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Gianluca Grimalda, and David Pipke

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ABSTRACT

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Redistribution differs widely across countries, but our understanding of why this is the case is limited. In democracies, the extent of redistribution should ultimately reflect citizens' preferences. We measure preferences for redistribution in six developed countries through internationally standardized questions in which respondents are faced with realistic budgetary constraints on their choice. We also measure a broad array of demographic, attitudinal, and ideological characteristics and examine their correlations with the preferred pattern of redistribution. As expected, individual income is associated with lower demand for redistribution, but this relationship loses significance once other factors are controlled for. Beliefs on social mobility have, in the aggregate, the largest effect in reducing demand for redistribution, the effect being largest in the US but insignificant in Italy and Slovenia. Trust in government has a negative effect on demand for redistribution across all countries. In line with other studies, we interpret this result as evidence that people believing that the political élite is corrupt demand more redistribution. Financial security, a proxy for the Prospect of Upward Mobility hypothesis, is also a significant correlate of preferences for redistribution, the effect being largest in Japan but small in the UK and Slovenia. Finally, discrimination of racial minorities is associated with lower demand for redistribution, but the effect is only significant in the US and Germany. Overall, the main theories that have been proposed to account for preferences for redistribution are confirmed to be valid, but with significant variation across countries.

Gianluca Grimalda
Kiel Institute for the World Economy
Kiellinie 66
D-24105 Kiel, Germany
Email:
gianluca.gimalda@ifw-kiel.de
www.ifw-kiel.de

David Pipke
Kiel Institute for the World Economy
Kiellinie 66
D-24105 Kiel, Germany
Email:
david.pipke@ifw-kiel.de
www.ifw-kiel.de

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Gianluca Grimalda, David Pipke

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Abstract

Redistribution differs widely across countries, but our understanding of why this is the case is limited. In democracies, the extent of redistribution should ultimately reflect citizens' preferences. We measure preferences for redistribution in six developed countries through internationally standardized questions in which respondents are faced with realistic budgetary constraints on their choice. We also measure a broad array of demographic, attitudinal, and ideological characteristics and examine their correlations with the preferred pattern of redistribution. As expected, individual income is associated with lower demand for redistribution, but this relationship loses significance once other factors are controlled for. Beliefs on social mobility have, in the aggregate, the largest effect in reducing demand for redistribution, the effect being largest in the US but insignificant in Italy and Slovenia. Trust in government has a negative effect on demand for redistribution across all countries. In line with other studies, we interpret this result as evidence that people believing that the political élite is corrupt demand more redistribution. Financial security, a proxy for the Prospect of Upward Mobility hypothesis, is also a significant correlate of preferences for redistribution, the effect being largest in Japan but small in the UK and Slovenia. Finally, discrimination of racial minorities is associated with lower demand for redistribution, but the effect is only significant in the US and Germany. Overall, the main theories that have been proposed to account for preferences for redistribution are confirmed to be valid, but with significant variation across countries.

1 Introduction

Redistribution is one of the defining features of modern welfare states. Developed countries such as the United States and European democracies redistribute large proportions of their GDP via taxes, transfers, and public goods provision. Public social spending - an approximation[1] of the extent of redistribution amounted to 18.7% of GDP in the US compared to 28.2% in Italy and 25.9% in Germany in the year 2019, according to the OECD (2020). At the same time, these countries show notable differences in the extent of their redistribution policies (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011) which is reflected in how strongly market income inequality is decreased due to transfers and taxes[2]. E.g., the United States reveals a reduction of market income inequality by roughly 17%, whereas the OECD average being a substantially larger one-quarter reduction (Causa and Hermansen, 2019).

In democracies, governments' decisions should to a considerable extent reflect their citizens' demand for redistribution through a process of electoral competition and voting (Persson and Tabellini, 2000).

In spite of the relevance of this topic (Bartels, 2009), the investigation of the underlying determinants of preferences for redistribution from a cross-country perspective is lacking. Most of the existing evidence comes from surveys, where the measurement of preferences for redistribution is confounded with (often wrong) beliefs on the specific level of inequality in the respondent's country. Furthermore, purely categorical survey items capturing respondent's willingness to redistribute incomes likely mix preferences over the absolute size of the government with the progressiveness of the tax system as they do not face any budgetary constraint. This paper adresses some of these shortcomings using individual-level data from a six-country online-survey of representative samples from the population in the US, Germany, the UK, Italy, Slovenia, and Japan, part

[1] Neither are all branches of social public spending equally redistributive, nor does social spending cover the whole extent of redistribution (e.g. progressivity of the tax system).

[2] Causa and Hermansen (2019) calculate the relative reduction in market income inequality in terms of the Gini index, comparing the Gini index before and after income taxes, social security contributions, and cash transfers, relative to the Gini index before transfers and taxes.

of the Trustlab project (Murtin et al., 2018), contributing to the growing literature using international online-surveys of representative samples of the populations to explore individual preferences and attitudes (Kuziemko et al., 2015; Alesina, Stantcheva and Teso, 2018; Stantcheva, 2020). We examine redistributive preferences measured by preferred tax rates within internationally standardized questions, in which respondents are faced with realistic budgetary constraints on their choice (Alesina, Stantcheva and Teso, 2018; Alesina, Miano and Stantcheva, 2018). We then examine the correlational relationship of various possible determinants of the individual demand for redistribution with the preferred progressivity of the underlying tax scheme, which constitutes our main measure of preferences for redistribution, and compare their relevance in a set of countries.

In the standard economic model of public choice, economic agents favor redistributive policies if they expect to be net beneficiaries[3] and oppose them otherwise (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). A basic implication of this model is that we should observe increased demand for progressive taxation in countries experiencing higher inequalities. However, this prediction is clearly at odds with reality (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Shelton, 2007; Kenworthy and McCall, 2008; Dallinger, 2010). The subsequent literature has tried to incorporate a broader view of individuals' self-interest or to assume that individual preferences are affected by country-specific cultural or ideological traits. For example, it has been shown that the median voter may demand less redistribution when taking into account prospects of upward mobility[4] (the so-called "POUM hypothesis") (Benabou and Ok, 2001) or may be demanding more redistribution when considering the uncertainty of income against which redistribution may serve as an insurance device (Varian, 1980; Sinn, 1995).

Recent accounts of preferences for redistribution incorporating cultural or ideological determinants have focused on two ideas. The first idea is that beliefs about the fairness of the economic system and of the deservedness of the recipients of the welfare state benefits matter for preferences for redistribution (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). The role of beliefs has been studied extensively in theoretical models that incorporate multiple self-sustaining equilibria that evolve in the interaction of redistributive politics and beliefs (Piketty, 1995; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005*a*,*b*; Benabou and Tirole, 2006). Authors draw a line between "European" and "American" equilibria (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005*b*; Alesina, Stantcheva and Teso, 2018), that may have their origin in personal or dynastical experiences (Piketty, 1995), ideology serving as motivation device (Benabou and Tirole, 2006) or (historical) indoctrination (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007). The 'American' equilibrium is characterized by beliefs that the economic system is fair and grants opportunities to everyone to 'grow from rags to riches' and fulfil the "American Dream" of increased inter-generational prosperity. This equilibrium is supported by the meritocratic view that economic success is self-determined and well-deserved as it originates from high effort and/or ability (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). The poor are viewed as being largely responsible for their situation, e.g., due to being lazy or not sharing the same work ethic as the majority. Conversely, the "European" equilibrium hinges upon beliefs that economic success is predetermined by factors outside individual control (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). This is consistent with the view that high incomes are not fully deserved, but are rather the product of luck, birth, connections, or illicit behavior (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). Many studies confirm that beliefs of the "American" type are leading to lower demand for redistribution whereas the "European" type demands more redistribution. In this regard, the perceived fairness of the income-generating process, and in particular the extent to which it offers opportunities for upward mobility as well as beliefs about the reasons to be either rich or poor matter. A study of particular relevance is Alesina, Stantcheva and Teso (2018) who find Americans (Europeans) being over-optimistic (over-pessimistic) in the sense of estimating actual chances for upward mobility and showing lower (stronger) demand for redistribution. Providing respondents

[3]Most empirical studies on the demand for redistribution control for current individual income in absolute (Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2001; Luttmer, 2001; Fong, 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011) or relative terms (Corneo, 2001; Corneo and Grüner, 2002; Isaksson and Lindskog, 2009; Guillaud, 2013; Karadja, Mollerstrom and Seim, 2017; Rueda, 2018). Other studies account for material self-interest by the inclusion of proxy variables for the socio-economic status (Jaime-Castillo and Sáez-Lozano, 2014; Keely and Tan, 2008). Typically, studies find that rich persons have a lower demand for redistribution than the poor.

[4]Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) show for the US that support for redistribution is indeed negatively affected by future income prospects using panel data to construct objective transition probabilities to account for prospects of upward mobility. Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) find lower support for governmental redistribution among people who expect their welfare to fall in the next year. For European countries, Cojocaru (2014) finds that when risk aversion is low, expecting to earn more than average in the future for people currently earning less than average is related to lower support for redistribution compared to people who expect to stay below the average. Checchi and Filippin (2004) offer experimental evidence for the POUM hypothesis by evaluating subjects' demand for redistribution with respect to different income transition matrices. While the original POUM hypothesis targets at intragenerational mobility, Gavira, Graham and Braido (2007) find lower support for redistribution among those who have experienced intergenerational mobility relative to their parents, which is also confirmed by Alesina and Giuliano (2011) using education level differences as proxy variables.

with pessimistic information about intergenerational mobility has an enhancing effect on the support for redistribution in case of left-wing respondents, but no effect on right-wing respondents, probably due to prevailing distrust in government in case of the latter (Alesina, Stantcheva and Teso, 2018). Kuziemko et al. (2015) show that people who underestimate the prevalence of inequality do not necessarily react with higher redistribution demand after being informed about its real extent, claiming this is possibly due to distrust in the government, and consequently doubting the government will address the problem. Our paper is also closely related to studies using survey data (Fong, 2001; Corneo, 2001; Corneo and Grüner, 2002; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011) which find that preferences for redistribution are strongly negatively correlated with the perceived level of opportunities for social mobility and the belief that the poor are responsible for their economic situation.

An alternative account of cross-country differences in redistribution is based on racial and ethnic hostility between groups Alesina and Glaeser (2004). The key idea is that people from the racial or ethnic majority may decide to "shrink" the size of the welfare state, if they realize that the beneficiaries of redistribution are mainly adversary racial or ethnic groups. Accordingly, the larger racial and ethnic fractionalization in the US in comparison to Europe plays a major factor in accounting for differences in demand for redistribution (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Lee and Roemer, 2006). An implication of this account is that, as ethnic fractionalization increases in Europe due to increased migration, the European equilibrium could eventually converge to the American one. This account also receives empirical support. Public spending has been found to be inversely related to ethnic fragmentation (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999). Concordantly, historical evidence shows that US cities' public spending of redistributive nature declined in response to diversity-enhancing immigration in the early 20th century (Tabellini, 2020). Recent immigration flows have crucially strengthened diversity in Europe and have possibly already affected preferences for redistribution (Dahlberg, Edmark and Lundqvist, 2012; Alesina, Harnoss and Rapoport, n.d.). Redistribution is regularly found to be traveling less across racial groups (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011), which may be due to several channels. Probably the most studied channel are group loyalty effects (Tajfel, 1974; Luttmer, 2001). Evidence gained from the US suggests that racial differences have an effect as the generosity of white people depends on whether they suspect black people being overrepresented among transfer recipients (Luttmer, 2001; Fong and Luttmer, 2011). Economic considerations about immigrants may matter as well (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). Immigration may be perceived as a threat that may overburden the welfare state resulting in weaker preferences for redistribution. Alternatively, natives may fear increased labor market competition leading to stronger demand for redistribution, ceteris paribus (Finseraas, 2008; Senik, Stichnoth and van der Straeten, 2009; Burgoon, Koster and van Egmond, 2012; Alesina, Harnoss and Rapoport, n.d.; Alesina, Murard and Rapoport, 2019). Alesina, Miano and Stantcheva (2018) find that respondents, on average, hold exaggeratedly negative views about immigrants' reliance on the welfare state. Providing respondents with an informational treatment about a hard-working immigrant increases support for redistributive politics (Alesina, Miano and Stantcheva, 2018).

