Friendly fire: the trade impact of the Russia sanctions and counter-sanctions*

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Abstract

Sanctions are an instrument of foreign policy designed to elicit a change in the policies of a foreign government by inflicting economic damage. Their use, however, also affects the sanctioning country. This paper evaluates these economic costs for the diplomatic crisis between Russia and 37 Western countries over the conflict in Ukraine. We gauge the impact using a general equilibrium trade framework and investigate the underlying mechanisms using French firm-level customs data. We find that the bulk of the impact in Western countries stems from own measures—financial sanctions disrupting trade finance—and not Russian retaliation, an effect we coin "friendly fire".

Keywords: Sanctions, Trade, Foreign policy, Boycott, Embargo, Trade finance
JEL Classification: F51, F14, F13, F52

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1 Introduction

"Smart sanctions," trade and financial sanctions, are some of the current favorites in the toolbox of foreign policy. Meant to hurt the target country's economy through restrictions or bans on the trade of certain goods and services, severance of financial ties, or an all-out embargo, sanctions are used when diplomacy fails, while military options appear too drastic. However, sanctions are not costless for the sanctioning economy, where domestic firms involved in business with the target countries might incur economic damages. It is therefore important for policymakers to have an assessment of the economic costs a sanctions regime may inflict on their own country.

In this paper we assess the consequences of the sanctions regime against the Russian Federation, as well as their countersanctions, on the exports of involved countries. The sanctions episode is particularly interesting to study, as it has remained a "hot topic" in political circles and has been eminent in the public debate in Western countries and Russia since its beginning in 2014. Unlike other recent and ongoing sanctions episodes like those against Iran or Cuba, public opinion is split in pro and contra camps with prominent voices on either side, in particular in the European Union. While political and security arguments dominate the political debate in Eastern European countries, in Western Europe the debate centers around economic aspects.

The sanctions regime has its origins in the escalating diplomatic conflict over the political and military crisis in Ukraine, beginning in 2014. Following the alleged involvement in separatist movements in eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea after the "Maidan Revolution" in the winter of 2013–2014, 37 countries, including all EU countries, the United States and Japan, levied sanctions on the Russian Federation starting in March of 2014. The measures were intensified in successive "waves" during the early summer of 2014. Russia then retaliated in August of the same year by imposing an embargo on certain food and agricultural products.

We conduct the analysis into the economic costs of this sanctions episode from a macro and micro perspective. We first gauge the global effects in a standard trade model—a structural gravity framework. The counterfactual analysis reveals, unsurprisingly, significant trade losses for Russia, but also for sanctioning Western countries. Intriguingly, we find the strongest negative economic consequences for Western countries in absolute terms to be caused by their own sanctions measures. We coin this self-inflected cost of sanctions *friendly fire*. We then investigate the micro-mechanisms driving the macro-results using data on French firm-level exports. The firm-level analysis confirms that the drop of French exports to Russia is not driven by a few large or highly visible exporters that stopped or delayed their business relations with Russia, potentially under political pressure or

due to adverse consumer behavior. Instead, our findings suggests that French exporters faced increased "country risk", of political or legal nature, that made it more difficult to financially secure their transactions with Russia.

The use of sanctions as a foreign policy tool has attracted substantial literature in both political science and economics. The bulk of the existent work has shed light on the determinants of the success or failure of such policies and the effect of sanctions on the *target* economy through which the intended outcome—change of certain policies—is supposed to work.[1] A number of papers have looked at the economic impact of sanctions in *sending* countries. The case of the Embargo Act of 1807 is particularly well studied, as it provided the first use of sanctions and embargoes in the modern era. Frankel (1982), Irwin (2005), and O'Rourke (2007) find effects in the range of 4%–8% of U.S. GDP by looking at trade losses and commodity price changes. Hufbauer and Oegg (2003) look at macroeconomic effects of sanctions in place in the 1990s and find the total effect on U.S. GDP to hover around a much lower 0.4%. Caruso (2003) estimates the average effects of sanctions in the second half of the 20th century in a simple empirical setup on aggregate trade flows. Others look at the economic impact on the *target* economy. Related to our work, Dreger et al. (2016) also evaluate the economic impact of the sanction regime between Western countries and the Russian Federation. While we focus on the impact on trade flows, they estimate the consequences of the sanctions on the Russian macroeconomic performance. Haidar (2014) studies the impact of Western-imposed sanctions on Iranian exports. He uses Iranian firm-level export data and employs an approach comparable to the one we develop in the second part of this paper, showing that mainly small Iranian exporters were impacted since bigger ones managed to deflect their exports to non-sanctioning countries.

Our paper is also related to the literature studying the link between conflict and trade. Glick and Taylor (2010) show the disruptive effects of war on international trade and economic activity in general. Their approach—comparable to ours in the first part of the paper—relies on a general equilibrium trade model.[2] Another strand of the literature analyzes changes in the consumer preferences following political shocks more generally. Fuchs and Klann (2013) show that high-level meetings with the Dalai Lama are costly for the hosting country, in the sense that bilateral trade with China is significantly reduced in the following year. Michaels and Zhi (2010) show that the diplomatic clash between France and the United States over the Iraq War in 2003 reduced significantly the trade between the two countries during a short period of time. Pandya and Venkatesan (2016) exploit scanner data to reveal that sales in the U.S. market of brands marketed to appear French,

[1] See Drezner (1999) and Hufbauer et al. (2009) for instructive overviews over the state of research in this respect.

[2] Our approach differs from theirs in that we also take into account endogenous changes to production and expenditure following and extending approaches by Dekle et al. (2007, 2008) and Anderson et al. (2015).

while not necessarily imported from France, were affected by this conflict. Heilmann (2016) studies the impact of various boycott campaigns, among others the boycott Danish products in some Muslim-majority countries in 2006 by using a synthetic control group methodology.[3]

Our paper sets itself apart from the existing literature on sanctions by focusing on the recent and politically impactful diplomatic conflict between the Russian Federation and Western countries, which involves all the of largest trading countries in the world but China. Furthermore, we focus a large part of the analysis on the impact of sanctions from the perspective of the *sender* country's economy. We show that friendly fire, i.e. the costs that sanctioning countries inflict on themselves, can be substantial. Using French firm-level data we can identify the disruption of trade finance services to be likely a major mechanism in this respect. We identify this channel in a novel way that in turns provides an original way to test the general effect of country risk and trade finance on international trade.

Our paper contributes to the literature analyzing the economic consequences of sanctions and, as a byproduct, provides a novel way to test the general effect of trade finance instruments on international trade. This paper offers the first assessment of the economic costs for both sender and target country of sanctions combining aggregate and firm-level evidence. Furthermore, the implications of one of the key results, the self-inflicted cost of sanctions on exports by domestic firms, are particularly relevant for policymakers.

We assess the consequences of the sanctions regime vis-a-vis the Russian Federation from two angles: Using monthly UN Comtrade data, we evaluate the impact on exports of the Russian Federation and all major economies—sanctioning or not—in a structural gravity framework. We find the overall costs to total US$114 billion from the beginning of the conflict until the end of 2015, with 61% being borne by the Russian Federation. The loss in exports in sanctioning Western countries amounts to around US$44 billion, of which 90% is incurred by EU countries. Importantly, products that are targeted by the Russian embargo account for a small fraction of their total loss: 9% only. This provides evidence for the notion that most of the impact of the diplomatic conflict on Western exports can be considered as friendly fire. This finding has direct implications for policy debates in sanctioning countries. Often, arguments against certain sanction policies only relate to potential retaliation and/or to the reduction of imports. Here, we show instead that—at least in the case of the Russia sanctions—the diplomatic conflict also generated losses in terms of export destruction that are not consequences of the retaliatory embargo, but the

[3]Another closely related literature investigates how political representation promotes bilateral trade relations. For instance, Rose (2007) finds that the presence of embassies and consulates is positively correlated with exports, with each additional consulate being associated with around 6–10 % increase in trade, ceteris paribus.

Western countries' own policies.

Using monthly French firm-level data we then evaluate the effects on French firms. We investigate two mechanisms that could explain the emergence of friendly fire: A change in Russian consumers' attitude towards French products, and a sudden increase in country risk driven by political, legal and financial instability generated by the conflict itself and the sanction. The empirical analysis finds little evidence in favor of the consumers' preference channels. Instead, we find that products that use trade finance instruments extensively have been relatively more impacted. This finding suggests that the diplomatic turmoil and the escalation of sanctions, by increasing legal instability and weakening the Russian banking system, have increased the cost of financing and securing international trade relations with Russia. Finally, we show that French exporters that were directly or indirectly affected by the sanctions regime were by and large not able to recover their incurred losses by diverting their foreign sales to alternate destinations.

The paper is structured as follows: section 2 provides a brief overview of the sanctions regime that affected trade flows between sanctioning countries and the Russian Federation. In section 3, we then quantify the country-level trade impact of the sanctions regime in a gravity framework for implicated sanctioning Western countries and the Russian Federation. In section 4, we refocus to the firm-level, identifying effects on intensive and extensive margins and disentangle different channels of impact at the firm-level using French customs data. In section 5, we explore possible trade diversion effects. Section 6 provides the conclusion.

2 Western sanctions and Russian counter-sanctions

The Western sanctions against the Russian Federation and their counter-sanctions are rooted in the simmering conflict in the eastern Ukraine and the Crimea. In this section, we try to give an overview over the developments that led to the introduction of sanctions and discuss the measures. Broadly speaking, the episode can be broken down into three periods, a conflict period in which tensions started to grow between December 2013 and February 2014, followed by a period of "smart sanctions" starting in March 2014. A third period then started in August 2014 with the implementation of both Western economic sanctions in the form of trade restrictions and financial sanctions, and the Russian embargo on imports of food and agricultural products from the 37 sanctioning countries.

In the following discussion, we denote a "sanctioning country" as all countries that enacted smart and economic sanctions against the Russian Federation and were thus the target of Russian counter-sanctions. As "embargoed products," we define all products that were tar-

geted by *Russian* counter-sanctions—an import embargo on certain agricultural and food products. Western economic sanctions were almost exclusively aimed at Russian financial institutions and did not target any *commonly* traded goods in particular. Those exports of highly specialized goods that were prohibited by Western countries were excluded from the analysis below, as trade in these goods is very granular.[4]

Aside from all EU member states and the United States, Norway, Albania, Montenegro, Georgia, Ukraine, Moldavia, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan enacted similar policies.[5] Switzerland, historically politically neutral, enacted legislation that made it more difficult to circumvent sanctions, e.g., by transshipping European exports and imports through the country, yet did not introduce any of its own measures. In terms economic size, countries sanctioning the Russian Federation totaled roughly 55% of the 2014 world GDP.

2.1 Winter 2013–2014: Origins of the conflict and growing tensions

In 2013, the eastern European country of Ukraine faced an apparent dilemma: either sign and conclude an Association Agreement with the European Union (EU)[6] or accede to the Eurasian Customs Union.[7] The former would entail closer ties to "the West" and economic integration with the EU. The latter would lead to stronger economic integration with the Russian Federation and other former members of the Soviet Union, strengthening the historical bonds already in place. While on the surface both options appeared to be of economic consideration, the implications would run much deeper. Economic integration goes hand in hand with political and geopolitical ties (Martin et al., 2012; Hinz, 2014) and thus the domestic and international political debate turned more heated quickly.[8]

Ukraine is a multi-lingual and multi-ethnic country. In late 2013, the ruling government's decision against further economic and political integration with the EU led to an important wave of demonstrations in Kiev and the western part of the country. This protest movement known as the "Euromaidan" led to the overthrow of the sitting Ukrainian government on

[4]As detailed below, Western trade sanctions did apply for goods originating from or destined for Crimea. However, as flows to and from Crimea were previously recorded as Ukrainian, their exclusion does not affect the analysis below. For a discussion of the products affected by Western sanctions, military dual use, and certain manufacturing goods used in oil production and refinery, see section 3.

[5]The exact timing of the enacting of sanctions varies by country, but all did so until the end of August 2014.

[6]The European Union has formed numerous so-called Association Agreements as part of its broader neighborhood policy. These agreements entail the development of economic, political, social, cultural, and security links (Smith, 2013).

[7]Ukraine already became observer to the Eurasian Customs Union in the summer of 2013 (Reuters, 2013). See Dragneva and Wolczuk (2012) for more on the Eurasian Customs Union.

