scenarios with the most favorable origin conditions. Hence, at the best possible origin conditions within our experiment, life aspirations do not impact the willingness to migrate anymore.

Figure 13 depicts how the impact of migration conditions depends on individual life aspirations. Within our experimental setup, life aspirations are more influential for the origin conditions, yet the general pattern also holds for the migration conditions. For poor migration conditions, individuals with high life aspirations report a significantly higher willingness to migrate; migration desires converge when migration conditions are more favorable.


Our findings suggest that, in line with the aspirations-capabilities framework, individuals compare conditions and prospects to their life aspirations when considering migration. If confronted with poor conditions, i.e., low incomes, adverse trends, or poor amenities, individuals with high life aspirations report particularly strong migration desires. That implies systematic self-selection based on life aspirations.

Figure 12. : Origin country factors by life aspiration quartiles



Notes: OLS-Regression. Dependent variable is the willingness to migrate in a conjoint migration scenario. We compute the origin condition measures as the normalized mean over the respective dimensions. Life aspirations are calculated using $\overline{LAM}_i$. Individuals that rate all scenarios with either the highest or the lowest rating and inconsistent responses are excluded from the analysis. The whiskers indicate the 95% confidence interval. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Figure 13. : Migration factors by life aspiration quartiles



Notes: OLS-Regression. Dependent variable is the willingness to migrate in a conjoint migration scenario. We compute the migration condition measures as the normalized mean over the respective dimensions. Life aspirations are calculated using $\overline{LAM}_i$. Individuals that rate all scenarios with either the highest or the lowest rating and inconsistent responses are excluded from the analysis. The whiskers indicate the 95% confidence interval. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

VII. Conclusion

In our paper, we study the decision-making processes of potential migrants. We focus on the formation of migration aspirations, the first and most crucial determinant of migration, and seek to determine the relative importance of origin-country (income, economic prospects, and quality of public goods), migration journey (costs and risks), and destination-country characteristics (income and legal status) in determining migration aspirations. By assessing how individual characteristics interact with origin, journey, and destination factors such as incomes, risks, and amenities, we analyze how changing those factors would affect the pool of individuals with migration aspirations.

We propose a new model based on recent theoretical developments in migration decision-making. For this, we integrate an essential feature of the aspirations-

capabilities framework, life aspirations, into the more standard neoclassical utility maximization framework. In our model, individuals receive extra utility if their living conditions and opportunities are sufficient to satisfy their life aspirations. Consequently, the relationship between life aspirations and living conditions (at home and abroad) is a crucial determinant of the attractiveness of migration. To test the implications of our model, we conducted a household survey and a conjoint migration decision-making experiment with 2,708 potential migrants in Uganda and Senegal. Respondents were asked to compare hypothetical scenarios which differ in crucial origin, journey, and destination conditions.

First, we establish non-monotonous impacts of origin (and migration) conditions on the respondent's willingness to migrate. In support of a utility premium, our experiment reveals that each dimension's impact positively depends on the overall level of origin (or migration) conditions. That supports the way migration aspirations are formed in our model. We additionally demonstrate that life aspirations are crucial determinants of migration decisions. To our knowledge, this is the first rigorous experimental evidence on the importance of life aspirations for migration decision-making. Individuals with higher life aspirations report, on average, higher migration desires. Life aspirations are particularly relevant if conditions are poor, implying a strong self-selection process in poor stagnating environments.

Second, our conjoint experiment reveals that legal status and the risk of dying on the journey are the most important dimensions. While the other factors influence the attractiveness to migrate in the expected directions, legality and death risks are much more important than the monetary dimensions (earnings at home and abroad, costs to migrate, economic trajectories) or the level of local amenities. This means that migration policies not only affect capabilities (i.e., whether people can migrate if they want to) but also change migration aspirations. Our results indicate a likely reason why migration policy is so effective in determining migration flows.

Third, we find individual and contextual characteristics that govern the relative importance of different dimensions of migration decisions. Generally, self-selection happens along age, risk aversion, and impatience. However, with decreasing migration risk, women and risk-averse individuals increase their migration aspirations, and we detect that individuals increasingly value legal migration opportunities with a positive assessment of their living conditions.