We begin our analysis by comparing the stated preferred tax rates across the six countries. We find that US respondents prefer on average the least progressive tax schemes. Somewhat unexpectedly, Italian respondents are very close to those from the US in their preferred tax rates. Tax preferences of Japanese respondents lie between those of US-American and Italian respondents on the one side and those of the more "pro-redistribution" respondents from Germany, Slovenia, and the UK on the other side. Exploring the correlational patterns of individual determinants for preferences for redistribution with the dependent variable, the top 40% of the income distribution prefer significantly less progressive tax schemes (measured by the difference between preferred tax rates on the top 1% and bottom 50%) than respondents from the bottom 40% ($p < 0.001$, t-test). This difference, however, loses significance when controlling for future income expectations and social mobility beliefs. Respondents who are optimistic about their future economic situation slightly prefer less progressive schemes. These results are in line with the POUM hypothesis (Benabou and Ok, 2001) and suggest that expectations about the future count more than current income in shaping preferences for redistribution. Furthermore, we find that perceived social mobility opportunities as offered by the society are strongly negatively correlated with preferred progressivity. The inspection of country-wise regressions indicates a remarkable heterogeneity in this association, which is strongly significant in the US, Germany, and the UK but appears to be almost irrelevant in Italy and Slovenia. The relationship of attitudes towards immigrants and progressivity preferences reveals an even more pronounced heterogeneity. Both are statistically significantly positively related in the US and to a lesser extent in Germany, while the relationship is statistically insignificant in the other four countries. Our results indicate that what matters most in attitudes towards immigrants is the perceived effect immigrants may have on the culture in the host

country whereas their perceived level of integration appears to be relatively irrelevant. We also find that trust in government is negatively correlated with preferences for redistribution in all countries from our sample. This is in contrast to some studies that find a relationship of opposite sign, which is consistent with the view that people need to have trust in the government's competencies in order to favour redistribution (Yamamura, 2014; Stantcheva, 2020). However, other studies (e.g., Di Tella, Dubra and Lagomarsino (2016) and Barnes (2015)) also find a negative correlation between trust in government and demand for redistribution. In particular, Di Tella, Dubra and Lagomarsino (2016) find that trust in government goes hand-in-hand with trust in financial elites. This suggests that a channel explaining our results is the following. If people believe that the society elites (including both politicians and business leaders) are corrupt, then they will find a stronger case for redistribution, in analogy to the argument that preferences for redistribution go hand-in-hand with beliefs over the deservedness of the rich.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the OECD Trustlab as our data source and we briefly summarize the structure of the survey with an emphasis on those parts used in this study. In Section 3 we show the results of our analysis. We start with a description of relevant attitudes and views across the six countries in our sample before we present our findings about the preferred tax rates. Section 4 concludes.

2 Survey, Data, and Methods

2.1 The Trustlab

Our data come from the OECD's Trustlab project. The Trustlab is an international initiative that has been run in eight countries (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Slovenia, United Kingdom, and the United States) so far. The initiative combines various techniques (e.g. psychometric measures, economic experiments) from different disciplines such as behavioral science and experimental economics with a large-scale survey on respondents' characteristics, attitudinal variables, measures of trust, and preferences for redistribution. The initiative studies the determinants of trust and social preferences from a cross-country perspective. With the data containing more than 1,000 respondents per country chosen to be nationally representative for the working age population (defined as those aged 15 to 64) in terms of age, gender and income, the Trustlab overcomes one of the main criticisms of the experimental approach, i.e. the focus on university students samples. Data collection took place online between November 2016 and February 2020[5]. Since the question which we use to analyze redistributive preferences was included in Germany, Italy, Japan, Slovenia, the UK and the US only, our analysis is restricted to these six countries.

2.2 The Survey

The survey is the third and final of Trustlab's modules. The Trustlab survey covers a broad, mixed range of questions targeting at measuring trust and its potential determinants[6]. Respondents arrive at the survey screen after having completed a series of economic experiments and implicit association tests in the first and second modules of the online platform, respectively (see Murtin et al., 2018, for a detailed explanation of the first two modules). The questionnaire in English[7] can be found in the Appendix. We briefly summarize the structure of the survey with an emphasis on those parts that are important for the understanding of our results. The structure is essentially the same in all participating countries.

Social norms and interpersonal trust. — After checking which device the respondent uses to browse on the platform, the survey starts with a mixed range of questions on social norms and trust in other people.

Trust in government. — The second block of questions deals with trust in public and private institutions followed by a battery of questions concerning satisfaction with the quality of the government. Trust in the government in its most general form is elicited by simply asking respondents how much they trust the government. Answers could thereby range on a scale between 0 "I don't trust them at all" and 10 "I completely trust them". Additionally, respondents were asked to state their level of agreement with certain statements focussing on specific dimensions of the perceived quality of public institutions. Evaluated dimensions cover

[5]Data collection of the first wave started in November 2016 in France followed by Korea in January 2017. The second wave includes data from Slovenia (April 2017), the US (June 2017), Germany (August 2017), and Italy (November 2017). Data from the UK is from March 2018 and Japanese data is from February 2020.

[6]Most of the questions are measured on a 10-point Likert scale.

[7]The questionnaire has been translated for each participating country to ensure thorough understanding and compatibility with the local culture.

the reliability ("Public institutions deliver public services in the best possible way."), responsiveness ("Public institutions pursue long term objectives."), integrity ("People working in public institutions are ethical and not corrupt."), transparency or openness ("Public institutions are transparent.") and non-discrimination ("Public institutions treat all citizens fairly regardless of their gender, race, age or economic condition.") of the government[8]. Answers could range between 0 "I don't agree at all" and 10 "I completely agree".

Preferred tax rates. — The survey block about trust in the government and an evaluation of the government's competencies is followed by a question on preferred tax rates, from which we derive the dependent variables in the regressions later on. Respondents are asked to state their preferred fair split[9] of the tax burden in their country on specific groups of the income distribution to sustain current public spending. The four groups are the top 1%, the next 9%, the next 40% and the bottom 50% of the income distribution. Respondents chose tax rates by moving sliders on the survey screen. A fifth slider below the other sliders moves simultaneously and turns green when the respondent's choice raises enough revenue. To ensure economically meaningful answers keeping the size of the government fixed, tax rates are restricted to generate a budget for the government between 97% and 103% of the revenue implied by a proportional (flat) tax rate of 25%. Revenues are calculated based on an OECD-average income distribution from the OECD Income Distribution Database. Thus, tax rates are measuring preferred progressivity as opposed to be confounded by concerns about the absolute size of the government. The chosen tax rates constitute our main variables of interest measuring preferences for redistribution, similar to Alberto Alesina, Stefanie Stantcheva and Edoardo Teso (2018) and Alberto Alesina, Armando Miano and Stefanie Stantcheva (2018). In contrast to commonly used survey measures, the chosen tax rates allow for a more quantitative examination of redistributive preferences. High (low) tax rates on the rich (poor) are interpreted as a sign of support for redistributive policies.

Social mobility beliefs. — In the Trustlab survey, beliefs about opportunities for social mobility are elicited by the following question: "Some people say there is not much opportunity to get ahead today for the average person. Others say anyone who works hard can climb up the ladder. Which one comes closer to the way you feel about this?". Answers range between 0 "There is not much opportunity" and 10 "There is plenty of opportunities".

Economic security. — Respondents were asked to state expectations about their household's financial situation in the next year by the following question. "When it comes to the financial situation of your household, what are your expectations for the 12 months to come, will the next 12 months be better, worse, or the same?" where 0 "Worse", 5 "The same" 10 "Better". The evaluation of one's personal economic prospects may serve as a proxy for the POUM hypothesis (Benabou and Ok, 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005), as for example Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) use a similar question. Additionally, respondents were asked to evaluate the likelihoods (i) of keeping their current job as well as (ii) of finding a new job within 6 months in case they lose their current job, both on a scale between 0 "Very unlikely" and 10 "Very likely". The remainder of the survey covers several other issues[10] of which we introduce those which we use in the following analysis.

Attitudes towards immigrants. — The survey includes several questions asking about views on immigrants. The first asks to assess the integration of immigrants on a scale between 0 "Immigrants are not integrated into our society" and 10 "Immigrants are well integrated into our society". The second question is about the effect that immigrants may have on the culture in the host country. Respondents may choose between 0 "Our culture is undermined by immigrants" and 10 "Our culture is enriched by immigrants" expressing the strength to which they believe in multiculturism. Attitudes towards immigrants may be important for redistributive preferences due to several reasons as discussed above. The first question is thought to be more related to the economic considerations about immigration, i.e. whether people think of immigrants as needier and relatively more dependent on the welfare state, whereas we interpret the second as a measure of general preferences for diversity. These two measures are complemented by a question on racial prejudices in which participants are asked to state their opinion on whether they believe that immigrants are on average less economically successful because of discrimination and reasons out of their control ("0" on the scale measuring prejudices) or due to lower ability, motivation, and effort ("10" on the scale). We also consider the stated

[8]Besides those direct measures of government's reliability, responsiveness, integrity, openess and non-discrimination these dimension are complemented by asking how the government would react in practical situations related to these issues.

[9]The exact wording in the survey is: "The government currently raises a certain amount of revenues through tax in order to sustain the current level of public spending. In your view, what would be the fair split of tax burden to sustain public spending? Please use the sliders below to tell us how much you think each of the following groups should pay as a percentage of their available resources. Each slider represents a segment of the population with a different income. For example, the top 1% represents a small group of rich people, whereas the bottom 50% is the half of the population that earns the least."

[10]Those questions cover attitudes to international trade, which technologies are used to obtain information, the perceived share of immigrants in the respondent's neighborhood and the extent to which the respondent feels connected to other people.