[8]Already in August 2013, Russia voiced its opposition to Ukraine's ambition to form an Association Agreement with the European Union and blocked virtually all imports from Ukraine (Popescu, 2013; AP, 2013).

February 22, 2014.[9] The overthrown government headed by President Yanukovic was perceived as pro-Russian, drawing most of its support from the majority Russian-speaking regions of eastern and southern Ukraine. The "Euromaidan" was, in contrast, by and large pro-European or nationalist, drawing most of its support from the rest of the country (Dreyer et al., 2015). This political split turned increasingly violent, with the EU and United States siding with the "Euromaidan" and the Russian Federation supporting the rivaling factions.

2.2 Spring 2014: First two waves of sanctions – Smart sanctions

The situation deteriorated further in southeastern Ukraine, in particular on the peninsula of Crimea. On February 27, 2014 separatists and armed men seized key government buildings and the main airport, and on March 16, 2014 a much-criticized referendum was held that aimed at the absorption of the Crimea into the Russian Federation. European and allied Western countries, most prominently the United States, imposed the first sanctions on the Russian Federation in mid-March 2014. This initial first wave of sanctions from Western countries, dubbed smart sanctions, focused on implicated political and military personnel as well as select Russian financial institutions (Ashford, 2016). A second wave in the weeks to follow expanded the list of sanctioned individuals and entities.

The first and second wave of Western sanctions consisted of travel bans and asset freezes on several officials and institutions from Russia and Ukraine. See appendix A.1 for a detailed presentation of the content and the timeline of diplomatic decisions. The Russian Federation condemned the measures and on March 20, 2014, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued travel bans on nine high-ranking and influential U.S. politicians and officials.[10]Three days later, 13 Canadian politicians and officials were targeted in a similar fashion and on May 27, 2015, a *blacklist* of 89 politicians and activists from European Union member states emerged.[11]

2.3 Summer 2014: The third wave of sanctions – Trade and financial restrictions

In July 2014, after the crash of a civilian airplane (Malaysian airlines flight MH17), shot down over the separatist region of Donbass with the probable implication of pro-Russian

[9]See also (Dreyer et al., 2015, pp. 44-47) for a timeline of events surrounding the 2014 Ukrainian revolution and subsequent conflict in eastern Ukraine and Crimea.

[10]See http://archive.mid.ru//brp_4.nsf/newsline/1D963ACD52CC987944257CA100550142 and http://archive.mid.ru//brp_4.nsf/newsline/177739554DA10C8B44257CA100551FFE.

[11]See http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/russia-bans-entry-to-13-canadians-in-retaliation-for-ottawas-sanctions/article17635115/ and http://uk.reuters.com/article/russia-europe-travelban-idUKL5N0YL07K20150530.

insurgents, Western countries reinforced the sanctions. This third wave of sanctions went beyond previous measures in depth and scope. Not only were Russian individuals and entities targeted, but European entities were restricted from exporting certain goods: military and dual-use goods, as well as very specific mining equipment. Financial sanctions targeted five major Russian financial institutions from refinancing on the European and US markets (see appendix A.1 for details).

The Russian side, unsurprisingly, retaliated and enacted sanctions on European and other sanctioning countries. On August 7, 2014, the Russian Federation imposed a ban on imports of certain raw and processed agricultural products as an "application of certain special economic measures to ensure the security of the Russian Federation."[12] The targeted products (henceforth the "embargoed products") were select agricultural products, raw materials and foodstuffs originating from the European Union, the United States, Canada, Australia and Norway. The list of banned products was been modified on August 20, 2014 and other sanctioning countries were successively included. See appendix table 8 for the full list of 4 digit HS codes of embargoed products.

3 The big picture: Global impact of sanctions on Russia

We now proceed to quantify the effect of the sanctions episode on trade in a general equilibrium counterfactual framework. Our approach requires no additional data next to trade flows by fully relying on estimated fixed effects. This makes the estimations consistent with theory and immune to data collection issues.

For information on bilateral trade flows, we rely on monthly UN Comtrade data (United Nations Statistics Division, 2015) from January 2012 until December 2015 between all 37 sanctioning countries, Russia, and the 40 other largest exporters in the world. We exclude export flows of certain HS codes for which trade takes place only very infrequently and then in very large values. The respective HS codes are heading 8401 ("Nuclear reactors and part thereof") and chapter 88 ("Aircrafts, spacecrafts, and parts thereof"). Although the sales of these products are also very likely to be impacted by the political tensions, these transactions are usually one-off events resulting in enormous spikes of total export and import values in some months and zero flows in all other months. We also exclude those products that were marked by the European Union as "energy-related equipment" and are subject to prior export authorization: HS headings 7304, 7305, 7306, 8207, 8413, 8430, 8431, 8705 and 8905. Furthermore, as trade with military and dual-use goods is banned by the EU and other sanctioning countries, we exclude chapter 93 ("Arms & Ammunition,

[12] See the *Russian President's Decree No. 560 of August 6, 2014* and the *Resolution of the Government Of the Russian Federation No. 830* of August 20, 2014.

parts & accessories") and all HS codes that are masked the 4-digit level, i.e., those codes that are not shown for reasons of confidentiality. Finally, we aggregate to embargoed and non-embargoed product-level and are left with a total of 335451 non-zero observations. We provide the list of countries and descriptive statistics in table 9 in appendix B.

3.1 Quantification of lost trade

We quantify the cost of sanctions in terms of "lost trade." We predict trade flows to Russia from sanctioning countries and calculate the difference to observed flows. This allows us to put a price tag on the use of sanctions employed by both sides. The different sets of sanctions—imposed by the EU and other countries, on the one hand, and by Russia, on the other hand—are assumed to affect trade as a *bilateral* trade cost. As such, our approach is similar to Hufbauer et al. (2009), but improves upon the theoretical foundation of the model.[13] Aside from the direct, or partial equilibrium impact, the changes in trade impediments due to the conflict and sanctions also had feedback effects on both involved and uninvolved countries. Changes in bilateral trade resistances between Western sanctioning countries and Russia affect all countries through what is known as inward and outward multilateral resistance terms that reflect a country's position in the global trade matrix (Head and Mayer, 2014). Additionally, the sudden increase in bilateral trade costs between sanctioning countries and Russia likely had a sizable impact on production and expenditure in Russia and, to a probably lesser degree, in sanctioning countries.

The methodology we employ is comparable to Glick and Taylor (2010)'s, who examine the effect of the two world wars in a gravity setup and compute a counterfactual by modifying the multilateral resistance terms accordingly. Importantly, though, and in contrast to their work, we also explicitly take changes in production and expenditure figures into account, building on an approach initially pioneered by Dekle et al. (2007). We therefore conduct what Anderson et al. (2015) term a *full* GE exercise, as opposed to a *conditional* one that does not take into account these changes to production and expenditure. We describe the approach in detail in appendix D.

Let trade between origin country o and destination country d at time t be described by an Armington-type gravity structure as in Head and Mayer (2014), so that

$$X_{odt} = \frac{Y_{ot}}{\Omega_{ot}} \cdot \frac{X_{dt}}{\Phi_{dt}} \cdot \phi_{odm} \cdot e^{\beta S_{odt}}, \tag{1}$$

where $Y_{ot} = \sum_d X_{odt}$ is the value of production, i.e. all exports, in o at time t, $X_{dt} = \sum_o X_{odt}$ is the value of expenditure, i.e. all imports, in d time t. Ω_{ot} and Φ_{dt} are the

[13] Hufbauer et al. (2009) employ what Head and Mayer (2014) coin a *naive* gravity setup.

Product	All		Embargoed		Non embargoed	
	Loss		*Loss*		*Loss*	
	in $ bil.	*in %*	*in $ bil.*	*in %*	*in $ bil.*	*in %*
Sanctioning countries	-43.83	-14.81	-4.08	-38.04	-39.74	-13.94
EU	-39.65	-15.46	-2.75	-35.31	-36.91	-14.84
Russia	-69.86	-14.65	0.01	0.51	-69.87	-14.70

Note: Observed and predicted values, and absolute losses are exports between implicated countries in billions of USD. Relative losses are in percent of predicted exports.

Table 1: Export losses by type of goods and country group

respective multilateral resistance terms, such that

$$\Omega_{ot} = \sum_{l \in d} \frac{X_{lt}}{\Phi_{lt}} \cdot \phi_{olm} \cdot e^{\beta S_{olt}} \quad \text{and} \quad \Phi_{dt} = \sum_{l \in o} \frac{Y_{lt}}{\Omega_{lt}} \cdot \phi_{ldm} \cdot e^{\beta S_{ldt}}.$$

ϕ_{odm} subsumes all seasonally-varying bilateral trade barriers and facilitators, which we allow to vary at the month-level denoted by subscript m (as opposed to t for year-month). Sanctions enter as indicator S_{odt} with an elasticity of β.

After estimating all relevant components, the setup allows us to compute counterfactual bilateral and multilateral resistance terms by setting all $S = 0$, i.e., "switching off" sanctions. As Anderson and Yotov (2010) and Head and Mayer (2014) note, this is does not entail a full general equilibrium analysis as production and expenditure terms are unaffected. In order to account for explicit changes to countries' production and expenditure, we follow Anderson et al. (2015) and account for changes to product and expenditure Y_{ot} and X_{dt} by what they coin the adjustment of *factory-gate prices* (see appendix C).

3.2 Estimated general equilibrium impact

Table 1 gives an overview over the estimated lost trade—the difference between observed and predicted trade flows—over the period from early 2014 until the end of 2015 for the implicated (mostly Western) sanctioning countries and Russia, by type of product.[14] Figures 1 and 2 show the results of performing the counterfactual analysis with total exports and those of embargoed products to Russia by all sanctioning and non-sanctioning countries. The solid line displays the observed value and the dashed one the predicted value using the procedure detailed above. The three vertical lines indicate the three dates at which the previously defined periods start: December 2013 for the beginning of the conflict, March 2014 for the first implementation of "smart sanctions" and August 2014 for the beginning of economic sanctions from both sides. The fit is remarkably good in the pre-conflict time between later "treated" country pairs and between "untreated" country

[14]The results of the estimations of lost trade for each sanctioning country and product separately are shown in tables 10, 11, and 12 in the appendix.

pairs, suggesting precisely estimated fixed effects and general validity for the results. The importer $\times$ time fixed effects in particular appear to capture well the overall turmoil in the Russian economy, as the observed drastic drop of imports from *non-sanctioning* countries in early 2015 is almost perfectly mirrored by a predicted drop. Note that this finding is of some importance as we will use the estimated importer $\times$ time fixed effects later in section 4 to control for importer-specific shocks.



Figure 1: Predicted vs. observed total value of exported goods to Russia from sanctioning and non-sanctioning countries by type of products. Solid lines display observed trade flows, dashed lines predicted flows. Vertical lines indicate dates of interest. 95% confidence intervals based on bootstrapped standard errors.

As seen in figures 1a and 1b, the predicted values match the observed values very closely for the time prior to the initial beginning of political tensions in December 2013. This changes afterwards. While the observed flows from non-sanctioning countries do not fall beneith their predicted values, those of the sanctioning countries do so strongly. Total trade of those countries moves away from its prediction starting in January 2014 and sharply so since the beginning of economic sanctions in August 2014. The pattern is dramatically visible for embargoed products, where the exports of sanctioning countries collapses starting in August 2014, while those from non-sanctioning countries remain stable and even appear to replace some of the exports from sanctioning Western countries.[15]

The picture is reinforced when zooming into two-country comparisons and performing (pseudo) placebo tests on non-treated importers and exporters. Figure 2a displays the total value of embargoed product exports to Russia from one sanctioning and one non-sanctioning country, namely Germany and Switzerland. The two countries are very comparable: both are located at similar distances to the Russian Federation, speak the same language and belong to the same free trade zone. However, only Germany is "treated".

[15] See appendix D, tables 10, 11 and 12 for the quantification of lost trade with total, embargoed and non-embargoed goods trade by period and country.

(a) Comparison between treated/non-treated exporter

(b) Comparison between treated/non-treated importer

Figure 2: (Pseudo) placebo test with treated/non-treated exporter and importers. Solid lines display observed trade flows, dashed lines predicted flows. Vertical lines indicate dates of interest. 95% confidence intervals based on bootstrapped standard errors.