Fourth, we identified the demographic characteristics of participants who fundamentally oppose/embrace migration decision-making. These participants do not react to changes in migration characteristics and consistently rate the migration scenarios lowest/highest.

Our results have three main implications for designing migration policies. First, they show that changes in destination, journey, and origin characteristics affect migration decision-making. That is important as it highlights policies' impact on migration behavior in all three dimensions. Both sides, origin and destination

country policies, influence migration decision-making. Second, our results show that life aspirations are essential in migration decision-making, and our model provides a possible mechanism. People might self-select into migration because they cannot fulfill their life aspirations at home. As increasing education and better livelihood can raise life aspirations (e.g. La Ferrara, 2019), one should not neglect increasing life aspirations as a determinant of long-term migration trajectories. Despite being a paper focusing on trade-offs by individuals with an empirical part based on choice experiments, our paper thus also has implications for the more macroeconomic debate about the long-run relationship between migration and development. Third, the finding that part of our participants is unresponsive to changes in our migration scenarios has implications for migration policies. On one end, many people have no migration aspirations and may not even consider migrating. For them, the vast differences in living conditions between places are irrelevant, and as a consequence, so are changes in their capabilities. On the other, some people are so firmly set in their aspiration to migrate that even large changes in decision parameters (even larger than what we can realistically expect due to policy changes) do not sway their decision. Hence, they are unresponsive to most policies. That also matters for the interpretation of research because the two groups' unresponsiveness will cause estimates of the average treatment effects of policies to be lower than the treatment effect on those whose decisions can actually be affected.

Generally, our results reveal that destination and journey characteristics have a larger impact on the willingness to migrate than origin country dimensions, such as the income at home, its trend, or the quality of public services. The two most significant components in our experiment - legality and risk - are primarily determined by migration policies. That clearly indicates that migration policies are powerful not only because they determine people's migration capabilities but also because they affect migration aspirations. If migration policies can already affect migration aspirations, there is less need for policies that purely affect migration decisions via their effect on capabilities, such as restricting the movements of people willing to migrate. However, although many individuals will be significantly less inclined to migrate if the journey is risky and results in an illegal stay abroad, those who fundamentally embrace migration will not be affected. Our results thus paint a nuanced picture of what can be achieved with policies that aim to manage migration. In the restrictive, negative domain, in light of our paper's findings, it becomes clear why fighting irregular immigration has never been fully effective. In the more constructive, positive domain, our finding that creating legal pathways can generate new migration aspirations is a reason for optimism that the so far rather ineffective policies aimed at winning suitable labor migrants for aging Western labor markets can be far more successful. Self-selection into migration can be shaped by understanding and targeting the determinants of migration aspirations. The importance of life aspirations implies that by setting the right incentives, highly motivated individuals would not thus migrate but could

also be induced to obtain the skills required to make the most of migration, creating a brain gain effect. For this, they will need the opportunity to do so, which suggests that flanking migration policies with support to improve education is especially important. Such improvements in amenities would, in turn, induce some individuals to prefer remaining in the country of origin, creating gains for the origin country beyond the contribution from migrants. Given the high level of policy effectiveness, our paper documents that more constructive and more integrated policymaking in the area of migration, labor market, and development policies can create large gains for beneficiaries, be it migrants or non-migrants, destination countries, as well as origin countries.

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
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
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A: ADDITIONAL FIGURES

Figure A1. : Maps of the sampling locations in Senegal and Uganda




Panel A: Sampling locations in Senegal



Panel B: Sampling locations in Uganda

B: ROBUSTNESS CHECK: FORCED CHOICE

Figure B1. : Conjoint experiment: Determinants of conjoint scenario choice



Notes: OLS-Regression. Dependent variable is conjoint scenario choice (0 / 1). Baseline categories are given in brackets. The whiskers indicate the 95% confidence interval. Individuals that rate all scenarios with either the highest or the lowest rating and inconsistent responses are excluded from the analysis. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.