Table 1: Sample Characteristics

	USA		GER		GBR		ITA		SVN		JPN	
	S	P	S	P	S	P	S	P	S	P	S	P
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Female	0.51	0.51	0.50	0.51	0.54	0.51	0.66 (0.51)	0.52	0.49	0.50	0.49	0.52
Age: 15-24	0.10	0.14	0.11	0.15	0.13	0.18	0.15 (0.12)	0.15	0.11	0.14	0.11	0.16
Age: 25-54	0.57	0.64	0.67	0.60	0.67	0.62	0.71 (0.69)	0.63	0.68	0.64	0.66	0.63
Age: 55-64	0.33	0.22	0.21	0.25	0.19	0.20	0.14 (0.19)	0.22	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.21
Low income	0.50	0.40	0.36	0.40	0.59	0.40	0.47 (0.47)	0.40	0.67	0.40	0.24	0.40
Medium income	0.20	0.20	0.23	0.20	0.19	0.20	0.20 (0.19)	0.20	0.15	0.20	0.15	0.20
High income	0.31	0.40	0.41	0.40	0.22	0.40	0.32 (0.34)	0.40	0.17	0.40	0.62	0.40
Low educ.	0.20	0.40	0.29	0.26	0.50	0.21	0.48 (0.51)	0.39	0.49	0.56	0.41	0.15
Medium educ.	0.38	0.28	0.37	0.56	0.15	0.34	0.18 (0.17)	0.42	0.16	0.21	0.11	0.38
High educ.	0.42	0.32	0.34	0.18	0.34	0.46	0.34 (0.32)	0.19	0.35	0.24	0.48	0.28
Employed	0.55	0.57	0.62	0.65	0.56	0.64	0.55 (0.56)	0.65	0.63	0.48	0.53	0.52
Self-employed	0.08	0.04	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.12	0.10 (0.11)	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.10	0.05
Unemployed	0.12	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.10	0.03	0.13 (0.11)	0.02	0.11	0.04	0.04	0.03
Out of labor force	0.25	0.37	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.21	0.22 (0.22)	0.26	0.20	0.42	0.32	0.40
Obs.	1,090		1,108		1,053		1,458 (1,016)		1,011		2,504	

Notes: Table displays means of sample characteristics and their respective values in the working age (15-65 years old) population. Low, medium and high income correspond to the first two, the third and the last two quintiles of the income distribution, respectively. Low education corresponds to an High School degree or less. Medium education equals vocational education or community college degree. High education corresponds to a University degree. Population statistics taken from nationally representative sources shortly listed here: (i) Age and gender statistics taken from the CIA World Fact Book (for all countries). (ii) Educational attainment statistics from the United States Census Bureau (USA), Statistisches Bundesamt (GER, 2018), OECD.Stat (GBR, 2018 and ITA, 2017), Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia (SVN, 2017), National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (JPN, 2017). (iii) Employment statistics from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (USA, 2018), Statistisches Bundesamt (GER, 2018), Labor Force Survey (GBR, 2018), Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (ITA, 2016), Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia (SVN, 2017), National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (JPN, 2017). See the Appendix for a more detailed description of data sources.

level of trust in immigrants.

Personal information. — The remainder of the survey collects additional personal information about the respondents. Respondents were asked to place their political orientation on a scale between 0 "Left" and 10 "Right". They were also asked for demographics such as gender and age, the place of residence, religious denomination, information about the respondent's and his or her parents' nationality and migration history as well as the educational attainment of the respondent and his parents. Furthermore, the Trustlab gathers information about the labor force status and the sector the respondent works in as well as about his or her income.

2.3 Summary Statistics

Table 1 shows summary statistics of the sample characteristics in each country side-by-side to their respective population means taken from nationally representative sources. Sample means are relatively close to their population values, especially along the targeted dimensions of age and gender. The sample's income distribution reflects quite closely the real income distribution in the US, Germany, and Italy. In the UK and Slovenia, people from the lower two quintiles have been oversampled whereas the Japanese sample contains more people from the top two quintiles than would be representative. The other non-targeted dimensions such as education and employment status are not as representative of the population as the targeted dimension, but they are not too dissimilar to the real distribution. The share of females in the Italian sample is significantly higher than in the other sampled countries because it has been supplemented by an extra sampling of 442 women of childbearing age to analyze fertility intentions (see Aassve et al., 2018). Summary statistics for the original Italian sample are denoted in parentheses resembling the population values more closely.

Figure 1: Attitudinal Variables by Country



Note: This figure shows mean answer score and the respective 95 percent confidence interval in the indicated country sample below the graph.

3 Results

We first discuss descriptive findings from the survey before we analyze the correlational pattern of attitudes, views, expectations, and redistributive preferences in a regression analysis.

3.1 Views, Attitudes and Expectations

Figure 1 shows the means and 95 percent confidence intervals from the variables of interest on a 11-point Likert scale (introduced in Section 2.2) broken up by country of survey. In Figure 2 we depict means of the same variables by personal characteristics. The first row of both graphics shows the mean answer to the evaluation of opportunities for social mobility offered by society. The next three rows deal with expectations about the financial situation of the household in the next year, the likelihood of keeping the current occupation, and the likelihood of finding a new one in case one loses the current, respectively. In the fifth and the sixth row, we show the mean answer score related to attitudes towards immigrants, i.e. an assessment of their integration and their effect on the culture of the host country. We also depict the survey measures of racial prejudices and trust in immigrants. The remaining rows show means of stated risk aversion, the importance of religion, political orientation (towards the right) and trust in the government.

Social mobility. — Beliefs about social mobility opportunities are highest in the US, closely followed by Germany. Both countries show similar mean scores, which seems to be in contrast with the so-called "American exceptionalism" hypothesis Lipset (1996); Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001). In contrast, respondents from Japan are most skeptical about opportunities "to climb the social ladder" by working hard in their country. Respondents from Italy, the UK, and Slovenia are between both extremes. Among personal characteristics, most noticeable is the difference between political extremes. Right-wing respondents have a significantly more positive assessment of social mobility opportunities than left-wing respondents.

Expectations about economic security. — We explore the answers to three questions inquiring about optimism over the respondents' economic situation. The first question is about the financial situation in the

Figure 2: Attitudinal Variables by Characteristic



Note: This figure shows the mean answer scores and their 95 percent confidence intervals for the subgroups defined by the indicated characteristics below the figure. Right-wing (left-wing) respondents are those stating a political orientation of 7 or above (3 or below) on the scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right). Low education corresponds to an High School degree or less. High education corresponds to a University degree. Low and high income correspond to the first two and the last two quintiles of the income distribution, respectively.

next year, whereas the second is about the likelihood of keeping the current job if one is employed and the third about the likelihood of finding a new job in case the respondent loses their contemporary occupation. US and German respondents are most optimistic about their economic situation in the near future but respondents from the UK are only marginally behind. The picture in the other countries is slightly more mixed. Japanese are the least optimistic concerning their financial situation in the next year, whereas Slovenians are by far the most pessimistic concerning the possibility of finding a new occupation. Non-surprisingly, when looking at personal characteristics, these expectations are more positive among the highly educated and those with a high income. Right-wing respondents also report, on average, higher confidence concerning their future economic situation than those respondents leaning to the political left.

Attitudes towards immigrants. — The first two questions asking about views on immigrants are related to their perceived level of integration and their effect on the culture in the host country. Additionally, we examine racial prejudices (not included in the Slovenian survey) and stated trust in immigrants. Generally, we observe a positive correlation between a country's ethnic and racial diversity and the tendency to hold positive views about immigrants. Respondents from the US hold the most positive views about immigrants concerning both their integration and their effect on the culture and they also report the highest level of trust in immigrants. At the other end of the spectrum, respondents from ethnically homogenous Japan and Slovenia have the most negative news over immigrants. Attitudes of Germans and respondents from the UK are somewhat more favorable toward immigrants than those from Italy who state average scores slightly to the left of the center. Again, when looking at personal characteristics, political orientation is defining. Right-wing respondents have significantly less positive attitudes towards immigrants than left-wing respondents. The same pattern holds, albeit less markedly, for respondents with low education vis-a-vis the highly educated, but not in the dimension of low vs. high incomes.

Trust in government and political orientation. — Mean scores of trust in the government are left to the center in all countries. Germans report the highest trust levels, followed by respondents from the US. Italians and Slovenians trust their governments the least. Germans, Italians, and respondents from the UK, on average, state a political orientation that is close to the center. Respondents from the US are a bit more leaning to the right, whereas Slovenias state to be a bit more left-wing, on average. There is little variation with respect to personal characteristics in both - political orientation and trust in the government, with the marginal note that right-wing respondents show, on average, more trust in the government than respondents from the political left.

3.2 Preferred Tax Schemes

Figure 3 depicts the mean values of preferred tax rates and their 95 percent confidence intervals in each country[11]. The tax rates reveal a clear pattern of similarity in preferred tax rates between US Americans and Italy at one side of the spectrum and respondents from Germany, Slovenia, and the UK at the other side [12]. Tax preferences of Japanese respondents lie somewhere in between the other groups.

US Americans and Italians, on average, both chose comparatively low tax rates on the "richest" percent and high tax rates on the poor half of the income distribution, which we interpret as relatively regressive redistribution preferences. Two-sided t-tests against the null of equal means between US and Italycannot be rejected ($p = 0.29$ and $p = 0.74$ for tax rate on the top 1 percent and bottom 50 percent, respectively). On the contrary, respondents from Germany, Slovenia and the UK reveal more progressive preferences as they chose a relatively high burden on the top 1 percent and a relatively small burden on the bottom 50 percent. A one-way ANOVA can neither reject the null of equal means for the tax rate on the top 1 percent nor for the tax rate on the bottom 50 percent among these three countries ($p = 0.34$ and $p = 0.18$, respectively). In contrast, pairwise t-tests against the null of equal means of the top 1 percent and bottom 50 percent tax rate between the US or Italian samples versus either of the Germany, Slovenia or UK sample are all highly significant ($p < 0.001$, see Appendix). This pattern is confirmed by the mean difference between the chosen top 1 percent and the bottom 50 percent tax rates shown in Figure 4.

[11] Detailed summary statistics can be found in the Appendix.

[12] This is confimed by an analysis in the Appendix. When we classify tax schemes into progressive and regressive schemes, the share of respondents from the US and Italy choosing tax schemes classified as progressive is significantly lower in than the other countries whereas the share of respondents choosing regressive tax schemes is significantly larger.

Figure 3: Preferred Tax Rates by Country



Note: This figure shows the average chosen tax rates in percentage points in each country. Whiskers span the 95 percent confidence interval.

3.3 Regression results

In the following regression analysis, we examine the association of redistributive preferences with the explanatory variables. The difference in preferred tax rates on the top 1 percent and the bottom 50 percent of the income distribution is the dependent variable that measures the preferred progressivity of the underlying tax scheme. We estimated several specifications to test for the explanatory power and significance of different theoretical drivers of preferences for redistribution. All of the regressions contain country dummies with the US serving as the reference category. Regression tables showing coefficients for all control variables may be found in the Appendix.

Table 2 reports our key regression results. First, it is noteworthy that the country dummies for Germany, the UK, and Slovenia remain positive, highly significant, and of roughly the same size relative to the US throughout all specifications as in the unconditional mean comparisons (see Figure 4). This indicates the prevalence of relatively stronger preferences for redistribution in these countries compared to the US even after controlling for the set of variables in the model. Opposed to this, the dummy for Italy is non-significant in all regressions confirming the relative closeness to the US. Only the country dummy for Japan loses significance when adding more explanatory variables, which indicates that these additional variables explain part of the difference vis-à-vis the US.

We find that income is not the defining determinant for redistributive preferences in the pooled sample as neither the dummy for the low-income category nor the dummy for the high-income category reaches significance in any specification with medium incomes serving as the reference category [13]. However, participants in the high-income category prefer lower progressivity than participants from the low-income category ($p = 0.027$, Wald test, specification in column (1) of table 2). On the other hand, individuals' expectations about their future income are significantly negatively associated with the preferred difference between the top and

[13] Regressions omitting the measure for perceived financial security in the next twelve months show that the dummy for high income people *almost* reaches significance at the 5 percent level. Since financial security serving as a proxy for the POUM is higher for people with higher incomes this may indicate some multicollinearity. Those regressions may be found as robustness checks in the Appendix.

Figure 4: Preferred Progressivity: Difference between Top and Bottom Tax Rates



Note: This figure shows the average chosen difference between tax rates on the top 1 percent and on the bottom 50 percent in each country. Whiskers span the 95 percent confidence interval.

bottom tax rates, supporting the POUM hypothesis. Higher trust in government is negatively associated with preferred progressivity of the underlying tax schemes - or, to frame differently, stronger distrust in the government correlates with stronger preferences for redistribution. As expected, beliefs about social mobility show a strong association with the dependent variables. People thinking of their society as meritocratic are more averse to redistribution. Furthermore, more positive attitudes towards immigrants[14] are associated with slightly stronger preferences for redistribution in the pooled regression.