Exports from Germany decreased significantly after the beginning of the conflict and collapsed after the imposition of economic sanctions in August 2014, while those of neutral Switzerland remained virtually unchanged, being even above their predicted values. In figure 2b, we conduct another comparison exercise by looking at exports of embargoed products by Germany to Russia and Turkey—a non-treated importer. There is virtually no difference between observed and predicted trade flows to Turkey when artificially treating these as sanctioned. The results of these placebo tests clearly indicate the particularity of bilateral trade flows between sanctioning countries and Russia since the beginning of the conflict and further support the validity and quality of the predictions using the estimated fixed effects.

To get a better idea of the magnitude of the impact, we compute the difference between predicted and observed trade flows by country, i.e. the *lost trade*. We report the key findings here and refer to appendix D for the results in full detail. The total global lost trade for the period between December 2013 and December 2015 amounts to US$ 114 billion. US$ 70 billion are being borne by the Russian Federation, which amounts to 15 % of Russia's predicted exports in a scenario without sanctions. On the other side, Western countries also bear a significant share of the global lost trade. One finding of particular relevance for the political debate is that only US$ 4.1 billion, or 9.3% of Western lost trade, are accrued in embargoed products. The bulk of the lost trade from Western countries can therefore be considered *friendly fire*, a cost on private actors that were not directly targeted by the Russian embargo.[16]

[16]Embargoed products are likely additionally exposed to the same factors that induced the decrease in exports of non-embargoed products, so that this estimate of friendly fire can be considered the lower-bound.

Figure 3: Composition lost exports to Russia of embargoed and non-embargoed products, by country

(a) Monthly absolute losses of exports to Russia (in million USD per month)



(b) Monthly relative losses of exports to Russia (in %)



The European Union bears 90% of all lost trade of sanctioning countries and 93% of lost trade in non-embargoed products. The impact, however, is not evenly distributed among sanctioning countries: Figures 3a and 3b display the average monthly difference between predicted and observed exports in relative and absolute terms by country, broken down into trade of embargoed and non-embargoed products. In relative terms, Norway and Australia are hit hardest, with lost trade amounting to up to 39% of predicted flows to Russia. When comparing to total exports, however, Finland (1.7 %), Poland (0.9 %) and Germany (0.8 %) are most affected. Germany's exports are, on average, about US$727 million lower per month compared to a counterfactual scenario without sanctions, most

of it incurred by non-embargoed products. The United Kingdom (US$ 144 million) and Poland (US$ 138 million) follow, albeit in much smaller magnitudes. In percentage terms, Germany is bearing almost 40% of Western lost trade, while other major geopolitical players like the United Kingdom (7.9%), France (4.1%) and the United States (0.6%) are much less affected. Overall, the composition of the losses incurred varies widely by period and affected products.

4 Drilling down: firm-level impact

We now explore more closely how firms reacted to the sanctions. By inspecting the response of exporters to the sanctions, we aim to shed light on the underlying mechanisms that gave rise to the export losses identified in the previous section. More precisely, the aim of this investigation is threefold.

First, we want to check the robustness of the results presented above. The use of firm data allows us to control for the unobservable characteristics of exporters and their links with the Russian market. They also help to verify that macroeconomic effects are not influenced by changes in the export behavior of a few major exporters. Second, we aim to provide indirect evidence about the exact nature of the trade impediments generated by the sanctions. The consequences to be expected from embargoes are obvious. But the previous section highlighted significant trade impacts for products that are not subject to embargo. The study of the channels through which trade in these products is affected allows us to better understand the nature of the "friendly fire" and to determine why and how sanctions (and, more generally, the surrounding diplomatic turmoil) can also penalize the sanctioning country. In order to enlighten this question, we propose a series of tests that exploit the heterogeneity of firms' responses depending on their own characteristics or the type of product they export. Finally, we analyze whether French exporters were able to offset their losses on the Russian market by diverting sales to other destinations.

To conduct these analyses, we focus on the case of France, for which we have detailed customs data providing monthly exports at the firm-product-destination level. As mentioned above, the Russian Federation is a major trade partner for France. In 2013, it was the 12th most important destination for French exports, and the 5th one outside the European Union, after the United States, China, Switzerland and Japan.

4.1 Empirical specification

In order to isolate the impact of the conflict in Ukraine and the sanctions on French firms' exports to Russia from possible confounding factors, we adopt a difference-in-differences (DID) approach which combines spatial and time differences. The ideal DID analysis would

compare the trend of exports of French firms to Russia to the ones of firms originating from a country not involved in the diplomatic conflict. This would require at least two sets of monthly firm-level records, from two different countries, which is not feasible in practice. Instead, we compare the change in French firms' exports to Russia before and after "Maidan revolution" to similar changes of exports to a set of alternative countries. The treatment variable is a dummy identifying export flows to Russia during the diplomatic conflict. The empirical specification includes both firm $\times$ date $\times$ product and firm $\times$ destination $\times$ product fixed effects. Ideally, we would like to add also destination $\times$ product $\times$ date fixed effects to control for changes in destination countries' market accessibility from all possible sources (such as demand, aggregate prices, and trade costs). This is of course not possible since the treatment variable and such a fixed effects would vary along the same dimensions. To circumvent this problem, we use the destination $\times$ time fixed effects estimated in the previous section.[17] Finally, we estimate the following specification:

$$X_{idkt} = \theta_{itk} + \theta_{idk} + \alpha\hat{\Theta}_{dk't} + \sum_{p=1,2,3} \delta_p \text{Event}_p \times (d = \text{Russia}) + \varepsilon_{idkt}, \tag{2}$$

where X_{idkt} is alternatively the value exported by firm i to destination d at date t or a dummy set to one if this value is strictly positive. θ_{itk} is a firm $\times$ date $\times$ product fixed effect, θ_{idk} is a firm $\times$ destination $\times$ product fixed effect. $\hat{\Theta}_{dk't}$ is the importer$\times$ date fixed effect estimated in the previous section, where k' denotes embargoed and non-embargoed products. ε_{idkt} is an error term. The vector of event dummies, $\text{Event}_p \times (d = \text{Russia})$, distinguishes three periods defined with respect to the implementation of sanctions described in section 2:

- p=1, from December 2013 until February 2014, in which political tensions were increasing while no sanctions were put in place yet.
- p=2 starts in March 2014 with the implementation of the first wave of sanctions, later succeeded by the "second wave", and ends in July 2014. During this period Western governments targeted people and institutions implicated in the events in eastern Ukraine and Crimea, a policy dubbed "smart sanctions".
- p=3 starts in August 2014 with the implementation of harsher trade and financial sanctions, first by the EU and allied countries and then in retaliation by the Russian Federation.

Each of the periods enters as a separate dummy into the regression of equation (2), i.e. is set to 1 during the respective time period and 0 otherwise.

[17] Note that the econometric analysis of firm-level response to the sanction is conducted with individual export data aggregated at the 4-digit level of the HS classification (HS4). Unfortunately, it is not computationally feasible to estimate the importer $\times$ date fixed effects for all HS4 products. We therefore simply use variables $\hat{\Theta}_{dk't}$ defined—as done in the previous section—for the aggregates (k') of embargoed and non-embargoed products.

4.2 Firm-level data

We exploit a dataset of the universe of monthly French exports at the firm level, provided by the French customs authorities. Our data covers more than 10 years until December 2014. Each observation records date (year and month), a unique firm code (*SIREN*), 8-digit product code (*nc8*), the destination country and the value exports (in Euros).

Our empirical specification, defined with equation 2, compares the trend of exports of a given firm to Russia to its trend of exports to alternative destinations. In consequence, we restrict our sample to firms that export to Russia at least once between January 2013 and December 2014. In order to reduce the sample size further, we aggregate all trade flows at the 4-digit level of the HS product classification (HS4), the level at which the Russian embargo on certain food and agricultural products applies. We exclude from the analysis the goods that are subjected to export restrictions within the framework of European sanctions (see table 7) along with "Nuclear reactors and part thereof" (*HS 8401*) and "Aircrafts, spacecrafts, and parts thereof" (*HS 88*). The reason for this exclusion is that the trade of these products is very granular, which makes a robust identification of a trend in export flows very difficult. All together, these products represented about 12% of French exports to Russia in 2012 but only 2% of French firms exporting to Russia which export very large amounts, in a very sporadic way. Finally, the analysis developed in this section focuses on all months of 2012–2014. The final database then contains 5746 firms, covers 950 HS4 products and counts 16,333 firm-HS4 groups.

In order to be able to control for unobserved determinants of time-varying individual supply capacities (with the firm $\times$ product $\times$ date fixed effect θ_{itk}), we need a control group consisting of alternative destinations of French exports. The difficulty is that export flows to any other country are potentially affected by the treatment. The limitations on trade with Russia can influence the exports towards other destinations in two different ways. On the one hand, French firms that had to cut exports to Russia because of the sanctions may have tried to compensate for their losses by expanding their sales to other countries. In this case, the measures would have boosted the French export to non-Russian markets, which were to lead us to overestimate the impact of the treatment on French exports towards Russia. On the other hand, the diversion of trade toward non-Russian markets should increase the toughness of these destinations in terms of competition and make them less accessible to French exporters. This effect would bias downward the estimated impact of sanctions. It seems reasonable, however, that firms that are directly affected by the trade restrictions divert their exports intended to Russia first and foremost towards their own domestic market. As a consequence, the second bias is presumably stronger in countries involved in the sanctions regime. Therefore, our preferred control group is composed of sanctioning European countries in close proximity to Russia: Romania, Bulgaria, Greece,

Finland, Norway, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Croatia. Because all these countries actively sanctioned Russia, we expect French exports to this control group to be negatively affected by the sanctions, leading to a conservative lower bound estimate of the direct impact of sanctions on French exports towards Russia.[18]

As has become customary in the literature on international trade following Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), we again use a PPML estimator (with the described fixed effects) for our estimation of the intensive margin,[19] and a linear probability estimator for the extensive margin. The error term in equation 2 reflects unobserved idiosyncratic shocks in firm-product-destination-time demand shifters. Therefore, we cluster errors by firm-product to allow for possible correlation between disturbances of trade flows across destinations and over dates within an exporter.

4.3 Impact on firm-level exports

In this section, we investigate the consequence of the escalation of sanctions between Russia and Western countries on French firms' exports.

The benchmark results are shown in table 2, for the group of embargoed agricultural products (columns 1 and 2) and non-embargoed ones (columns 3 and 4) separately. All regressions corroborate the fact, established in section 3, that the diplomatic dispute impacted negatively French exports to Russia. The firm-level regressions reveal a significant and sizable decline in both export participation and exported values during each of the three periods of interest. Unsurprisingly, the marginal impact grows steadily as the diplomatic climate with Russia deteriorated.

For embargoed products, the impact is of course the strongest in period 3, when the embargo is implemented, but the decline in export participation is visible since the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine. The probability of exporting is reduced by 0.058 in period 1, 0.143 in period 2 and 0.467 in period 3, which means large magnitude impacts given the observed export probability. The percentage differences between the estimated average probabilities of exporting to Russia in presence of the treatment and the ones when the treatment dummy is set to zero are 9.3%, 22.8% and 75.5% for periods 1, 2 and 3

[18] See also figure 5 in appendix E. Panels (a) and (b) show the number of French exporters and total French exports to Russia and the control group, respectively, normalized by the average levels during the pre-event period (from December 2012 to November 2013). While there is a clear drop in the intensity of export relationships with the Russian Federation starting in December 2013, there is no visible change in the trend of exports toward control group countries. Table 13 shows the robustness of our benchmark results to an alternative control group.

[19] To deal with the large number of fixed effects we use the poi2hdfe estimator developed by Guimaraes and Portugal (2010). Table 14 in appendix confirms that our results are robust to robust to alternative estimators, i.e. OLS and Logit respectively for the value exported and export participation.