Additional regressions in the Appendix (table A.13) show that the coefficient for risk aversion has the expected sign. Risk aversion is associated with a stronger preference for redistribution, significant at the 1 percent level. Consistent with the interpretation that religion may act as a substitute for social insurance (Corneo, 2004; Scheve and Stasavage, 2006; Guillaud, 2013), we find that people stating a higher importance of religion are more averse to redistribution.

Cross-country comparison. — Table 3 shows regressions estimated for each country subsample separately. These regressions enable us to explore whether some factors are relevant for redistributive preferences in all countries or only in a subset. The complete regression tables may be found in the Appendix.

Beginning with income, we see that neither the dummies indicating being in low-income group or in the high-income group, respectively, have a coefficient significantly different from zero in any country. Financial security, on the other hand, shows a negative correlation with preferred progressivity, although being significant from a statistical point of view only in Japan and the US. Interestingly, beliefs about opportunities for social mobility showing strongly significant coefficients in the aggregate are practically irrelevant for the preferred progressivity in the Italian and Slovenian subsample. Opposed to this, trust in government shows a statistically significant negative coefficient in all six countries, with the pairwise Wald tests showing no significant differences across countries relative to the US constituting the reference point. In the US subsample,

[14] We use the average score of the perceived effect of immigrants on the culture in the host country and the perceived level of integration of immigrants to measure attitudes towards immigrants. Results are robust to use stated trust in immigrants or racial prejudices (with reversed sign), whereof the latter measure has many missing values and was not included in the Slovenian survey.

Table 2: Main Regression Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GER	7.025****	7.481****	6.975****	7.902****	7.618****	6.831****
	(1.07)	(1.07)	(1.07)	(1.10)	(1.09)	(1.08)
GBR	5.891****	5.593****	4.930****	5.886****	5.498****	4.407****
	(1.13)	(1.12)	(1.12)	(1.16)	(1.16)	(1.11)
ITA	0.255	-0.612	-0.867	-0.231	-0.188	-0.968
	(1.13)	(1.13)	(1.13)	(1.16)	(1.16)	(1.12)
SVN	7.428****	6.351****	5.854****	7.639****	7.399****	6.267****
	(1.21)	(1.20)	(1.21)	(1.28)	(1.28)	(1.24)
JPN	2.796***	2.708**	1.882*	2.517**	2.001*	1.358
	(1.06)	(1.06)	(1.07)	(1.13)	(1.13)	(1.05)
Low income	0.98	0.793	0.746	0.611	0.449	
	(0.84)	(0.85)	(0.85)	(0.88)	(0.87)	
High income	-0.711	-0.739	-0.493	-0.717	-0.576	
	(0.83)	(0.83)	(0.84)	(0.87)	(0.87)	
Financial security	-1.584****	-1.128****	-0.683****	-1.236****	-0.751****	-0.818****
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Trust in government		-1.190****	-0.915****	-1.224****	-0.954****	-0.972****
		(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Social mobility			-1.127****		-1.186****	-1.177****
			(0.14)		(0.15)	(0.15)
Attitudes immigrants				0.351**	0.479***	0.446***
				(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Constant	29.47****	31.64****	34.66****	30.15****	32.30****	36.25****
	(1.93)	(1.96)	(2.01)	(2.26)	(2.28)	(1.55)
Controls						
Age, Gender	x	x	x	x	x	
Migration background	x	x	x	x	x	
Occupation	x	x	x	x	x	
Education	x	x	x	x	x	
Obs.	7854	7762	7577	7125	7025	7026
R2	0.0346	0.0443	0.0532	0.0465	0.0553	0.0501
Adj. R2	0.0327	0.0422	0.051	0.0441	0.0528	0.0489

Notes: Table shows OLS regressions. Dependent variable is the preferred difference between tax rates on the top 1 percent and the bottom 50 percent. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, **** $p < 0.001$. GER, GBR, ITA, SVN, and JPN are country dummies for the respondent's residence with the United States serving as the reference category. Low income (High income) is a dummy for household income from the first (last) two quintiles. Financial security is the answer to the question "When it comes to the financial situation of your household, what are your expectations for the 12 months to come, will the next 12 months be better, worse, or the same?" where 0 "Worse", 5 "The same" 10 "Better". Trust in government is the answer score to the general trust in government question where 0 "I don't trust them at all" and 10 "I completely trust them". Social mobility is the answer score to the question on about opportunities to climb the social ladder where 0 "There is not much opportunity" and 10 "There is plenty of opportunities". Attitudes immigrants is the average of both questions related to their perceived level of integration and their effect on the culture in the host country.

preferred progressivity shows a strongly statistically significant positive association with attitudes towards immigrants whereas the coefficient remains largely non-significant in the other countries. Subsequent Wald tests indicate that the US coefficient is statistically significantly larger than in the UK, Italy, and Japan whereas the difference to Germany and Slovenia is less pronounced.

Heterogeneity Analysis. — Table 4 shows the results of a heterogeneity analysis with respect to four key respondent characteristics which were found to be crucial in determining redistributive preferences (Fong, 2001; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Alesina, Miano and Stantcheva, 2018). The dimensions of heterogeneity are the "right-wing" (defined as stating a 7 or above on the 10-point political orientation scale), the "rich" (belonging to the two top quintiles of household income), the "highly educated" (having a university degree) and females. The heterogeneity is explored by interacting the relevant characteristics with the explanatory variable of interest such that the interaction term gives the difference in coefficient size relative to respondents not falling into the respective category. More detailed regression tables may be found in the Appendix.

The regressions indicate that there is little heterogeneity across the examined categories concerning the association of social mobility, attitudes towards immigrants, and trust in the government with the dependent variable. An exception are attitudes towards immigrants among the political right-wing, which are, unlike in the whole sample, negatively correlating with preferred progressivity of the tax scheme (-0.8539, s.e. = 0.3241). The number of observations is significantly lower in the model from the first column due to a large number of respondents refusing to state their political orientation in the survey.

Post-regression accounting. — In Table 5 we provide a simple post-regression accounting, akin to Corneo (2001). The purpose is to explore how much the explanatory variables can explain of the observed cross-country differences in the preferred progressivity, measured as the difference between the tax rate on the top 1 percent and the bottom 50 percent. To this end, we use the coefficients from the pooled regression (fifth column in table 2) and multiply them with the difference in means of the respective explanatory variable between the country from the first row relative to the US-sample mean. As such, the cells in table 5 show the quantity $\beta_k(x_k^i - x_k^{US})$ in which j is one of the other five countries.

The interpretation is as follows. The actual observed difference between the top and bottom tax rates between German respondents and those from the US is 6.63 percentage points. The country dummy alone explains more than the full magnitude of this observed difference. Differences in means of social mobility beliefs account for roughly 1/20 of the difference, as those beliefs are slightly higher in the US than in Germany but the sign of the respective coefficient is negative. Summing up the contribution of all individual-level predictors, the model evaluated at the sample average predicts a difference of about 6.47 percentage points in the preferred progressivity of both countries. While the explanatory power of our main predictors is the least impressive in the comparison of Germany and the US, this is not the case for the other countries. For example, differences in means of social mobility beliefs can explain more than one-third of the cross-country difference in progressivity between the US and Japan. This exercise offers two main insights. First, in most of the pairwise comparisons, the country dummies capture most of the observed country difference which may particularly point to cross-cultural variation. Second, cross-country differences in social mobility beliefs, attitudes towards immigrants, and trust in government matter as well, especially when comparing Italy and Japan to the US.

Robustness checks. — We performed several robustness checks. First, we have run several regressions in which we replaced the composite score thought to be a measure of attitudes towards immigrants by other proxies (see Appendix table A.13). Those are the original answer scores concerning the integration of immigrants and their perceived impact on the culture of the host country as well as stated trust in immigrants and a question on racial prejudices (which has not been part of the questionnaire in Slovenia). Results using these alternative measures are qualitatively equivalent, and coefficients of the other explanatory variables remain largely unaffected. Respondents stating to have higher trust in immigrants are also preferring more progressive taxation. Consistently, stronger racial prejudices are associated with a smaller preferred difference between top and bottom tax rates. The negative correlation between racial prejudices and redistributive preferences prevails statistically strongly significant even after controlling for political orientation. The evaluation of immigrants' integration shows a positive, albeit statistically non-significant coefficient. Opposed to this, the coefficient of the perceived effect of immigration on the culture in the host country is positive and strongly significant from a statistical point of view. Taken together, the strong significance of racial prejudices and the higher relevance of the perceived cultural effects of immigration may indicate that the correlation between attitudes towards immigrants and redistributive preferences is driven more by xenophobia or group loyalty than by considerations about the economic effects of immigration.

A similar exercise in which we replaced trust in government in its general form by perceptions of the gov-

Table 3: Country-wise regressions

	USA	GER	GBR	ITA	SVN	JPN
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Low income	-0.0748	2.865	1.909	-1.336	-0.93	-0.725
	(1.99)	(2.01)	(2.15)	(2.00)	(2.34)	(2.27)
High income	-1.624	2.07	-0.496	-2.342	-3.278	0.7
	(2.05)	(1.94)	(2.39)	(2.04)	(2.86)	(1.86)
Financial security	-0.792*	-0.58	-0.031	-0.731	-0.324	-1.468****
	(0.45)	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.46)	(0.48)	(0.35)
Trust in government	-1.160****	-0.681*	-0.882***	-1.059***	-0.983**	-0.743**
	(0.34)	(0.36)	(0.33)	(0.37)	(0.45)	(0.29)
Social mobility	-2.192****	-1.797****	-2.045****	-0.0992	-0.451	-0.857***
	(0.38)	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.40)	(0.42)	(0.31)
Attitudes immigrants	1.512****	0.696*	0.13	0.0625	0.634	0.19
	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.35)	(0.41)	(0.45)	(0.37)
Constant	30.02****	36.60****	36.96****	31.30****	35.27****	36.26****
	(5.32)	(4.49)	(5.17)	(4.92)	(5.70)	(4.54)
Controls						
Age, Gender	x	x	x	x	x	x
Migration background	x	x	x	x	x	x
Occupation	x	x	x	x	x	x
Education	x	x	x	x	x	x
Obs.	972	1016	935	1362	875	1865
R2	0.131	0.0717	0.0976	0.0215	0.0298	0.0491
Adj. R2	0.118	0.0587	0.0839	0.0113	0.0141	0.0419
Tests against nullhypothesis of jointly equal coefficients						
Attitudes towards immigrants	p = 0.089					
Social mobility	p = 0.000					
Trust in government	p = 0.914					
Pairwise tests vs. USA						
Attitudes towards immigrants		p = 0.159	p = 0.009	p = 0.012	p = 0.146	p = 0.016
Social mobility		p = 0.442	p = 0.778	p = 0.000	p = 0.002	p = 0.007
Trust in government		p = 0.329	p = 0.552	p = 0.838	p = 0.750	p = 0.348

Notes: Table shows OLS regressions. Dependent variable is the preferred difference between tax rates on the top 1 percent and the bottom 50 percent. The regression model is the same as in column 5 of the main regression results table. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Tests against equality of coefficients using seemingly unrelated estimations (STATA's suest command). Low income (High income) is a dummy for household income from the first (last) two quintiles. Financial security is the answer to the question "When it comes to the financial situation of your household, what are your expectations for the 12 months to come, will the next 12 months be better, worse, or the same?" where 0 "Worse", 5 "The same" 10 "Better". Trust in government is the answer score to the general trust in government question where 0 "I don't trust them at all" and 10 "I completely trust them". Social mobility is the answer score to the question on about opportunities to climb the social ladder where 0 "There is not much opportunity" and 10 "There is plenty of opportunities". Attitudes immigrants is the average of both questions related to their perceived level of integration and their effect on the culture in the host country.

Table 4: Heterogeneity with respect to personal characteristics

	(1) H = Right-wing	(2) H = High Inc.	(3) H = High Education	(4) H = Female
Social mobility	-1.113****	-1.034****	-1.099****	-1.445****
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.21)
Attitudes immigrants	0.830****	0.577***	0.461**	0.605***
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Trust in government	-0.779****	-1.038****	-0.792****	-0.734****
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.20)
H × Social mobility	3.024	-0.421	-0.231	0.507*
	(2.18)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)
H × Attitudes immigrants	-1.684****	-0.271	0.03	-0.253
	(0.38)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.31)
H × Trust in government	0.0518	0.224	-0.38	-0.438
	(0.35)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)
N	6096	7025	7025	7025
R2	0.0752	0.0558	0.0559	0.0561
Adj. R2	0.0717	0.0529	0.0529	0.0531

Notes: Table shows OLS regressions. Dependent variable is the preferred difference between tax rates on the top 1 percent and the bottom 50 percent. The regression model is the same as in column 5 of table 2, adding interactions of "H" with social mobility beliefs, attitudes towards immigrants and trust in government. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, **** $p < 0.001$. Right-wing is a dummy for a political orientation of 6 and above on the scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right). High income is a dummy for household income from the first (last) two quintiles. High education is a dummy for having a tertiary degree. Financial security is the answer to the question "When it comes to the financial situation of your household, what are your expectations for the 12 months to come, will the next 12 months be better, worse, or the same?" where 0 "Worse", 5 "The same" 10 "Better". Trust in government is the answer score to the general trust in government question where 0 "I don't trust them at all" and 10 "I completely trust them". Social mobility is the answer score to the question on about opportunities to climb the social ladder where 0 "There is not much opportunity" and 10 "There is plenty of opportunities". Attitudes immigrants is the average of both questions related to their perceived level of integration and their effect on the culture in the host country.

Table 5: Post-regression accounting

	GER	GBR	ITA	SVN	JPN
Financial security	0.18	0.60	0.61	0.50	1.11
Trust in government	-0.42	0.50	1.01	0.86	0.46
Social mobility	0.31	1.00	0.99	1.16	1.57
Attitudes immigrants	-0.46	-0.46	-0.75	-0.98	-0.91
Controls	-0.75	-1.00	-0.66	-1.01	-0.48
Country dummy	7.62	5.50	-0.19	7.40	2.00
Predicted diff.	6.47	6.14	1.00	7.92	3.75
Actual diff.	6.63	5.86	0.91	7.63	4.02

Notes: Table shows how much of the difference in the dependent variable (T1-T50) relative to the US can be explained by differences in means of the explanatory variables. Coefficients from regression model in column 5 of table 2. Actual difference shows the difference in means vis-a-vis the US using all available observations.

ernment's reliability, responsiveness, integrity, openness (transparency), and non-discrimination essentially leads to identical results as above. Respondents who evaluate the government more positively on those dimensions, on average, prefer less progressive tax schemes indicating weaker demand for redistribution. The coefficients are largest in magnitude for the perceived integrity of the government and for its transparency. Our results are also robust to different specifications of probit models (see table A.11 in the Appendix) using an indicator for progressive[15] preferences as the dependent variable. Qualitatively, this yields the same results with respect to the sign and statistical significance of explanatory variables as our regressions with the difference between the top and bottom tax rates as the dependent variable.

In principle, it could be that the association of the explanatory variables is not symmetric, i.e. that a factor which correlates with higher progressivity in the aggregate in fact has a positive effect on both tax rates on the rich and on the poor, with the first dominating in magnitude. However, running separate regressions with the tax rates on the richest percent and the poor half of the population shows that this is not the case (see Appendix table A.12). That is, stronger social mobility beliefs which are associated with lower preferred progressivity are at the same time correlating with lower preferred tax rates on the rich and higher preferred tax rates on the poor. The regression coefficients for trust in government and attitudes towards immigrants are symmetric as well. Persuasively, positive attitudes towards immigrants show an even more statistically significant (at the 0.1 percent level) negative coefficient in the regression using the tax rate on the bottom 50 percent as the dependent variable. Presumably, this might be because respondents expect immigrants to make up a relatively larger part in this group of the population.

Furthermore, country-wise standardized regressions with standardization at the country-level indicate that differences in coefficients are not due to different understanding of questions between countries. The ratios of standardized coefficients (see Figure A.8) between countries are very similar to those known from unstandardized regressions in table 3. For example, the standardized coefficient of attitudes towards immigrants in the US is about twice as large as in Germany, as it is in the unstandardized regressions. The same holds for the coefficients on trust in government and social mobility beliefs.

4 Conclusion

This paper reports results from a large-scale survey as part of OECD's Trustlab initiative which was run on representative samples in six countries (United States, Germany, the UK, Italy, Slovenia, and Japan). We examine preferences for redistribution through a quantitative measure derived from an internationally standardized question on how to split the tax burden across income groups. Our results show that both preferences and the underlying determinants of preferences significantly differ between countries. Rather than American being "exceptional" (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004), Italian respondents align with US Americansin their choice of tax rates on the richest 1 percent and the poorest 50 percent. Respondents from these two countries, on average, demand the least progressive tax schemes in our sample[16]. Another cluster is formed by German, British and Slovenian respondents who have the most progressive preferences in our sample. Tax preferences from Japanese respondents are located between these two groups.

Our analysis also confirm that some of the mechanisms that have been proposed to explain preferences for redistribution matter, but they do so differently in different countries. First, beliefs about social mobility are strongly correlated with preferences for redistribution in the aggregate (Fong, 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). Those believing that anyone who works hard can climb the social ladder are significantly less supportive of redistribution. Looking at standardized regressions (see figure A.8 in the Appendix), we can note that social mobility beliefs have the largest effect pooling all countries, almost twice that of attitudes towards immigrants. However, the mechanism of social mobility beliefs is almost irrelevant in Italy and Slovenia, while it is highly significant in the US, Germany, the UK, and to a somewhat smaller extent in Japan. We can also find some support for the POUM-hypothesis as preferred progressivity is negatively correlated with the expected personal financial situation during the next year, albeit this coefficient is not statistically significant in all countries. On the other hand, personal income is never a statistically significant predictor in our regressions, thus questioning the relevance of self-interest in a strict sense when asking people about their tax preferences.

Attitudes towards immigrants also matter in the aggregate, as people having more positive views on

[15] We defined progressive tax preferences as T1 >= T9 >= T40 >= T50 with pairwise comparisons being strictly larger in at least one case.

[16] The striking similarity of US and Italian preferences is in line with recent experimental evidence by Grimalda, Farina and Schmidt (2018).

immigrants show stronger preferences for progressiveness. This correlation is stronger using the tax rate on the poor half of the income distribution as opposed to the tax rate on the top 1 percent as the dependent variable. This may be due to respondents expecting the share of immigrants to be larger in the former group. However, this variable is only strongly statistically significant in the US and, albeit weakly, in Germany, but not in the other countries. This result suggests that the predicted reduction in demand for redistribution as countries become more ethnically heterogenous Alesina and Glaeser (2004) is not (yet) detectable. Looking at different dimensions of attitudes towards immigrants (see Appendix table A.13) we see that preferences for redistribution correlate most strongly with the perceived effect immigrants may have on the culture of the host country, racial prejudices, and stated trust in immigrants. On the other hand, point estimates of the perceived level of immigrants' integration on preferred tax rates are small and statistically insignificant which may suggest that discrimination and group loyalty instead of economic considerations are at the basis of this correlation.

We also find that trust in government is negatively associated with preferred progressivity in our sample, a relationship that is significant in all countries. Our findings, thus, replicate those by (Barnes, 2015; Di Tella, Dubra and Lagomarsino, 2016) (but not those by (Yamamura, 2014; Kuziemko et al., 2015; Stantcheva, 2020),). The channel behind this finding is that people stating high trust levels believe that their government already provides fair opportunities for economic mobility, so that there is less need for governmental redistribution. Likewise, low trust in government is likely related to higher perceived levels of corruption, which may give rise to higher redistribution demand to correct (perceived) inequities Alesina and Angeletos (2005*a*). We offer empirical support for the latter view as measures of integrity and transparency (openness) of the government are negatively correlated with preferred progressivity at a strongly statistically significant level having larger coefficient sizes than measures of government's perceived level of pursuing long-term objectives (responsiveness) or its capability to deliver public services (reliability).

A Appendix

Table A.6: Detailed Summary Tax Rates

	Top 1%	Next 9%	Next 40%	Bottom 50%	T1-T50
DEU					
Obs.	1108	1108	1108	1108	1108
Mean	43.70	33.90	23.32	14.29	29.41
SE	0.48	0.33	0.15	0.31	0.69
Median	45	34	24	13	32
IQR	18	11	4	10	26
Minimum	0	0	0	0	-57
Maximum	75	75	46	75	75
GBR					
Obs.	1053	1053	1053	1053	1053
Mean	43.63	33.39	23.25	14.99	28.64
SE	0.50	0.34	0.14	0.34	0.73
Median	44	33	24	14	30
IQR	16	11	4	11	27
Minimum	1	0	0	0	-70
Maximum	75	75	40	75	75
ITA					
Obs.	1458	1458	1458	1458	1458
Mean	40.66	32.86	23.00	16.97	23.69
SE	0.48	0.31	0.14	0.35	0.74
Median	40	33	24	15	27
IQR	20	11	4	12	33
Minimum	0	0	0	0	-75
Maximum	75	75	50	75	75
JPN					
Obs.	2504	2504	2504	2504	2504
Mean	42.72	33.90	22.78	15.92	26.80
SE	0.36	0.23	0.09	0.23	0.54
Median	45	35	23	14	31
IQR	18	11	5	10	29
Minimum	0	0	0	0	-75
Maximum	75	75	47	75	75
SVN					
Obs.	1011	1011	1011	1011	1011
Mean	44.59	34.52	22.91	14.18	30.41
SE	0.56	0.34	0.14	0.35	0.85
Median	45	35	24	12	34
IQR	21	10	5	10	32
Minimum	0	1	6	0	-72
Maximum	75	75	44	75	75
USA					
Obs.	1090	1090	1090	1090	1090
Mean	39.92	31.43	23.58	17.13	22.78
SE	0.53	0.35	0.15	0.37	0.81
Median	39	30	25	15	23
IQR	21	11	3	14	34
Minimum	0	0	0	0	-75
Maximum	75	75	50	75	75
Total					
Obs.	8224	8224	8224	8224	8224
Mean	42.46	33.40	23.07	15.71	26.75

Table A.6: Detailed Summary Tax Rates

	Top 1%	Next 9%	Next 40%	Bottom 50%	T1-T50
SE	0.19	0.13	0.05	0.13	0.29
Median	43	33	24	14	30
IQR	19	12	4	11	30
Minimum	0	0	0	0	-75
Maximum	75	75	50	75	75

Notes: Detailed summary statistics of preferred tax rate variables. The table shows the mean, standard error, median, interquartile range, minimum and the maximum for the pooled sample as well as for the country subsamples.

Figure A.5: Progressive and Regressive Tax Schemes by Country



Note: This figure shows the share of respondents stating tax schemes either classified as progressive or regressive in each country. Whiskers span the 95 percent confidence interval. We define progressive tax schemes as a tax burden which is weakly descending going from the top 1 percent over the next 9 percent and next 40 percent to the bottom 50 percent. This means that T1 is larger or equal than T9 which is larger or equal than T40 which is larger or equal than T50, whereof at least one pairwise comparison must be strictly larger. Conversely, a regressive tax scheme is defined as weakly ascending over the same groups.