Table 2: Intensive and extensive trade margins: Export values and export probability

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
HS.	Embargoed		Non-Embargoed	
Estimator	PPML	LPM	PPML	LPM
Dep. var.	x_{idkt}	$x_{idkt} > 0$	x_{idkt}	$x_{idkt} > 0$
Russia × Dec '13 - Feb '14	-0.144	-0.058^{b}	-0.150^{a}	-0.026^{a}
	(0.128)	(0.028)	(0.053)	(0.003)
Russia × Mar '14 - Jul '14	-0.468^{c}	-0.143^{a}	-0.207^{a}	-0.030^{a}
	(0.247)	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.002)
Russia × Aug '14 - Dec '14	-2.173^{a}	-0.467^{a}	-0.245^{a}	-0.048^{a}
	(0.365)	(0.029)	(0.060)	(0.003)
$\hat{\Theta}_{dk't}$	0.011	0.016^{a}	0.059^{a}	0.007^{a}
	(0.027)	(0.004)	(0.018)	(0.001)
Nb. Obs.	47533	47533	2136210	2842920
R^2	-	0.601	-	0.589

Notes: All regression include Firm × Destination × HS4 and Firm × time × HS4 fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by Firm × HS4. Significance levels: ^{c}: p<0.1, ^{b}: p<0.05, ^{a}: p<0.01.

respectively.[20] This is corroborated by the PPML results which indicate that the individual trade value decreased by $1 - \exp(-0.468) = 37.3\%$ with the first wave of sanctions (period 2), and 89% with the embargo. It is noteworthy that a significant decrease in exports of embargoed products is visible before the implementation of the embargo. In other words, if it is true that the embargo almost eliminated the exports of embargoed products, the political instability in the region and—even more—the "smart sanctions" imposed by Western countries also struck a blow at French exporters of agricultural products.[21]

French exporters of non-embargoed products also reacted strongly to the growing instability at the Russian border. Estimates reported in column (3) indicate that the average monthly value of export shipment to Russia decreased by 13.9% in period 1, 18.7% in period 2 and 21.7% in period 3. A part of this decline is the consequence of a decrease in export participation. The contraction of the export probability plunged progressively:

[20]The impact is less than 100% in period 3, however, as the list of products that are banned by the Russian authorities does not overlap exactly the HS classification, baby food for instance is explicitly exempt. In other words, our definition of the embargoed products is quite comprehensive (and conservative) and covers some varieties of products for which the export to the Russian Federation is not prohibited. For these products, the consequence of the embargo transits through the intensive margin (see column 1).

[21]This finding has important policy implications. France, as most EU countries, faced a severe farming crisis in 2014–2015 and several political leaders blamed the Russian embargo for generating excess supply in the EU and depressing the agricultural goods prices. For instance, Xavier Beulin, the former leader of the main French farmer union (FNSEA), in October 2014 wrote a public letter to the French president claiming that "the Russian Embargo generates, at least, a direct loss of 5.2 billion Euros per year." Not to mention the evident overestimation of this figure (from 2011 to 2013 the total French exports of agricultural and agri-food products to Russia was less than 1,2 billion Euros per year), our estimations show that most of the drop in exports of embargoed goods to Russia in 2014 is not the consequence of the embargo: A part of it (not estimated here because it is absorbed by the fixed effects and $\hat{\Theta}_{dk't}$) is the consequence of the economic crisis in Russia, and about a third of the rest occurred before Russia decided to embargo western agricultural products.

by 8.2% in period 1, 9.5% during the time of Western "smart sanctions" (period 2) and 15.4% during the last period.

4.4 Differential impact across firms and products and the causes of trade disruption

We do not exactly know how the impact of sanctions may vary across firms, as we do not know the exact nature of the trade frictions they generated. Of course, the Russian embargo on agricultural and food products is unambiguous. Determining why the conflict in Ukraine and the complex scheme of sanctions imposed by Western countries affected the exports of non-embargoed products is much more challenging. Since we have excluded from the analysis the products listed by the EU to be subject to trade restrictions, the impact of the sanctions estimated in the previous sections must be channeled by less direct mechanisms. It seems unlikely that the EU measures concerning economic cooperation (e.g., suspension of EU-Russia bilateral and regional cooperation programs), diplomatic relations (e.g., cancellation of a G8 summit, suspension of the negotiations over Russia's accession to the OECD), and asset freezes and visa bans applied to a handful of Russian citizens had an immediate and direct effect on the export flows to Russia. However, we suspect two mechanisms that may have been at work and contributed to the decline of export. The first possible mechanism could be an abrupt change of Russian consumers' preferences resulting from a spontaneous boycott of Western products in reaction to the diplomatic gridlock. The second one is related to increasing country risk. The sudden rise of economic and political instability might have hindered to do business in Russia or with Russian firms. In this context, the sanctions themselves, which have added legal instability and weakened the Russian financial system, might have generated a disruption in the supply of trade finance instruments and lessened the ability to secure international payments.

In this subsection, we focus on non-embargoed products and exploit the possible heterogeneous response to political turmoil across firms and products in order to shed light on the nature of the trade impediments generated by the sanctions.

4.4.1 Change in consumers' attitude

A first reason that could explain why the exports of non-embargoed products to Russia declined after the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine (and further when the EU imposed sanctions) is an abrupt change of consumers' preferences. It is indeed possible that the Western sanctions have been perceived by Russian consumers as an unjustified interference in Russian affairs. If the diplomatic reaction of the Western governments has been perceived as a "Russia bashing," it could have deteriorated the brand image of Western products and

led part of the Russian consumers to remove these products from their consumption basket.

Existing studies on the consequences of boycotts on international trade lead to diverging conclusions. However, several recent studies, including Michaels and Zhi (2010), Pandya and Venkatesan (2016), and Heilmann (2016),[22] confirm that boycott calls and, more generally, worsening consumer attitudes towards a foreign country have a sizable impact on trade volumes. In the case of Russia, we are not aware of any large scale boycott campaign against Western products. However, during summer 2014, the Russian government set up a media campaign on its decision to ban Western food products in retaliation to the Western sanctions, organizing, for instance, the public destruction of illegally imported food. These official messages might have influenced consumers' decisions.

If a part of the impact estimated above is the consequence of a loss of popularity of Western products, we would expect a more severe trade disruption for consumer goods and varieties that are easily identified as Western products. Heilmann (2016) shows clearly that boycotts have larger effects on highly-branded products and consumer goods than on capital or intermediate ones. We base our identification strategy on the expected heterogeneous effect of the change in consumers' attitude across firms and products, by interacting our treatment variables with indicators of *made-in-label* visibility. Table 3 shows the results obtained with three different indicators of visibility.

In panel A we add interactions with a dummy set to one for consumption goods.[23] In panel B we focus on consumption goods and break up the analysis by whether consumer goods tend to be branded. This distinction is based on the presence of exporters of luxury brands within a product category. The idea here is that luxury firms need to invest substantially in their brand image, which is possible only for consumption products that are easily branded. The list of French exporters of luxury goods is provided by Martin and Mayneris (2015).[24] In order to identify the producers of luxury goods, they exploit the list of French firms that are member of the "Comité Colbert," a French organization gathering the main brands of the French luxury industry with the objective to promote these high-end producers and defend their interests. In panel C, we focus on those HS4 products goods that are exported by "Comité Colbert" members but, instead of differentiating the impact of the sanctions

[22]Heilmann (2016) studies the impact of various boycott campaigns. In particular, this paper confirms Michaels and Zhi (2010)'s conclusion showing that the diplomatic clash between France and the United States over the Iraq War in 2003 reduced significantly the trade between the two countries during a short period of time.

[23]We use the classification by broad economic categories (BEC) provided by the United Nations to identify consumption products. The BEC groups the sections of the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) according their main end use. It distinguishes food, industrial supplies, capital equipment and consumer goods. After matching the SITC classification with the HS, we coded as consumer goods the HS4 containing majority of HS6 identified in the BEC as "consumer goods," "food," and " Passenger motor cars."

[24]We thank Julien Martin and Florian Mayneris for sharing their data.

Table 3: Interaction with brand visibility - Non-embargoed products

	(1)	(2)
Estimator	PPML	LPM
Dep. var	x_{idkt}	$x_{idkt} > 0$
Panel A		
Sample = All non-embargoed goods		
Russia × Dec '13 - Feb '14	0.022	0.004
× Consumption goods	(0.097)	(0.005)
Russia × Mar '14 - Jul '14	0.068	0.010[b]
× Consumption goods	(0.074)	(0.005)
Russia × Aug '14 - Dec '14	0.043	0.002
× Consumption goods	(0.113)	(0.005)
Nb. obs.	2136210	2842920
R^2	-	0.589
Panel B		
Sample = Consumption goods		
Russia × Dec '13 - Feb '14	0.145	-0.008
× Luxury goods	(0.090)	(0.011)
Russia × Mar '14 - Jul '14	-0.072	0.003
× Luxury goods	(0.081)	(0.011)
Russia × Aug '14 - Dec '14	0.092	-0.003
× Luxury goods	(0.135)	(0.012)
Nb. obs.	824391	1144908
R^2	-	0.576
Panel C		
Sample = Luxury goods		
Russia × Dec '13 - Feb '14	0.038	-0.007
× Luxury firms	(0.088)	(0.010)
Russia × Mar '14 - Jul '14	0.049	-0.009
× Luxury firms	(0.091)	(0.010)
Russia × Aug '14 - Dec '14	0.045	-0.008
× Luxury firms	(0.111)	(0.011)
Nb. obs.	690718	973152
R^2	-	0.570

Notes: Non-embargoed products only. All regression include Firm × Destination × HS4 and Firm × time × HS4 fixed effects, and four unreported variables: $\hat{\Theta}_{dk't}$ and dummies Russia × Aug '14 - Dec '14, Russia × Mar '14 - Jul '14, and Russia × Aug '14 - Dec '14. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by Firm × HS4. None of the coefficients reported in this table are significantly different from zero at the 10% level.

across different types of products, we look at whether the impact is different for these high-end producers, within their HS4. The underlying assumption here is that French luxury brands are highly visible and easily identified as "typically" French. Therefore, they may be potential targets of boycott calls and/or more sensitive to worsening attitudes towards French products.[25] Except for a small unexpected positive coefficient in column

[25]This hypothesis is in line with the evidence provided by Pandya and Venkatesan (2016). In their study of the consequence of the diplomatic conflict between France and the United States over the war in Iraq, they show that brands that are the most clearly *perceived* as French are the most impacted by the boycott campaign.

2 of panel A, none of these interaction terms is significantly different from zero. This discards the hypothesis that sudden changes in consumer preferences is the main driver of the drop in French exports to Russia after December 2014.

4.4.2 Country risk, firm size and trade finance

We now turn to the exploration of the role of country risk. Until firms are reassured on the security of their shipments and payments, businesses may be inclined to reduce their exports and stop or delay their search of new business opportunities.

Again, our data do not offer a direct way to test whether this reaction of exporters to insecurity may have contributed to the decline of French exports to Russia. The first test we propose looks at whether the impact of the political turmoil varies according to the size of exporters. It is indeed sensible to expect larger and more experienced exporters to be less affected by political instability, either because they can afford higher exports cost, they have a better ability to deal with complex situations in cross-border relationships, or because their international transactions are likely to be based on larger and more stable networks of customers. The existing literature on firms' dynamics on export markets confirms that persistence on export markets increases with the firms' size and length of export experience (e.g., Timoshenko (2015), Berman et al. (2015), Bricongne et al. (2012)). Haidar (2014) also shows that the sanctions against Iran affected most severely small Iranian exporters.

In table 4, we interact the three binary treatment variables with an indicator of firm size. This interaction variable is, for each firm and HS4, the log of the total export sales of the firm before the treatment period, i.e. between January 2011 and November 2013, over total French export of the HS4. This variable, which is invariant over time, is larger when the firm exported relatively large values compared to other French exporters of the same HS4, and/or when the firm has been active on foreign markets for a relatively long time.[26] Estimation results are not very conclusive. The positive coefficient reported in the first row of column (2) confirms that big exporters are more resilient when facing political uncertainty. Their probability of exporting to Russia is relatively less impacted by the surge of the military conflict. However, this small advantage disappears in the second and third periods, when "smart sanctions" and economic sanctions are implemented. This result may appear intriguing, but it is better understood when one adopts a more precise strategy for identification of sensitivity to country risk.

We, therefore, push forward our investigation on the impact of country risk by looking

[26] Of course, results are robust to alternative measures of firm size. Robustness checks, not reported here, are available from the authors upon request.