Figure A.6: Views of government by country



Note: This figure shows the average scores for the respective variable on the vertical axis in each country. Whiskers span the 95 percent confidence interval.

Figure A.7: Views of government by characteristic



Note: This figure shows the average score of views of government variables for the respective subgroups indicated below the figure. Whiskers span the 95 percent confidence interval.

Table A.7: Preferred Tax Rates across Countries: t-tests

	USA	GER	GBR	ITA	SVN
GER	0.0000				
	0.0000				
GBR	0.0000	0.9205			
	0.0000	0.1251			
ITA	0.2970	0.0000	0.0000		
	0.7378	0.0000	0.0000		
SVN	0.0000	0.2278	0.2021	0.0000	
	0.0000	0.8144	0.0961	0.0000	
JPN	0.0000	0.0998	0.1367	0.0005	0.0051
	0.0051	0.0000	0.0230	0.0113	0.0000

Notes: Table displays p-values from t-tests accounting for unequal variances against the null of equal means in the countries from the column vs. from the respective row. The first (second) row for each country shows the p-value for the tax rate on the top 1 percent (bottom 50 percent).

Table A.8: Summary statistics by country

Variable	Pooled	USA	GER	GBR	ITA	JPN
Female	0.441	0.474	0.456	0.598	0.385	0.462
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Migration background	0.107	0.201	0.245	0.0298	0.0098	0.0935

Table A.8: Summary statistics by country

Variable	Pooled	USA	GER	GBR	ITA	JPN
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age 15-24	0.104	0.0927	0.126	0.0935	0.0891	0.0976
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Age 25-54	0.645	0.719	0.713	0.793	0.679	0.708
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age 55-64	0.246	0.172	0.153	0.114	0.218	0.185
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Low education	0.139	0.233	0.421	0.423	0.333	0.315
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Medium education	0.355	0.363	0.146	0.172	0.0891	0.203
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
High education	0.505	0.403	0.433	0.405	0.578	0.482
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Employed	0.761	0.781	0.793	0.724	0.656	0.726
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Selfemployed	0.0875	0.0788	0.0962	0.129	0.113	0.104
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Unemployed	0.05	0.0201	0.0335	0.0583	0.0221	0.0348
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Out of labor force	0.102	0.121	0.0774	0.0894	0.209	0.135
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Social mobility	6.234	5.975	5.709	5.509	4.955	5.543
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Financial security	6.389	6.125	5.649	5.504	4.762	5.52
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Keep job	7.982	7.776	7.586	7.201	6.654	7.29
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.04)
Find new job	6.146	5.96	5.795	4.354	4.27	5.075
	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.05)
Immigration: Integretation	6.134	4.957	5.222	4.459	4.396	4.883
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Immigrants: Culture	6.866	5.915	6.025	5.154	4.667	5.503
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Attitudes immigrants	6.5	5.436	5.623	4.807	4.531	5.193
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Racial prejudices	5.766	5.723	4.964	5.114	4.471	5.087
	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Trust in immigrants	6.57	5.536	5.734	4.882	4.649	5.291
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Risk aversion	3.834	4.725	4.665	4.247	5.507	4.746
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Political orientation	5.886	5.167	5.395	5.294	5.503	5.446
	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Religion importance	5.987	3.609	3.109	4.991	3.64	4.199
	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Trust in government	4.771	5.002	4.285	3.591	4.121	4.291
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Government's reliability	5.766	5.913	5.609	4.215	5.303	5.302
	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Government's responsiveness	6.15	6.318	5.877	4.439	5.078	5.438
	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Government's integrity	5.714	5.624	5.485	4.221	4.468	4.948
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.04)

Table A.8: Summary statistics by country

Variable	Pooled	USA	GER	GBR	ITA	JPN
Government's openess	5.289	5.226	5.117	3.702	4.085	4.53
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Government's fairness	5.405	5.4	5.444	3.946	4.377	4.769
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Trust financial institutions	5.839	4.607	5.044	3.736	5.329	4.92
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.04)

Notes: Table shows country-wise summary statistics. Standard errors in parentheses. First 12 rows are indicator variables. Remaining rows show Likert variables on a scale from 0 to 10.

A.1 Description of Data Sources

We collected data for the population statistics from reliable representative sources. Whenever possible, we used data from the year in which the survey was carried out in the respective country.

1. Age and sex composition of the population
   (a) Data taken from the CIA World Fact Book for all six countries in the sample (Central Intelligence Agency, 2020).
2. Ethnic groups
   (a) USA: Data taken from the United States Census Bureau, based on populaton estimates from 2010(United States Census Bureau, 2019).
   (b) Germany: Estimates based on calculations using the number of people with migration background (at least one of the parents not born in Germany) from the respective countries. Turkish ethnicity approximated by migration background from the Republic of Turkey. Eastern European ethnicity comprises migration backgrounds from Belarus, Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Ukraine, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo. Data from Statistisches Bundesamts publication "Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus 2018 - Fachserie 1 Reihe 2.2 - 2018" (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2018).
   (c) UK: Data from the 2011 Census of the Office for National Statistics which was published in 2013(Office for National Statistics, 2013).
3. Educational attainment: Data for educational attainment is not perfectly comparable across countries. We searched for the most accurate equivalent of US education levels of which we classified "High-school degree or less" as low education, a non-tertiary degree as medium education and a tertiary degree as high education.
   (a) USA: Data from the publication of the United States Cenus Bureau "Educational Attainment of the Population 18 Years and Over, by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 2018" (United States Census Bureau, 2018). Low education is high-school degree or less. Medium education is a non-tertiary degree whereas High-education corresponds to University degrees (Bachelor, Master, Professional or Doctoral degree).
   (b) Germany: Data from Statistisches Bundesamt. Publication "Bevoelkerung im Alter von 15 Jahren und mehr nach allgemeinen und beruflichen Bildungsabschluessen nach Jahren". Estimates from 2017 based on the Mikrozensus 2011 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2019). Low education corresponds to "Abitur or below". Medium education is Ausbildung or Fachschulabschluss. High education is Bachelor, Master, Diplom or Promotion (degrees from Fachhochschulen or Universities).
   (c) Italy: Data (reference year 2017) from the OECD Statistics website "Educational attainment of 25-64 year-olds" (OECD, 2019). Low education is "below upper-secondary", medium education is "upper-secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary education" and high education is "tertiary education".

(d) United Kingdom: Data (reference year 2018) from the OECD Statistics website (same source as for Italy) "Educational attainment of 25-64 year-olds" (OECD, 2019). Low education is "below upper-secondary", medium education is "upper-secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary education" and high education is "tertiary education"

(e) Slovenia: Data (2018 reference year) from Stat.si's (Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia) publication "Population aged 15 years or more by SEX, AGE, YEAR and EDUCATION" (Republic of Slovenia Statistical Office SiStat, 2019). Low education comprises "Basic or less", medium education is "Upper secondary" and high education is "Tertiary education".

(f) Japan: Data (2010 reference year) based on Population Census of Japan from the publication "Proportion of Persons 15 Years of Age and Over by Age, Sex and Educational Attainment: 1970, 2010" by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, 2017). Low education "Primary education" medium education is "Secondary education" and high education is "High grade education".

4. Labor market statistics

(a) USA: Data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Empoyment statistics for the civilian non-institutional population (16 and older, no army, no inmates) (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020). Averaged over all four quarterly periods of 2018.

(b) Germany: Data (working population aged 15-74) from Statistisches Bundesamt "Eckzahlen zum Arbeitsmarkt, Deutschland" for the reference year 2018 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2020).

(c) Italy: Data from the Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (ISTAT) for the reference year 2016 (population aged 15 and over). Published as part of the "Italy in Figures" series (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, 2017).

(d) United Kingdom: Employment data (population aged from 16 to 64 years) from the Office for National statistics in the UK for the reference year 2018 (Office for National Statistics, 2018).

(e) Slovenia: Employment statistics from the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia (Stat.si) for the reference year 2017 (population aged 15 and over) (Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, 2020). Averaged over all reported four quartely periods of 2017.

(f) Japan: Data on employment (population aged 14 and over) from the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research for the reference year 2015 (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, 2017)

A.2 Strength of association across countries

Figure A.8: Standardized Coefficients by Country



Note: This figure shows standardized regression coefficients from country-wise subsample regressions using the same model as in column (5) of the main regression results table. Standardization (substract mean and divide by standard deviation) within each subsample. The interpretation is that a one standard-deviation increase of the independent variable in the respective country is associated with change in standard deviations of the dependent variable.

A.3 Complete regression tables

Table A.9: Complete Table: Pooled sample regression

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled
Female	1.274**	1.083*	0.941	0.723	0.638	
	(0.61)	(0.61)	(0.61)	(0.63)	(0.63)	
Age/10	0.422*	0.519**	0.499**	0.525**	0.545**	
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.25)	
Migration	-2.462**	-1.985*	-2.012*	-2.139**	-2.268**	
	(1.03)	(1.03)	(1.03)	(1.06)	(1.06)	
Low income	0.98	0.793	0.746	0.611	0.449	
	(0.84)	(0.85)	(0.85)	(0.88)	(0.87)	
High income	-0.711	-0.739	-0.493	-0.717	-0.576	
	(0.83)	(0.83)	(0.84)	(0.87)	(0.87)	
Self-employed	4.006****	3.436***	3.627****	3.657***	3.788****	
	(1.06)	(1.07)	(1.07)	(1.12)	(1.11)	
Unemployed	1.293	1.074	1.024	1.11	0.88	
	(1.22)	(1.22)	(1.23)	(1.27)	(1.28)	
Inactive	1.571**	1.663**	1.878***	1.708**	2.081***	
	(0.71)	(0.72)	(0.72)	(0.75)	(0.75)	
Low education	-2.550***	-2.339***	-2.260***	-2.002**	-1.919**	
	(0.83)	(0.83)	(0.84)	(0.87)	(0.87)	
High education	-0.155	0.208	0.325	0.271	0.353	
	(0.81)	(0.81)	(0.82)	(0.85)	(0.85)	
GER	7.025****	7.481****	6.975****	7.902****	7.618****	6.831****
	(1.07)	(1.07)	(1.07)	(1.10)	(1.09)	(1.08)
GBR	5.891****	5.593****	4.930****	5.886****	5.498****	4.407****
	(1.13)	(1.12)	(1.12)	(1.16)	(1.16)	(1.11)
ITA	0.255	-0.612	-0.867	-0.231	-0.188	-0.968
	(1.13)	(1.13)	(1.13)	(1.16)	(1.16)	(1.12)
SVN	7.428****	6.351****	5.854****	7.639****	7.399****	6.267****
	(1.21)	(1.20)	(1.21)	(1.28)	(1.28)	(1.24)
JPN	2.796***	2.708**	1.882*	2.517**	2.001*	1.358
	(1.06)	(1.06)	(1.07)	(1.13)	(1.13)	(1.05)
Financial security	-1.584****	-1.128****	-0.683****	-1.236****	-0.751****	-0.818****
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Trust in government		-1.190****	-0.915****	-1.224****	-0.954****	-0.972****
		(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Social mobility			-1.127****		-1.186****	-1.177****
			(0.14)		(0.15)	(0.15)
Attitudes immigrants				0.351**	0.479***	0.446***
				(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Constant	29.47****	31.64****	34.66****	30.15****	32.30****	36.25****
	(1.93)	(1.96)	(2.01)	(2.26)	(2.28)	(1.55)
N	7854	7762	7577	7125	7025	7026
R2	0.0346	0.0443	0.0532	0.0465	0.0553	0.0501
Adj. R2	0.0327	0.0422	0.051	0.0441	0.0528	0.0489

Notes: Table shows OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the difference between preferred tax rates on the top 1 percent and the bottom 50 percent.

Table A.10: Complete Tables: Country-wise regressions

	USA	GER	GBR	ITA	SVN	JPN
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	2.319	1.538	-1.17	1.314	-0.467	0.94
	(1.68)	(1.42)	(1.61)	(1.64)	(1.80)	(1.35)
Age/10	1.309**	0.919	0.686	0.0643	0.49	0.208
	(0.63)	(0.57)	(0.63)	(0.68)	(0.76)	(0.49)
Migration	-7.329***	-0.0211	-5.211***	0.556	2.349	-14.88
	(2.78)	(1.90)	(1.96)	(3.72)	(2.35)	(9.53)
Low income	-0.0748	2.865	1.909	-1.336	-0.93	-0.725
	(1.99)	(2.01)	(2.15)	(2.00)	(2.34)	(2.27)
High income	-1.624	2.07	-0.496	-2.342	-3.278	0.7
	(2.05)	(1.94)	(2.39)	(2.04)	(2.86)	(1.86)
Self-employed	2.057	1.469	4.572	3.006	8.510**	4.027*
	(3.13)	(2.71)	(3.09)	(2.31)	(3.40)	(2.19)
Unemployed	-0.477	3.296	-7.117**	2.639	3.952	2.859
	(2.77)	(3.31)	(3.42)	(2.61)	(3.25)	(3.43)
Inactive	0.586	2.075	-0.239	3.828*	0.553	2.521*
	(2.08)	(1.76)	(1.79)	(2.09)	(2.29)	(1.51)
Low education	-0.796	-3.479**	3.872*	-2.332	-2.491	-1.89
	(2.45)	(1.77)	(2.31)	(2.09)	(2.67)	(2.38)
High education	0.98	-1.202	5.102**	-0.411	-2.197	1.864
	(1.79)	(1.77)	(2.49)	(2.11)	(2.73)	(2.28)
Financial security	-0.792*	-0.58	-0.031	-0.731	-0.324	-1.468****
	(0.45)	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.46)	(0.48)	(0.35)
Trust in government	-1.160****	-0.681*	-0.882***	-1.059***	-0.983**	-0.743**
	(0.34)	(0.36)	(0.33)	(0.37)	(0.45)	(0.29)
Social mobility	-2.192****	-1.797****	-2.045****	-0.0992	-0.451	-0.857***
	(0.38)	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.40)	(0.42)	(0.31)
Attitudes immigrants	1.512****	0.696*	0.13	0.0625	0.634	0.19
	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.35)	(0.41)	(0.45)	(0.37)
Const	30.02****	36.60****	36.96****	31.30****	35.27****	36.26****
	(5.32)	(4.49)	(5.17)	(4.92)	(5.70)	(4.54)
Obs.	972	1016	935	1362	875	1865
R2	0.131	0.0717	0.0976	0.0215	0.0298	0.0491
Adj. R2	0.118	0.0587	0.0839	0.0113	0.0141	0.0419

A.4 Additional regressions

Table A.11: Probit regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled
Low income	0.0112	0.00599	0.0133	0.00996	0.0102	
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	
High income	0.0595	0.0584	0.072	0.0595	0.07	
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	
GER	0.310****	0.325****	0.311****	0.327****	0.325****	0.299****
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
GBR	0.302****	0.300****	0.269****	0.286****	0.268****	0.209***
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
ITA	-0.0151	-0.0432	-0.0589	-0.043	-0.0447	-0.0809
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
SVN	0.359****	0.320****	0.288****	0.357****	0.343****	0.276****
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
JPN	0.169***	0.162***	0.116**	0.138**	0.109*	0.117**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Financial security	-0.0683****	-0.0539****	-0.0399****	-0.0613****	-0.0450****	-0.0459****
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Trust in government		-0.0340****	-0.0241***	-0.0386****	-0.0297****	-0.0297****
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Social mobility beliefs			-0.0393****		-0.0418****	-0.0398****
			(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Attitudes immigrants				0.0204**	0.0254***	0.0239***
				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.917****	0.970****	1.083****	0.917****	0.997****	1.158****
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.08)
Obs.	7854	7762	7577	7125	7025	7026
R2 McFadden	0.0242	0.0265	0.0296	0.0275	0.0311	0.0268
Log-lik.	-3916.5	-3847.2	-3747.8	-3568.5	-3505.7	-3521.3

Notes: Table shows probit regression estimate with binary dependent variable (1 = progressive preferences). Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions contain controls for age, gender, education and labor force status. Same independent variables included as in main text regressions.

Table A.12: Pooled Sample Regression with T1 and T50 as Dependent Variable

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	T1	T1	T50	T50
Female	0.576	0.616	-0.0616	-0.119
	(0.42)	(0.45)	(0.28)	(0.31)
Age/10	0.288*	0.295*	-0.258**	-0.233**
	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Migration	-1.094	-1.522*	1.173**	1.235**
	(0.68)	(0.78)	(0.50)	(0.57)
Low income	0.496	0.848	0.0466	-0.0758
	(0.58)	(0.64)	(0.39)	(0.44)
High income	-0.576	-0.131	0.000318	-0.248
	(0.58)	(0.61)	(0.39)	(0.41)
Self-employed	2.318***	1.367*	-1.470***	-0.939*
	(0.72)	(0.78)	(0.50)	(0.55)

Unemployed	0.581	0.25	-0.299	-0.462
	(0.83)	(0.92)	(0.59)	(0.68)
Inactive	0.978*	0.716	-1.102****	-1.155****
	(0.50)	(0.53)	(0.33)	(0.35)
Low education	-1.186**	-0.795	0.733*	0.664
	(0.57)	(0.62)	(0.40)	(0.43)
High education	-0.0137	0.154	-0.366	-0.373
	(0.56)	(0.60)	(0.38)	(0.40)
GER	4.439****	4.442****	-3.180****	-2.889****
	(0.74)	(0.74)	(0.51)	(0.51)
GBR	3.555****	3.079****	-1.943****	-1.386**
	(0.77)	(0.79)	(0.54)	(0.56)
ITA	-0.0193	-0.172	0.169	0.642
	(0.76)	(0.76)	(0.54)	(0.54)
SVN	4.354****		-3.045****	
	(0.84)		(0.57)	
JPN	1.652**	1.189	-0.349	0.401
	(0.75)	(0.75)	(0.51)	(0.51)
Financial security	-0.448****	-0.438****	0.303****	0.293****
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Trust in government	-0.624****	-0.562****	0.330****	0.280****
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Social mobility beliefs	-0.762****	-0.817****	0.424****	0.401****
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Attitudes immigrants	0.206*		-0.274****	
	(0.11)		(0.07)	
Racial prejudices		-0.534****		0.438****
		(0.09)		(0.07)
Constant	46.63****	50.30****	14.33****	10.68****
	(1.47)	(1.47)	(1.06)	(1.04)
Obs	7025	5907	7025	5907
R2	0.0516	0.0649	0.0394	0.0504
Adj. R2	0.0491	0.062	0.0368	0.0475

Notes: Table shows OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable in the first two columns is the preferred tax rate on the top 1 percent and the last two columns the preferred tax rate on the bottom 50 percent.

Table A.13: Additional Pooled Sample Regressions

	(1) Pooled	(2) Pooled	(3) Pooled	(4) Pooled	(5) Pooled	(6) Pooled
Female	0.546	1.093*	0.79	0.871	0.815	0.239
	(0.64)	(0.63)	(0.63)	(0.63)	(0.68)	(0.72)
Age/10	0.619**	0.701***	0.557**	0.716***	0.631**	0.744***
	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.27)
Migration	-1.685	-1.568	-1.625	-1.800*	-2.554**	-2.847**
	(1.06)	(1.06)	(1.06)	(1.05)	(1.19)	(1.22)
Low income	0.285	0.664	0.481	0.533	0.941	1.102
	(0.88)	(0.87)	(0.86)	(0.86)	(0.96)	(1.02)
High income	-0.912	-0.595	-0.763	-0.711	-0.0212	-0.151
	(0.87)	(0.86)	(0.86)	(0.86)	(0.91)	(0.96)
Self-employed	3.737****	3.599***	3.630***	3.413***	2.226*	2.066*
	(1.12)	(1.11)	(1.11)	(1.11)	(1.21)	(1.25)
Unemployed	0.868	0.993	0.926	1.28	0.986	0.631

Table A.13: Additional Pooled Sample Regressions

	(1) Pooled	(2) Pooled	(3) Pooled	(4) Pooled	(5) Pooled	(6) Pooled
	(1.28)	(1.28)	(1.26)	(1.25)	(1.43)	(1.53)
Inactive	1.838**	2.164***	2.023***	1.946***	1.758**	1.820**
	(0.76)	(0.75)	(0.75)	(0.75)	(0.80)	(0.84)
Low education	-1.889**	-2.228**	-1.837**	-1.894**	-1.511	-1.928*
	(0.88)	(0.87)	(0.87)	(0.86)	(0.94)	(1.01)
High education	0.54	0.157	0.518	0.552	0.544	0.213
	(0.85)	(0.84)	(0.84)	(0.83)	(0.90)	(0.95)
GER	6.454****	6.532****	6.221****	6.652****	6.745****	5.711****
	(1.12)	(1.12)	(1.12)	(1.10)	(1.13)	(1.17)
GBR	4.435****	4.288****	4.021****	4.600****	3.905***	3.874***
	(1.20)	(1.19)	(1.19)	(1.18)	(1.23)	(1.28)
ITA	-0.176	-0.65	-0.648	-0.29	-0.794	-1.735
	(1.16)	(1.16)	(1.15)	(1.14)	(1.17)	(1.24)
SVN	7.104****	5.267****	6.001****	6.673****		
	(1.30)	(1.25)	(1.28)	(1.25)		
JPN	1.094	1.848	0.977	1.446	0.521	0.935
	(1.16)	(1.14)	(1.14)	(1.13)	(1.15)	(1.20)
Financial security	-0.630****	-0.640****	-0.678****	-0.658****	-0.668****	-0.620***
	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.20)
Trust in government	-0.858****	-0.954****	-0.810****	-0.908****	-0.817****	-0.731****
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Social mobility beliefs	-1.101****	-1.106****	-1.091****	-1.147****	-1.205****	-1.124****
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Attitudes immigrants	0.478***					
	(0.17)					
Trust in immigrants		0.469***				
		(0.17)				
Immigrants integration			0.12			
			(0.15)			
Immigrants culture				0.433****		
				(0.12)		
Racial prejudices					-0.919****	-0.682****
					(0.14)	(0.16)
Religion importance	-0.316***	-0.397****	-0.388****	-0.356****	-0.231**	-0.115
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Risk aversion	0.453***					
	(0.14)					
Political orientation						-1.255****
						(0.19)
Constant	30.34****	32.78****	35.04****	32.61****	39.67****	43.89****
	(2.49)	(2.20)	(2.21)	(2.21)	(2.26)	(2.38)
Obs.	6873	7043	7032	7070	5807	5169
R2	0.0588	0.0574	0.0557	0.0594	0.0719	0.0883
Adj. R2	0.056	0.0547	0.053	0.0567	0.0688	0.0847

Notes: Table shows OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the difference between preferred tax rates on the top 1 percent and the bottom 50 percent.