Table 4: Interaction with firm size - Non-embargoed products

	(1)	(2)
Estimator	PPML	LPM
Dep. var	x_{idkt}	$x_{idkt} > 0$
Russia × Dec '13 - Feb '14	-0.004	0.002[a]
× Firm Size$_{ik}$	(0.018)	(0.001)
Russia × Mar '14 - Jul '14	-0.006	-0.000
× Firm Size$_{ik}$	(0.015)	(0.001)
Russia × Aug '14 - Dec '14	-0.018	-0.001
× Firm Size$_{ik}$	(0.021)	(0.001)
Russia × Dec '13 - Feb '14	-0.128	-0.025[a]
	(0.086)	(0.003)
Russia × Mar '14 - Jul '14	-0.172[b]	-0.030[a]
	(0.073)	(0.003)
Russia × Aug '14 - Dec '14	-0.142	-0.048[a]
	(0.093)	(0.003)
$\hat{\Theta}_{dk't}$	0.059[a]	0.007[a]
	(0.093)	(0.003)
Nb. Obs.	2136210	2842920
R^2	-	0.589

Notes: Non-Embargoed products only. All regression include Firm × Destination × HS4 and Firm × time × HS4 fixed effects. Significance levels: [c]: p<0.1, [b]: p<0.05, [a]: p<0.01.

at the specific role of trade finance. Growing political instability in Russia might have increased the price of trade finance products aiming at mitigating the risk affecting international transaction. This increase logically raised the transaction costs and reduced both the volume of trade and firms' export participation. In our case, this channel might be particularly important since the sanctions imposed by Western countries on major Russian businesses and financial institutions could have directly affected the provision of trade finance services by Russian banks.[27]

Of course, the sanctions imposed by Western countries—since they were explicitly designed to spare western exports as much as possible—did not directly target the provision of trade finance services. There is reason to believe that they impacted this business however. First, the financial sanctions imposed after August 2014, undoubtedly weakened the major Russian banks, reducing their capacity to offer competitive financial services. Second, even before these financial sanctions were put in place, it is possible that the first wave of sanctions generated a climate of legal insecurity leading both Western and Russian banks to stop or delayed pending transactions until having guarantees on their legality. Existence of serious concerns about the scope of the sanctions and the resulting legal instability regarding trade finance is revealed, for instance, by the fact that the EU commission felt the need to publish a guidance note in December 2014 concerning the implementation

[27]The five Russian banks directly hit by the EU sanctions are Sberbank (the largest Russian bank and the third largest bank in Europe), VTB Bank, Gazprombank, Vnesheconombank and Rosselkhozbank.

of certain provisions of the financial sanctions.[28] The purpose of this note was to clarify some aspects of the regulation establishing the sanctions, including those relating to the provision of financial services by Russian banks. The note confirmed that "EU persons can process payments, provide insurance, issue letters of credit, extend loans, to sanctioned entities." At the same time the note remarks that the clarification followed questions that had been brought forward to the EU Commission, suggesting that some actors felt the need for a clarification about the legal environment.

In order to assess the role of this possible link between the sanctions and trade, we look at whether the magnitude of the impact of the sanctions is related to the importance of the usage of trade finance instruments. Unfortunately, we again face data limitations. We do not have any information about usage of trade finance instruments by French exporters directly. In fact, information of this kind is very rare. Most of the existing empirical literature on the importance of trade finance is based on partial and very limited data,[29] or on information on firm-bank links that are not specific to the provision of trade finance instruments.[30] There are also a few studies using detailed information, but restrict the analysis to a single country. Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2016) and Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2017) exploit data on U.S. banks allowing the provision of trade finance services for US international trade transactions across the world. Finally, two papers exploit very detailed firm-level data: Demir and Javorcik (2014) for Turkey and Ahn (2015) for Colombia and Chile. This literature shows that the use of trade finance instruments varies greatly across firms, partner countries and products. Our empirical strategy is based on the variance across products. In the spirit of many empirical studies on the consequence of financial development, which exploit the variation in financial vulnerability across sectors computed from firm-level data for a reference country,[31] the identification of the role of trade finance is based on an interaction between our variables of interest and a product-level indicator of dependence on trade finance.

The indicator we use is calculated from the data exploited by Demir and Javorcik (2014).[32] Their data covers the universe of Turkish exports disaggregated by exporter, product, destination, and financing terms for 2003-2007. Three types of financing terms supporting international trade contracts are identified: "Cash-in-advance" (the importer pays before the arrival of the good and bears the risk), "open account" (the importer pays after the arrival and the exporter bears the risk) and "letters of credits" (a bank intermediary secures the payment on behalf of the importer confirming that the exporter meets the requirements

[28] Commission Notice of 16.12.2014, `http://europa.eu/newsroom/files/pdf/c_2014_9950_en.pdf`.

[29] For instance, the empirical analysis provided by Antràs and Foley (2015) in support of their theoretical model is based on information for a single U.S.-based exporter.

[30] See e.g. Paravisini et al. (2014).

[31] See e.g. Manova (2013).

[32] We are deeply indebted to Banu Demir for providing us with these indicators.

Figure 4: Trade finance dependence: Share of trade using letters of credits by HS2 (mean, max and min)



specified in the contract). We aggregate this information to compute, for each HS4, the share of Turkish trade paid for by letters of credits.[33] Needless to say, Turkey is not Russia. However the two countries share a lot of similarities and we can be confident that French firms that export towards these countries make very comparable decisions regarding their choice of payment contract. Russia and Turkey are both emerging countries, with comparable GDP per capita. More importantly for the choice of the financing terms that support international trade, they are equally distant to France and they have quite comparable levels of development of their financial systems (the recent literature on trade finance has revealed that these two variables influence greatly the usage of letters of credits). According to the financial development indicator proposed by Svirydzenka (2016), Russia is ranked 32nd in the world and Turkey is 37th.[34] It is noteworthy that the use of Turkish data is not only motivated by the lack of data for Russia. It is also a way to obtain indicators that are exogenous to the economic and political situation in Russia.

After matching this source with our trade data, we have information on the use of letters of credit for 684 HS4-level products,[35] all of which are not embargoed by the economic sanctions imposed by the EU or the Russian Federation. For most HS4, the share of trade

[33] As a robustness check, we also used the share of French exports to Turkey using letters of credits. The results (unreported but available from the authors upon request) are very similar to the ones reported in table 5.

[34] In the ranking proposed by the World Economic Forum (World Economic Forum, 2012), Russia is ranked 39th and Turkey 42th.

[35] Because few products show very exterme shares of trade using LC, we exclude values that fall below the 1th percentile or above the 99th percentile.

Table 5: Interaction with dependence to trade finance - Non-embargoed products

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Estimator	PPML	OLS	PPML	OLS
Dep. var	x_{idkt}	$x_{idkt} > 0$	x_{idkt}	$x_{idkt} > 0$
Russia × Dec '13 - Feb '14	-0.064	-0.004		
× Trade Finance	(0.050)	(0.003)		
Russia × Mar '14 - Jul '14	-0.115^{a}	-0.001		
× Trade Finance	(0.037)	(0.003)		
Russia × Aug '14 - Dec '14	-0.139^{b}	-0.001		
× Trade Finance	(0.066)	(0.003)		
Russia × Dec '13 - Feb '14			-0.064	-0.005
× Trade Finance × Small			(0.057)	(0.003)
Russia × Mar '14 - Jul '14			-0.023	-0.002
× Trade Finance × Small			(0.059)	(0.003)
Russia × Aug '14 - Dec '14			-0.115^{c}	-0.002
× Trade Finance × Small			(0.068)	(0.003)
Russia × Dec '13 - Feb '14			-0.064	-0.001
× Trade Finance × Large			(0.054)	(0.005)
Russia × Mar '14 - Jul '14			-0.122^{a}	0.000
× Trade Finance × Large			(0.039)	(0.005)
Russia × Aug '14 - Dec '14			-0.141^{b}	-0.000
× Trade Finance × Large			(0.070)	(0.005)
Russia × Dec '13 - Feb '14	-0.127^{b}	-0.027^{a}	-0.127^{b}	-0.027^{a}
	(0.055)	(0.003)	(0.055)	(0.003)
Russia × Mar '14 - Jul '14	-0.198^{a}	-0.029^{a}	-0.198^{a}	-0.029^{a}
	(0.041)	(0.003)	(0.041)	(0.003)
Russia × Aug '14 - Dec '14	-0.246^{a}	-0.046^{a}	-0.246^{a}	-0.046^{a}
	(0.060)	(0.003)	(0.059)	(0.003)
$\hat{\Theta}_{dk't}$	0.060^{a}	0.008^{a}	0.060^{a}	0.008^{a}
	(0.019)	(0.001)	(0.018)	(0.001)
Nb. obs.	2029621	2695068	2029621	2695068
R^2		0.590		0.590

Notes: Non-embargoed products only. All regression include Firm × Destination × HS4 and Firm × time × HS4 fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by Firm × HS4. Significance levels: ^{c}: p<0.1, ^{b}: p<0.05, ^{a}: p<0.01.

using letters of credit is very small. The average is about 5.3% and the median value is only 4.1%. However, this share varies a lot across HS4. The coefficient of variation is 0.81. The variance is also substantial within broader categories of products. In Figure 4, we report the average value across chapters of the HS classification (HS2), along with the maximum and minimum levels. There are clearly some categories of products for which it is relatively common to rely on letters of credits. This is mainly the case for raw materials such as minerals, basic chemicals or metals. Within most chapters, however, and in particular in those showing high averages, the variance across HS4 is substantial.

Results are shown in table 5. The linear probability estimates fail to show any significant impact of dependence to trade finance (columns 2 and 4). On the intensive margin

(columns 1), however, the PPML estimates reveal that the reaction to the political shocks is higher for product categories where the usage of trade finance instruments is more widespread. Interestingly, the interacted effect is larger in magnitude and more significant in periods 2 and 3, when the Western sanctions were implemented.
Let us come back now to the role of firm size studied in table 4. Existing evidence on the usage of trade finance indicates that the provision of these services involves substantial fixed costs for the trading companies. Consequently, they are mainly used by large firms. Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2017), for instance, show that the average value of "letter of credit"-financed transactions with the United States is about 18 times larger than those transactions that do not rely on bank intermediation. Therefore, we expect that the impact of dependence on trade finance is magnified for large firms. We test this prediction in columns (2)–(3) by interacting our variable of interest with dummies indicating whether the exporters have a size greater than the 75th percentile within their HS4. Results confirm that the overreaction of products with higher trade finance dependence is clearly stronger for larger firms, which contribute to understanding the results shown in table 4.

5 Trade diversion

The two previous sections revealed a substantial reduction of exports from France and other sanctioning countries to Russia. These losses are the consequence of a direct effect of the Russian retaliations (on embargoed products) and indirect effects (the "friendly fire"), which seems to be mainly channeled by increased country risk and lower accessibility of trade finance instruments. However, what we have estimated so far is only a net loss of bilateral trade. To clarify the economic policy message on the economic cost of sanctions for sanctioning countries, we have to look at the overall effect on firms' total exports. As exporting to the Russian Federation became more difficult, firms may have found new business opportunities in other countries and partly compensated their losses on the Russian market. They may also have found ways to circumvent the sanctions by selling to some intermediary firms located in a country not involved in the diplomatic conflict—and not hit by counter-sanctions—in order to re-export to Russia.[36] Inversely, it is also possible that the disruption of trade with Russia have affected exporters' cash-flow and their capacity to finance their activities in other markets. In this case, sales in different export markets would be positively correlated and we could expect an additional negative impact of the sanctions on exports of affected firms.[37]

[36] Haidar (2014) observes very strong trade diversion effects in the case of Iran. Iranian firms that used to export to countries imposing an embargo have increased their exports of the same product to non-sanctioning destinations.

[37] Berman et al. (2015) provide empirical evidence of such a positive correlation between sales on different markets.

Our empirical strategy to evaluate the impact of the sanctions on exports to Russia to alternative destinations exploits again our French firm-level data. Here, we compare the trends of export performances on non-Russian markets of firms that have been directly exposed to the sanctions to the ones of non-exposed firms. We aggregate our firm-level data to eliminate the destination country dimension and estimate the following difference-in-difference specification:

$$\text{Total Exports}_{ikt} = \beta[\text{RUexporter}_{ik,t0} \times \text{PostSanctions}_t] + \theta_{ik} + \theta_{kt} + \varepsilon_{ikt}. \quad (3)$$

where Total Exports$_{ikt}$ is the total exports (to all destinations) of product k, by firm i at date t. θ_{idk} and θ_{dkt} are firm $\times$ product $\times$ destination and destination $\times$ product $\times$ time fixed effects. The treatment dummy is [RUexporter$_{ik}$ $\times$ PostSanctions$_t$]. It is set to one during the time when sanctions are active and when firm i exported the product k to Russia before the sanctions. The average treatment effect, β, therefore measures the change in total exports of exposed firms, relative to non-exposed ones. A non-significant coefficient would indicates that firms exporting to Russia in 2013 managed to fully divert their trade to other destinations (or that the exports to Russia were totally marginal in their total exports). A negative β would mean that these exposed firms incurred a net reduction in their export sales. Since we are not interested in the timing of events here and in order to avoid potential biases due to seasonal effects, we focus on the months during which the sanctions are the most severe and retaining two periods only: a treatment period from August 2014 to November 2014 and a pre-treatment period covering the same months, from August 2013 to November 2013.

The regression results are shown in table 6, for embargoed and non-embargoed products respectively. The table also reports in column (5) the average percentage in total firm-product exports in pre-treatment period of exports to Russia for exposed firms (i.e. those for which this percentage is not zero). In column (6), we report the coefficients we obtain from a the specification presented in section 4.1 (equation (2)), but now estimated on the exact same sample of exposed firms we use in this section and on the same period of time (using a single treatment dummy set to one when the destination of exports is Russia and the export takes place after August 2014). This coefficient indicates the marginal export loss to Russia during the treatment period. These coefficients are, of course, very close than the ones reported in table 2 and provide the marginal impact of the sanctions on exports to Russia.

The negative coeficients reported in column (1) clearly indicate that firms that exported to Russia before the events were not able to fully recover their lost trade by shifting to

Table 6: Trade diversion

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
				% Exported	Coef.
β	s.e.	Nb. Obs.	R^2	to Russia	eq. (2)
A. Embargoed Products					
-0.228^a	(0.079)	16858	0.949	19.15	-2.031^a
B. Non-embargoed Products					
-0.059^a	(0.013)	354632	0.931	14.35	-0.282^a

Notes: All regressions in column (1) include Firm $\times$ $\times$ HS4 and Time $\times$ HS4 fixed effects. The dependent variable is the total firm-product exports in Aug-Nov. 2013 and Aug-Nov. 2014. Robust standard errors reported in column (2) are clustered by Firm $\times$ HS4. Column (5) reports the average share of exports to Russia in total firm-product exports of exposed firms in Aug-Nov. 2013. Coefficients reported in column (6) correspond to a regression based on eq. (2) and show the marginal decline in firm-product exports to Russia between Aug-Nov. 2013 and Aug-Nov. 2014. ^{a}: Significance at 1%.

other foreign markets.[38] On the contrary, those firms that exported agricultural and food products targeted by the Russian embargo saw their total exports decrease by 20.39% (=1-$\exp(-0.228)$). This is larger than the loss they incurred on the Russian market. Indeed, the coefficient reported in column (6) suggests that those firms have decreased their sales in Russia by 86.9% on average (1-$\exp(-2.031)$), which correspond to a decrease in their total exports of $86.9\% \times 19.15\% = 16.6\%$.

Exporters of non-embargoed products exposed to the Russian conflicts also experienced a gross drop in their total exports (see panel B). On average their exports decreased by 5.7% (=1-$\exp(-0.059)$). While this is limited in percentage terms, it nevertheless is again slightly larger than the firms' loss on the Russian market. Figures reported in columns (5) and (6) indicate that exports to Russia decreased by 24.5% (=1-$\exp(-0.282)$), which represents $24.5\% \times 14.35\% = 3.5\%$ of their total exports. In sum, unlike in previous related research looking at the impact in *target* countries of sanctions as in Haidar (2014), our results suggest that French exporters to Russia were unable to quickly respond to the diplomatic shock and shift sales to other markets in the short-run in order to counter losses incurred. On the contrary, it seems that the diplomatic conflict has weakened those firms doing business with Russia and deteriorated their global export performance.

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we evaluate and quantify the effects of the sanctions regime between the European Union and allied countries on the one side and the Russian Federation on the other

[38] Naturally, our analysis is silent about the possibility that the products intended for exports to Russia were finally sold on the domestic market.

side. The strength of pre-conflict trade ties between involved countries and the variety of policy options employed make this case especially instructive. Aside from these economic characteristics, the episode is of particular political importance as it has remained a hotly debated topic in policy circles and the broader public since its beginning in early 2014.

We contribute to the literature along multiple lines by extending the analysis to the impact on the *sender* countries of the sanctions and providing firm-level evidence. The analysis is conducted from two perspectives: We first gauge the global effects in a traditional trade framework, highlighting the heterogeneous impact on the different countries involved. Using monthly trade data from UN Comtrade, we perform a general equilibrium counterfactual analysis that allows us to put a price tag on the policies put in place. We find that the global *lost trade*—the difference between predicted and observed trade flows—amounts to US$ 4.7 billion per month, US$ 1.8 billion being borne by sanctioning Western countries. This cost on private actors is unevenly distributed among countries, with European Union member states bearing 90% of the sanctioning countries' impact. Interestingly, the bulk of the lost trade, 91%, is incurred through non-embargoed products, and can hence be considered *friendly fire*.

In order to gain a deeper understanding of the root causes of this observed friendly fire, we then drill deeper using a rich dataset of monthly French firm-level exports. We investigate the micro effects along the intensive and extensive margins and examine possible channels through which the exports of non-embargoed products are hurt. We find significant effects on both intensive and extensive margins—the probability to export any given good to Russia drops by on 8.2%–14.1% and the average shipment values decreased by 3.5%–7.5%. Again, significant effects are found for non-embargoed products.

While a direct identification of a mechanism explaining friendly fire is difficult, we find evidence that country risk—through legal and political uncertainty, and financial sanctions—impeded the provision of trade finance services, causing firms and products relying on financial intermediation to cease or roll back sales in the Russian Federation. The data rejects a plausible alternative mechanisms: a consumer boycott, i.e. a sudden change in preferences, cannot account for the decline in exports.

Finally, we investigate whether affected French exporters diverted their sales to other markets after being hit with restrictions to the Russian market. Firms that were directly exposed to Russian counter-sanctions, i.e. previously exported certain agricultural or food products later targeted by counter-sanctions by the Russian Federation, were not able to recover their loss by expanding sales to new or existing destinations aside from Russia. Those firms that were not directly hit by counter-sanctions did serve more markets after-

wards, but did not increase flows to existing partner countries. Overall, trade diversion effects remain insignificant and very small in magnitude.

Shedding light on the impact of sanctions on the sender countries opens up new boxes of intriguing questions. What happens to firms in sender and target countries engaged in trade after the lifting of sanctions? Are previous business networks revived or do sanctions imply structural changes? We refer these to further research.

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A Details on EU and Russian sanctions

A.1 Detailed timeline

The initial EU measures were implemented through *Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP* and *Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014* on March 17, 2014 and amounted to an "EU-wide asset freeze and travel ban on those undermining the territorial sovereignty or security of Ukraine and those supporting or doing business with them." The list of targeted individuals and entities was first amended with *Council Implementing Decision 2014/151/CFSP* and *Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 284/2014* on March 21, 2014 to 33 persons and then extensively appended with what was called the second wave of sanctions with *Council Implementing Decision 2014/238/CFSP* and *Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 433/2014* on April 28, 2014. Until the end of 2015, this list of persons was amended 12 times.[39]

The U.S. sanctions, implemented by *Executive Orders 13660*, *13661* and *13662*, targeted individuals or entities in a way such that "[...] property and interests in property that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United States person (including any foreign branch) of the following persons are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in" while also "suspend[ing] entry into the United States, as immigrants or nonimmigrants, of such persons" (Kleinfeld and Landells, 2014, Executive Order 13662). Such asset freezes and travel bans were extended to a growing list of persons and entities, including major Russian financial institutions with close links to the Kremlin (Baker and McKenzie, 2014).[40]

Other countries allied with the European Union and the United States followed a similar path and introduced comparable measures at around the same time.[41] These lists of individuals and entities were successively appended over the spring and summer of 2014.[42]

The restrictions in the third wave of sanctions were enacted through *Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP* and *Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014* on July 31, 2014.[43] European

[39] See `http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/09/pdf/150915-sanctions-table---Persons--and-entities_pdf/` for a list of currently sanctioned people and entities.

[40] See the current *Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List* of the United States Office of Foreign Assets Control here `https://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/ssi/ssi.pdf` and the list of *Specially Designated Nationals* here `https://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/sdnlist.pdf`.

[41] See `https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_individuals_sanctioned_during_the_Ukrainian_crisis` for a list of sanctioned individuals by the respective countries.

[42] Compare, e.g., Ashford (2016) and Dreger et al. (2016).

[43] The "third wave" had been in the making–publicly–for sometime then, presumably as a threat, see `http://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/eu-prepares-more-sanctions-against-russia/`. The US had implemented its measures on 17 July 2014 already and were pushing EU lead-

exporting firms were still mostly indirectly affected, as only a small number of industries' exports were directly targeted: Those firms that export products and technology intended for military and dual use and some equipment for the oil industry.[44]

The U.S. State Department announced a "third wave" of sanctions on July 17, 2014, stating that the US Treasury Department had "imposed sanctions that prohibit U.S. persons from providing new financing to two major Russian financial institutions [...] and two Russian energy firms [...], limiting their access to U.S. capital markets", as well as "eight Russian arms firms, which are responsible for the production of a range of materiel that includes small arms, mortar shells, and tanks."[45] On July 29, 2014, these were broadly expanded, with the State Department announcing that new measures prohibited U.S. persons from "providing new financing to three major Russian financial institutions," while at the same time "suspend[ing] U.S. export credit and development finance to Russia."[46] Further amendments in the same vein were announced on September 9, 2014.[47]

Other Western countries reciprocated the measures taken by the United States and European Union and enacted similar trade sanctions and financial restrictions (Dreger et al., 2016; Dreyer et al., 2015). The Swiss government enacted further legislation that was meant to prevent circumvention of existing sanctions, while maintaining not to impose direct sanctions on the Russian Federation and as such was not affected by Russian counter-sanctions (Reuters, 2014).[48] All measures, from the Western and the Russian side, were extended multiple times and continue to be in place as of July 2017.

A.2 EU sanctions: List of embargoed products

Table 7: HS codes affected by export restrictions to Russia imposed by Westerns countries

Commodity Code	List of products
7304 11 00	Line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, seamless, of stainless steel

Table 7 – *Continued on next page*

ers to reciprocate, see `http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/new-sanctions-wave-hits-russian-stocks/503604.html`.

[44] Military use products are defined in the so-called *common military list* as adopted through *Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP* and dual use goods through *Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009*. See appendix table 7 for the affected HS 8 codes.

[45] See `https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2572.aspx`. Additionally previous "smart sanctions" were extended to more individuals and entities, including the two Ukrainian break-away regions "Luhansk People's Republic" and the "Donetsk People's Republic".

[46] See `https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2590.aspx`.

[47] See `https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2629.aspx`.

[48] See also the Swiss *Verordnung über Massnahmen zur Vermeidung der Umgehung internationaler Sanktionen im Zusammenhang mit der Situation in der Ukraine, AS 2014 877*. As a Schengen member state, all travel bans automatically included travel to Switzerland.