Table A.14: Exploring various measures of trust

	Trust	Reliability	Responsiveness	Integrity	Openess	Fair	Civil servants	Financial institutions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Female	0.638	0.733	0.689	0.595	0.852	0.49	0.758	0.962
	(0.63)	(0.64)	(0.65)	(0.64)	(0.64)	(0.64)	(0.64)	(0.63)
Age/10	0.545**	0.438*	0.462*	0.455*	0.486**	0.485**	0.482*	0.497**
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.24)
Migration	-2.268**	-2.406**	-2.283**	-2.387**	-2.509**	-2.678**	-2.485**	-2.557**
	(1.06)	(1.07)	(1.09)	(1.08)	(1.08)	(1.08)	(1.07)	(1.05)
Low income	0.449	0.432	0.0674	0.484	0.61	0.482	0.475	0.54
	(0.87)	(0.89)	(0.90)	(0.90)	(0.89)	(0.89)	(0.88)	(0.87)
High income	-0.576	-0.556	-0.593	-0.525	-0.443	-0.588	-0.452	-0.397
	(0.87)	(0.87)	(0.89)	(0.88)	(0.87)	(0.88)	(0.87)	(0.86)
Self-employed	3.788****	4.120****	4.204****	3.897****	3.800****	3.512***	4.050****	3.789****
	(1.11)	(1.13)	(1.14)	(1.13)	(1.12)	(1.12)	(1.12)	(1.11)
Unemployed	0.88	1.52	0.816	0.865	0.818	0.859	1.11	0.928
	(1.28)	(1.30)	(1.38)	(1.32)	(1.33)	(1.30)	(1.30)	(1.28)
Inactive	2.081***	2.170***	2.657****	2.224***	2.137***	1.966**	2.167***	2.080***
	(0.75)	(0.76)	(0.78)	(0.76)	(0.76)	(0.77)	(0.76)	(0.75)
Low education	-1.919**	-2.046**	-1.766*	-2.162**	-1.887**	-2.391***	-1.915**	-1.914**
	(0.87)	(0.88)	(0.91)	(0.89)	(0.89)	(0.88)	(0.88)	(0.87)
High education	0.353	0.117	0.242	0.124	0.0774	0.0514	0.315	0.111
	(0.85)	(0.86)	(0.88)	(0.87)	(0.86)	(0.86)	(0.85)	(0.85)
GER	7.618****	7.468****	6.989****	7.298****	7.407****	7.450****	7.114****	6.160****
	(1.09)	(1.11)	(1.14)	(1.12)	(1.11)	(1.11)	(1.10)	(1.10)
GBR	5.498****	5.919****	5.896****	6.012****	5.789****	5.990****	5.365****	5.274****
	(1.16)	(1.18)	(1.21)	(1.18)	(1.19)	(1.19)	(1.17)	(1.16)
ITA	-0.188	-0.32	-0.221	-0.311	-0.532	-0.172	-0.185	-1.177
	(1.16)	(1.19)	(1.23)	(1.18)	(1.18)	(1.17)	(1.18)	(1.20)
SVN	7.399****	7.284****	7.173****	7.026****	7.095****	7.164****	7.284****	7.168****
	(1.28)	(1.30)	(1.34)	(1.29)	(1.30)	(1.29)	(1.30)	(1.29)
JPN	2.001*	2.041*	1.263	1.641	1.484	1.907*	1.251	1.753
	(1.13)	(1.15)	(1.17)	(1.15)	(1.14)	(1.14)	(1.15)	(1.13)
Financial security	-0.751****	-0.902****	-0.952****	-0.918****	-0.777****	-0.871****	-0.923****	-0.855****
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.17)
Trust in government	-0.954****							
	(0.14)							

Table A.14: Exploring various measures of trust

	Trust	Reliability	Responsiveness	Integrity	Openess	Fair	Civil servants	Financial institutions
Government reliability		-0.584****						
		(0.16)						
Government responsiveness			-0.410***					
			(0.16)					
Government integrity				-0.803****				
				(0.16)				
Government openess					-0.927****			
					(0.15)			
Government fairness						-0.793****		
						(0.14)		
Trust civil servants							-0.350**	
							(0.15)	
Trust financial institutions								-0.792****
								(0.15)
Social mobility beliefs	-1.186****	-1.290****	-1.353****	-1.237****	-1.274****	-1.227****	-1.362****	-1.245****
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Attitudes immigrants	0.479***	0.411**	0.406**	0.496***	0.543***	0.449***	0.374**	0.417***
	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.16)

Table A.14: Exploring various measures of trust

	Trust	Reliability	Responsiveness	Integrity	Openess	Fair	Civil servants	Financial institutions
Constant	32.30****	33.61****	33.36****	33.99****	33.13****	33.65****	32.92****	34.01****
	(2.28)	(2.34)	(2.40)	(2.34)	(2.32)	(2.31)	(2.32)	(2.31)
Obs.	7025	6890	6643	6781	6833	6854	6966	7030
R2	0.0553	0.0526	0.0511	0.0543	0.056	0.0551	0.0508	0.0537
Adj. R2	0.0528	0.05	0.0483	0.0516	0.0534	0.0525	0.0482	0.0512

Notes: Table shows OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the difference between preferred tax rates on the top 1 percent and the bottom 50 percent.

B Questions from the Trustlab

Table B.1: Definitions, questions, and value ranges from the Trustlab questionnaire

Variable	Survey Question or Definition	Value Range
Altruism	How willing are you to give to good causes without expecting anything in return?	0 (Completely unwilling to do so) - 10 (Very willing to do so)
Donation	Voluntary donation to UNICEF after completion of Trustlab	0-40 USD
Risk willingness	How do you see yourself: are you generally a person who tries to avoid taking risks, or are you fully prepared to take risks?	0 (Generally unwilling to take risks) – 10 (Fully prepared to take risks)
Risk aversion	10 – Risk willingness (to inverse the meaning)	0-10
Pos. reciprocity survey	When someone does me a favor, I am willing to return it'. How well does this statement describe you as a person?	0 (Completely unwilling to do so) -10 (Very willing to do so)
Neg. reciprocity survey	How willing are you to punish someone who treats others unfairly, even if there may be costs for you?	0 (Completely unwilling to do so) -10 (Very willing to do so)
Age	Age in years	Number of years
Female	Gender dummy	1 (Female), 0 (Male/Other)
Respondent born in country	Respondent born in country dummy	1 (yes), 0 (no)
One or more parents born outside	One or more parents born outside the country dummy	1 (yes), 0 (no)
Migration (background)	Dummy for respondent born outside the country and/or one or more parents born outside the country	1 (yes), 0 (no)
Education	What is the highest level of education you have completed?	0 (Less than high school); 1 (High school or less); 2 (Some college);
Low education	Highschool or less (1)	3 (Diploma, trades certificate or
High education	Tertiary degree (4-5)	other post school qualification other than university); 4 (Undergraduate degree (e.g. BA, BS)); 5 (Post-graduate degree)
Household income	In the last 12 months, what was the total income of your household after (before in the US) taxes have been deducted? (Income can come salaries and wages, profit from self-employment, interest, rent, pension, social insurance payments and other benefits, among others)	Number in USD
Household income quintile	Just to confirm, which of these income bands corresponds best to your household income? Remember, we are asking for your household income, after taxes have been deducted. [Choice of 5 even quintiles based on country income distribution]	1 (first quintile) – 5 (last quintile)
Labor force status	Which of these bests describes your situation? [Employee], [Employer/self-employed], [Unemployed] or	0 (Employee); 1 (Employer/self-employed);

	[Outside the labor force (e.g. homemaker, student, retired, unable to work)]	2 (Unemployed); 3 (Outside the labor force)
Job sector	Do you currently work in the. . . ?	0 (Administration); 1 (Public);
	[Central, regional or local government administration],	2 (Private);
	[Public sector], [Private (for profit) sector],	3 (Non-profit);
	[Not for profit sector] or [Not applicable]	4 (Not applicable)
Social mobility beliefs	Some people say there is not much opportunity	0 (There is not much opportunity)
	to get ahead today for the average person.	
	Others say anyone who works hard can climb up the ladder.	-10 (There is plenty of opportunity)
	Which one comes closer to the way you feel about this?	
Financial security	When it comes to the financial situation of your household,	0 (Worse)
	what are your expectations for the 12 months to come,	– 5 (The same)
	will the next 12 months be better, worse, or the same?	– 10 (Better)
Job security "keep current job"	How likely do you think it is that you will still have a	0 (Very unlikely)
	job in 6 months (if you have one now)?	– 10 (Very likely)
Job security "find new job"	If you were to lose your job, how likely is it that you	0 (Very unlikely)
	would find a job with a similar salary within 6 months?	– 10 (Very likely)
Values, attitudes, and views		
Racial prejudices	On the average Blacks/African Americans have worse jobs, income,	0 (Mainly discrimination
	and housing than white people. Do you think the differences are	and lack of opportunity –
	mainly due to discrimination and disadvantages of educational opportunity,	10 (Mainly lesser ability,
	mainly due to differences in in-born ability,	motivation and effort)
	motivation, and effort, or some combination?	
Perceived diversity	How high do you estimate the percentage of people of	0-100 (Percentage)
	non-[Country] origin in your neighborhood to be?	
	With non-[Country] origin we mean people who	
	were not born in [Country] or of whom	
	at least one parent was not born in [Country].	
	Please give a percentage between 0 and 100.	
Political orientation	In political matters, people often talk of "the left" and "the right."	0 (Left) – 5 (Center) – 10 (Right)
	How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?	
Political inefficacy	To what extent do you agree with the following statement:	0 (I don't agree at all) – 10 (I completely agree)
	'People like me don't have any say about what the government does?'	
Immigrants: Integration	To what extent do you agree with the following statements?	0 ('Immigrants are not integrated in our society')
		– 10 ('Immigrants are well integrated in our society')
Immigrants: Culture	To what extent do you agree with the following statements?	0 ('Our culture is undermined by immigrants')
		– 10 ('Our culture is enriched by immigrants')
Attitudes towards immigrants	Unweighted average of Immigrants: Integration and Culture	0 - 10
Importance of religion	How important would you say religion is in your own life?	0 (Not important at all)
		– 10 (Very important)

Trust in others 1	In general, how much do you trust most people? (OECD question)	0 (Not at all) – 10 (Completely)
Trust in others 2	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted,	0 (You can't be too careful)
	or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? (Rosenberg)	– 10 (Most people can be trusted)
Trust financial institutations	How much trust do you have in financial institutions (e.g. banks)?	0 (I don't trust them at all)
		– 10 (I completely trust them)
Trust in immigrants	How much do you trust people who immigrated?	0 (I don't trust them at all)
		– 10 (I completely trust them)
Trust civil servants	How much trust do you have in civil servants?	0 (I don't trust them at all)
		– 10 (I completely trust them)
Trust in government	How much trust do you have in the government?	0 (I don't trust them at all)
		– 10 (I completely trust them)
Government's reliability	Public institutions deliver public services in the best possible way.	0 (I don't agree at all)
		– 10 (I completely agree)
Government's responsiveness	Public institutions pursue long term objectives.	0 (I don't agree at all)
		– 10 (I completely agree)
Government's integrity	People working in public institutions are ethical and not corrupt.	0 (I don't agree at all)
		– 10 (I completely agree)
Government's openness	Public institutions are transparent.	0 (I don't agree at all)
		– 10 (I completely agree)
Government's fairness	Public institutions treat all citizens fairly,	0 (I don't agree at all)
	regardless of their gender, race, age or economic condition.	– 10 (I completely agree)
Preferred tax rates	The government currently raises a certain amount of revenues through tax in order to sustain the current level of public spending. In your view, what would be the fair split of tax burden to sustain public spending? Each slider	
Top 1%	represents a segment of the population with a different income. For	0-75
Next 9 %	example, the top 1% represents a small group of rich people,	0-75
Next 40%	whereas the bottom 50% is the half of the population that earns the least.	0-75
Bottom 50%	Please use the sliders below to tell us how much you think each of the following groups should pay as a percentage of their available resources.	0-75

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