Table 7 – *Continued from previous page*

7304 19 10	Line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, seamless, of iron or steel, of an external diameter not exceeding 168,3 mm (excl. products of stainless steel or of cast iron)
7304 19 30	Line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, seamless, of iron or steel, of an external diameter exceeding 168,3 mm but not exceeding 406,4 mm (excl. products of stainless steel or of cast iron)
7304 19 90	Line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, seamless, of iron or steel, of an external diameter exceeding 406,4 mm (excl. products of stainless steel or of cast iron)
7304 22 00	Drill pipe, seamless, of stainless steel, of a kind used in drilling for oil or gas
7304 23 00	Drill pipe, seamless, of a kind used in drilling for oil or gas, of iron or steel (excl. products of stain less steel or of cast iron)
7304 29 10	Casing and tubing of a kind used for drilling for oil or gas, seamless, of iron or steel, of an external diameter not exceeding 168,3 mm (excl. products of cast iron)
7304 29 30	Casing and tubing of a kind used for drilling for oil or gas, seamless, of iron or steel, of an external diameter exceeding 168,3 mm, but not exceeding 406,4 mm (excl. products of cast iron)
7304 29 90	Casing and tubing of a kind used for drilling for oil or gas, seamless, of iron or steel, of an external diameter exceeding 406,4 mm (excl. products of cast iron)
7305 11 00	Line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, having circular cross-sections and an external diameter of exceeding 406,4 mm, of iron or steel, longitudinally submerged arc welded
7305 12 00	Line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, having circular cross-sections and an external diameter of exceeding 406,4 mm, of iron or steel, longitudinally arc welded (excl. products longitudinally submerged arc welded)
7305 19 00	Line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, having circular cross-sections and an external diameter of exceeding 406,4 mm, of flat-rolled products of iron or steel (excl. products longitudinally arc welded)
7305 20 00	Casing of a kind used in drilling for oil or gas, having circular cross-sections and an external diameter of exceeding 406,4 mm, of flat-rolled products of iron or steel
7306 11	Line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, welded, of flat-rolled products of stainless steel, of an external diameter of not exceeding 406,4 mm
7306 19	Line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, welded, of flat-rolled products of iron or steel, of an external diameter of not exceeding 406,4 mm (excl. products of stainless steel or of cast iron)
7306 21 00	Casing and tubing of a kind used in drilling for oil or gas, welded, of flat-rolled products of stain less steel, of an external diameter of not exceeding 406,4 mm
7306 29 00	Casing and tubing of a kind used in drilling for oil or gas, welded, of flat-rolled products of iron or steel, of an external diameter of not exceeding 406,4 mm (excl. products of stainless steel or of cast iron)
8207 13 00	Rock-drilling or earth-boring tools, interchangeable, with working parts of sintered metal carbides or cermets

Table 7 – *Continued on next page*

Table 7 – *Continued from previous page*

8207 19 10	Rock-drilling or earth-boring tools, interchangeable, with working parts of diamond or agglomerated diamond
8413 50	Reciprocating positive displacement pumps for liquids, power-driven (excl. those of subheading 8413 11 and 8413 19, fuel, lubricating or cooling medium pumps for internal combustion piston engine and concrete pumps)
8413 60	Rotary positive displacement pumps for liquids, power-driven (excl. those of subheading 8413 11 and 8413 19 and fuel, lubricating or cooling medium pumps for internal combustion piston engine)
8413 82 00	Liquid elevators (excl. pumps)
8413 92 00	Parts of liquid elevators, n.e.s.
8430 49 00	Boring or sinking machinery for boring earth or extracting minerals or ores, not self-propelled and not hydraulic (excl. tunnelling machinery and hand-operated tools)
ex 8431 39 00	Parts of machinery of heading 8428, n.e.s.
ex 8431 43 00	parts for boring or sinking machinery of subheading 8430 41 or 8430 49, n.e.s.
ex 8431 49	Parts of machinery of heading 8426, 8429 and 8430, n.e.s.
8705 20 00	Mobile drilling derricks
8905 20 00	Floating or submersible drilling or production platforms
8905 90 10	Sea-going light vessels, fire-floats, floating cranes and other vessels, the navigability of which is subsidiary to their main function (excl. dredgers, floating or submersible drilling or production platforms; fishing vessels and warships)

A.3 Russian sanctions: List of embargoed products

Table 8: HS codes banned by the Russian Federation embargo

Code	Simplified description	Code	Simplified description
0201	Meat of bovine animals, fresh or chilled	0202	Meat of bovine animals, frozen
0203	Meat of swine, fresh, chilled or frozen	0207	Meat and edible offal, fresh, chilled or frozen
0210*	Meat and edible offal, salted, in brine, dried or smoked	0301*	Live fish
0302	Fish, fresh or chilled	0303	Fish, frozen
0304	Fish fillets and other fish meat, etc	0305	Fish, dried, salted, smoked or in brine
0306	Crustaceans, etc.	0307	Molluscs, etc.
0308	Other aquatic invertebrates	0401*	Milk and cream
0402*	Milk and cream, concentrated or containing sweetening matter	0403*	Buttermilk, yogurt and other fermented milk and cream
0404*	Whey ; products consisting of natural milk constituents	0405*	Butter and fats derived from milk; dairy spreads
0406*	Cheese and curd	0701*	Potatoes, fresh or chilled
0702	Tomatoes, fresh or chilled	0703*	Onions, leeks and other alliaceous vegetables, fresh or chilled
0704	Cabbages and similar edible brassicas, fresh or chilled	0705	Lettuce and chicory , fresh or chilled
0706	Carrots and similar edible roots, fresh or chilled	0707	Cucumbers and gherkins, fresh or chilled
0708	Leguminous vegetables, fresh or chilled	0709	Other vegetables, fresh or chilled
0710	Vegetables, frozen	0711	Vegetables provisionally preserved
0712*	Dried vegetables, whole, cut, sliced, broken or in powder	0713*	Dried leguminous vegetables, shelled
0714	Manioc, arrowroot and similar roots	0801	Coconuts, Brazisl nuts and cashew nuts
0802	Other nuts, fresh or dried	0803	Bananas, including plantains, fresh or dried
0804	Dates, figs, pineapples, avocados, guavas, mangoes	0805	Citrus fruit, fresh or dried
0806	Grapes, fresh or dried	0807	Melons (including watermelons) and papaws (papayas), fresh
0808	Apples, pears and quinces, fresh	0809	Apricots, cherries, peaches, plums and sloes, fresh
0810	Other fruit, fresh	0811	Fruit and nuts, frozen
0813	Fruit and nuts, provisionally preserved	1601	Sausages and similar products, of meat, meat offal or blood
1901*	Malt extract; food preparations of flour, groats, meal, starch or malt extract, etc.	2106*	Food preparations not elsewhere specified or included

B Country-level Data

Table 9: Descriptive statistics for exports to Russia in 2012

Country	Sanctions	Mean exports	SD exports	Share of emb. exports	Share of exports to Russia	Share of emb. exports to Russia
Argentina	FALSE	85936844.44	197924523.56	0.08	0.01	0.47
Australia	TRUE	205707651.90	494726706.29	0.06	0.00	0.43
Austria	TRUE	220764492.46	557218071.68	0.03	0.04	0.02
Belgium	TRUE	617637152.89	1316207812.62	0.04	0.02	0.05
Bulgaria	TRUE	31939457.69	55577654.42	0.02	0.03	0.02
Belarus	FALSE	64413678.69	207544443.25	0.08	0.37	0.20
Brazil	FALSE	234022075.64	400358142.02	0.06	0.02	0.51
Canada	TRUE	623423426.84	3596935498.37	0.03	0.00	0.34
Switzerland	FALSE	304466773.18	605830039.27	0.01	0.02	0.03
Chile	FALSE	80309298.54	158724013.16	0.16	0.01	0.74
Cyprus	TRUE	1812282.86	4964067.33	0.17	0.02	0.53
Czech Republic	TRUE	230067416.74	580859985.37	0.01	0.04	0.00
Germany	TRUE	1797757171.46	2395402034.14	0.02	0.04	0.02
Denmark	TRUE	134782890.19	258790895.56	0.12	0.02	0.19
Algeria	FALSE	181442939.77	281827423.79	0.00	0.00	0.97
Egypt	FALSE	27333880.56	49966805.49	0.05	0.01	0.76
Spain	TRUE	362108402.99	688523013.01	0.09	0.02	0.16
Estonia	TRUE	21400343.19	43996414.14	0.03	0.14	0.04
Finland	TRUE	90274628.90	140606107.32	0.01	0.12	0.05
France	TRUE	719828711.96	1269325175.19	0.04	0.02	0.03
United Kingdom	TRUE	562873529.56	948700405.10	0.02	0.02	0.01
Greece	TRUE	35408947.64	60060038.86	0.10	0.02	0.29
Hong Kong	FALSE	267318172.27	552285734.77	0.00	0.01	0.01
Hungary	TRUE	134769157.04	290265649.69	0.02	0.04	0.02
India	FALSE	265377176.61	468848332.57	0.03	0.01	0.03
Ireland	TRUE	167607783.06	391717896.69	0.06	0.01	0.13
Israel	FALSE	84691965.41	214869220.08	0.02	0.02	0.23
Italy	TRUE	653521902.30	1030007953.49	0.03	0.03	0.02
Japan	TRUE	783779172.96	1742077240.97	0.00	0.02	0.00
Lithuania	TRUE	42252718.62	84478097.32	0.08	0.21	0.21
Luxembourg	TRUE	27667347.86	65477511.40	0.03	0.01	0.02
Latvia	TRUE	17212301.84	33097346.94	0.05	0.13	0.03
Mexico	FALSE	530570389.84	3213093116.40	0.03	0.00	0.23
Malta	TRUE	4515775.09	9635479.58	0.04	0.02	0.00
Malaysia	FALSE	264526826.04	536756014.55	0.01	0.00	0.01
Netherlands	TRUE	728404996.38	1625683062.31	0.05	0.02	0.05
Norway	TRUE	237596744.02	580380158.33	0.05	0.01	0.70
New Zealand	TRUE	38658455.77	98748116.65	0.33	0.01	0.72
Peru	FALSE	54107656.23	110929621.26	0.06	0.00	0.66
Philippines	FALSE	66173955.01	164194209.35	0.03	0.00	0.19
Poland	TRUE	264345582.72	546322353.76	0.05	0.06	0.09
Portugal	TRUE	73857553.20	185021337.50	0.04	0.00	0.03
Romania	TRUE	76829394.34	148349731.86	0.01	0.03	0.00
Russian Federation	FALSE	1137025212.19	1965612051.97	0.00		
Singapore	FALSE	541328587.51	1138393953.36	0.01	0.00	0.01
Slovakia	TRUE	119105277.97	253360661.49	0.01	0.04	0.00
Slovenia	TRUE	34178206.68	76910359.20	0.01	0.05	0.02
Sweden	TRUE	227719042.18	348826924.42	0.03	0.02	0.00
Thailand	FALSE	250066747.56	436249497.74	0.03	0.01	0.04
Turkey	FALSE	140334455.76	208323719.86	0.05	0.07	0.14
Ukraine	TRUE	78363287.03	210179801.50	0.02	0.35	0.04
United States	TRUE	1719068879.73	3883586752.98	0.03	0.01	0.12
South Africa	FALSE	74507956.47	127316187.76	0.05	0.01	0.31
Indonesia	FALSE	214679843.24	437697384.15	0.02	0.01	0.08

C General equilibrium effects

We estimate equation (1) *without* "treated observations," i.e. those directly affected by the sanctions, allowing us to predict partial equilibrium trade flows without imposing a homogeneous impact on certain groups of countries or time periods. This effectively permits the elasticity to vary by country and time, equivalent to (but computationally less intensive than) setting β_{odt}. The setup of the general equilibrium exercise below demands a balanced panel, which restricts the number of countries to 53. We estimate the fixed effects using a PPML estimator following Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). Aside from the usual benefits, the PPML estimator is particularly relevant in the present case in order to account for the "adding-up problem" of the OLS estimator as described by Fally (2015).[49] Furthermore, owing to the structure of bilateral fixed effects varying at the calendar month level, we can slice up the panel along the calendar month dimension and estimate each separately. The estimated bilateral fixed effect $\hat{\phi}_{odm}$ captures bilateral monthly trade costs for "normal times," as the period and country pairs that are directly affected by sanctions are excluded. The importer and exporter fixed effects $\hat{\Psi}_{ot}$ and $\hat{\Theta}_{dt}$ are capturing everything country-specific at the respective time. This means that those fixed effects for the time during the sanctions period are also capturing sanctions-induced changes in multilateral resistance terms, production and expenditure figures.[50] Using these estimated fixed effects then, the predicted *partial equilibrium* flows can be constructed simply as

$$\hat{X}_{odt} = \exp\left(\hat{\Psi}_{ot} + \hat{\Theta}_{dt} + \hat{\phi}_{odm}\right).$$

Crucial for the *general equilibrium* analysis to follow, partial equilibrium (pseudo-) production and (pseudo-) expenditure figures can be backed out of the estimated fixed effects as[51]

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{Y}_{ot}^{\text{PE}} &= \sum_{l \in d} \exp\left(\hat{\Psi}_{ot} + \hat{\Theta}_{lt} + \hat{\phi}_{olm}\right) \quad \text{and analogously} \\ \hat{X}_{dt}^{\text{PE}} &= \sum_{l \in o} \exp\left(\hat{\Psi}_{lt} + \hat{\Theta}_{dt} + \hat{\phi}_{ldm}\right), \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

[49] The property of the PPML estimator described by Fally (2015) posits that estimated production and expenditure figures, i.e. the sum of exports and imports, respectively, remain equal to observed figures with the PPML estimator. This stands in contrast to the OLS estimator that does not produce matching figures, hence yielding an "adding-up" problem.

[50] The estimated fixed effects are relative to one reference country and one bilateral country-pair-calendar month, for which either $\hat{\Psi}_{ot}$ or $\hat{\Theta}_{dt}$ is zero at all dates and one $\hat{\phi}_{odm} = 0$. The choice of these references has no impact on the results, however they have to remain the same in all following estimations and computations.

[51] We refer to the figures as pseudo-figures, as they are only proportional to the production and expenditures for countries present in the data. This departure from Anderson et al. (2015), who convert them into actual production figures with additional data, however, does not impact the results as all later general equilibrium adjustments to the figures enter in multiplicative form.

where *PE* denotes partial equilibrium, while inward and outward multilateral resistance terms can be constructed as

$$\hat{\Omega}_{ot}^{\text{PE}} = \sum_{l \in d} \exp\left(\hat{\Theta}_{lt} + \hat{\phi}_{olm}\right) \quad \text{and}$$
$$\hat{\Phi}_{dt}^{\text{PE}} = \sum_{l \in o} \exp\left(\hat{\Psi}_{lt} + \hat{\phi}_{ldm}\right). \tag{5}$$

As noted by Anderson and Yotov (2010), $\Omega \cdot \lambda$ and $\Phi \cdot \lambda^{-1}$ are unique for any λ, given a set of production figures Y, expenditure figures X and trade costs ϕ. The conditional general equilibrium impact, the change in trade flows due to the sanctions-induced change in multilateral resistance terms, can therefore be determined by recomputing the multilateral resistance terms accordingly. This is easily done via a contraction mapping algorithm, i.e. iteratively solving the following system of matrix equations:

$$\hat{\Omega}_t = \hat{\phi}_m \left(\hat{X}_t \otimes \hat{\Phi}_t^{-1}\right)$$
$$\hat{\Phi}_t = \hat{\phi}_m^{\text{T}} \left(\hat{Y}_t \otimes \hat{\Omega}_t^{-1}\right), \tag{6}$$

where $\hat{\Omega}_t$ and $\hat{\Phi}_t$ are vectors of outward and inward multilateral resistances[52] at time t and $\hat{\phi}_m$ the trade cost matrix for calendar month m.[53] The conditional general equilibrium counterfactual trade flows can then be computed as

$$\hat{X}_{odt}^{\text{CE}} = \frac{\hat{Y}_{ot}^{\text{PE}}}{\hat{\Omega}_{ot}^{\text{CE}}} \cdot \frac{\hat{X}_{dt}^{\text{PE}}}{\hat{\Phi}_{dt}^{\text{CE}}} \cdot \hat{\phi}_{odm}, \tag{7}$$

where *CE* denotes conditional general equilibrium figures. This *conditional* general equilibrium effect, however, still omits changes in the production and expenditures of exporters and importers due to the sanctions. In order to obtain the *full* general equilibrium impact, Anderson et al. (2015) propose an adjustment of *factory-gate prices* to production and expenditures, such that[54]

$$\hat{Y}_{ot}^{\text{GE}} = \hat{Y}_{ot}^{\text{PE}} \cdot \left(\frac{\hat{\Psi}_{ot}^{\text{GE}}}{\hat{\Psi}_{ot}}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \quad \text{and} \quad \hat{X}_{dt}^{\text{GE}} = \hat{X}_{dt}^{\text{PE}} \cdot \left(\frac{\hat{\Psi}_{dt}^{\text{GE}}}{\hat{\Psi}_{dt}}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}, \tag{8}$$

[52] $\hat{\Phi}_t^{-1}$ and $\hat{\Omega}_t^{-1}$ are vectors of elementwise inverses of $\hat{\Omega}_t$ and $\hat{\Phi}_t$, and $\otimes$ denotes the elementwise product.

[53] Alternatively, Anderson et al. (2015) show that the PPML estimator can be used to compute correct multilateral resistance terms with observed trade flows and counterfactual trade costs. Iteratively estimating a gravity setup with counterfactual flows incorporating updated production and expenditure figures yields the same results as the present methodology. Computationally, however, solving iteratively the system of matrices is far less demanding than a PPML gravity estimation with a full set of fixed effects.

[54] The term "factory-gate price" should be understood as an aggregate, country-wide measure, as it implicitly incorporates not only effects on the intensive margin, but also the extensive margin at the individual firm level.

where σ is the elasticity of substitution and $\hat{Y}_{ot}^{\text{PE}}$ and $\hat{X}_{dt}^{\text{PE}}$ and production and expenditure figures constructed using equation (4) and estimated fixed effects from the initial partial equilibrium estimation. We take the value of $\sigma = 5$ from Head and Mayer (2014), who conduct a meta analysis of estimates of the elasticity of substitution and find 5 to be the median estimate. $\hat{\Psi}_{ot}$ and $\hat{\Psi}_{dt}$ are the exporter fixed effects from the same initial partial equilibrium estimation, while $\hat{\Psi}_{ot}^{\text{GE}}$ and $\hat{\Psi}_{dt}^{\text{GE}}$ are constructed pseudo exporter fixed effects using current (initially partial) pseudo production figures and outward multilateral resistances incorporating the respective conditional general equilibrium effect. Iteratively determining these general equilibrium counterfactual production and expenditure figures with the corresponding multilateral resistance terms, equation (7) yields the counterfactual flows between all countries.

D Quantification of lost trade

Table 10: Losses of total trade by period and country

	Total		Conflict		Smart sanctions		Economic sanctions	
Country	*absolute*	*relative*	*absolute*	*relative*	*absolute*	*relative*	*absolute*	*relative*
Australia	-7.25	-30.64	10.57	40.76	-8.96	-27.45	-9.89	-47.96
Austria	-31.77	-8.62	43.69	11.72	-36.35	-7.62	-43.74	-13.03
Belgium	-85.08	-18.81	-64.13	-12.68	-111.54	-18.76	-80.99	-20.20
Bulgaria	-3.95	-7.65	2.11	4.42	-4.22	-6.65	-4.94	-10.11
Canada	-17.11	-21.68	-4.71	-4.43	8.10	7.66	-26.72	-40.35
Czech Republic	-77.01	-17.66	-28.18	-6.03	-31.18	-6.05	-99.11	-24.33
Germany	-705.79	-21.04	-395.33	-11.18	-661.20	-15.79	-773.69	-25.14
Denmark	-18.55	-16.69	-14.02	-10.28	-16.61	-10.88	-19.92	-21.08
Spain	-41.41	-15.95	-27.45	-9.34	-10.74	-3.27	-52.89	-22.67
Estonia	29.03	22.23	59.62	47.33	54.41	33.92	16.17	13.19
Finland	-76.98	-16.02	-22.92	-4.39	-55.14	-9.19	-92.94	-21.22
France	-73.22	-12.43	-22.19	-3.26	-58.50	-7.90	-86.56	-16.37
United Kingdom	-134.79	-23.69	-47.59	-7.54	-99.58	-14.60	-160.53	-30.61
Georgia	9.94	116.01	14.61	152.95	14.79	170.44	7.69	91.95
Greece	-4.91	-14.08	-5.67	-15.63	-6.87	-12.76	-4.20	-14.46
Croatia	-5.58	-17.80	3.12	8.69	-5.35	-17.33	-7.19	-23.41
Hungary	-45.80	-19.40	-13.12	-4.96	-56.47	-19.39	-48.42	-22.54
Ireland	3.02	5.67	6.66	11.62	42.00	63.29	-9.09	-18.72
Italy	-59.28	-6.49	43.78	4.52	1.21	0.10	-95.26	-11.44
Japan	-112.20	-15.65	-31.25	-3.61	-37.26	-4.11	-148.53	-23.40
Lithuania	33.79	8.48	43.26	9.52	88.91	17.07	15.91	4.51
Latvia	-3.70	-3.53	8.52	7.64	-5.32	-4.48	-5.38	-5.40
Montenegro	-0.11	-23.68	0.09	16.09	0.03	8.16	-0.19	-40.22
Netherlands	-107.25	-15.75	-140.50	-17.73	-97.07	-11.40	-104.37	-17.09
Norway	-27.89	-36.63	-18.24	-13.94	-16.87	-14.39	-32.83	-60.37
Poland	-134.90	-17.50	-66.63	-7.92	-98.17	-10.54	-157.75	-22.17
Portugal	-1.11	-5.63	1.04	4.64	0.77	3.11	-2.04	-11.50
Romania	7.11	5.95	23.62	18.28	27.07	18.83	-1.67	-1.51
Slovakia	-44.92	-19.55	-22.57	-8.90	10.64	4.12	-65.20	-30.04
Slovenia	2.77	3.08	6.88	7.20	5.76	5.13	1.16	1.41
Sweden	-16.44	-7.46	32.07	14.60	-1.48	-0.54	-29.40	-14.40
United States	-13.37	-1.77	46.32	5.21	135.77	15.87	-67.76	-9.69
average	-55.15	-14.27	-18.08	-4.24	-32.17	-6.70	-68.45	-19.45
cumulative	-1764.71	-14.27	-578.51	-4.24	-1029.40	-6.70	-2190.30	-19.45

Note: Losses are per month. Absolute losses are in millions of USD. Relative losses are in percent. "Total" is the average monthly loss since December 2013; "Conflict" losses are the average monthly losses incurred during the time of conflict before the imposition of financial sanctions in mid-March 2014; "Smart sanctions" are the monthly losses during the time of conflict and financial sanctions before the imposition of economic sanctions in late July/early August 2014; "Economic sanctions" are average monthly losses incurred since the imposition of trade and banking restrictions.

Table 11: Losses of embargoed products trade by period and country

	Total		Conflict		Smart sanctions		Economic sanctions	
Country	*absolute*	*relative*	*absolute*	*relative*	*absolute*	*relative*	*absolute*	*relative*
Australia	-8.61	-60.04	10.70	77.17	-10.64	-60.86	-12.95	-99.32
Austria	-0.75	-13.44	1.81	23.84	-1.43	-13.41	-1.00	-27.07
Belgium	-6.37	-38.77	1.66	5.35	-3.55	-12.26	-8.62	-84.75
Bulgaria	0.27	36.26	0.00	0.43	-0.48	-27.31	0.56	130.58
Canada	-3.58	-17.60	12.79	45.60	20.38	67.02	-14.85	-95.88
Czech Republic	0.21	31.35	0.63	53.07	1.07	90.70	-0.11	-24.66
Germany	-17.55	-41.70	-23.81	-31.67	-36.58	-50.18	-10.85	-39.91
Denmark	-2.02	-12.22	5.58	18.33	-2.73	-10.26	-3.15	-28.42
Spain	-14.85	-58.49	-18.88	-36.46	-13.38	-30.13	-14.57	-96.26
Estonia	-1.03	-22.94	1.18	16.18	-1.40	-16.97	-1.31	-45.64
Finland	-6.47	-35.10	3.94	12.64	7.25	26.50	-12.34	-91.05
France	-3.59	-24.87	0.96	3.70	-0.80	-3.26	-5.21	-55.32
United Kingdom	-0.40	-10.52	0.57	8.06	0.93	13.89	-0.96	-40.57
Georgia	1.56	308.52	0.95	52.49	0.25	163.97	1.97	552.89
Greece	-5.00	-45.28	-3.41	-29.19	-1.94	-10.06	-6.83	-95.98
Croatia	-0.12	-25.19	-0.00	-0.74	0.22	80.58	-0.24	-46.74
Hungary	-1.69	-42.30	1.14	21.05	-2.66	-35.77	-1.91	-69.41
Ireland	-0.07	-1.15	4.95	54.58	-0.77	-6.57	-0.75	-19.00
Italy	-3.42	-34.45	0.52	2.99	-0.10	-0.64	-5.10	-74.54
Japan	0.55	121.01	0.66	84.52	-0.13	-18.72	0.73	228.43
Lithuania	-28.14	-40.39	-18.46	-14.66	-15.92	-12.94	-33.44	-75.91
Latvia	1.47	64.85	6.19	145.96	5.21	155.06	-0.46	-28.82
Montenegro	0.05	405.72	-Inf	-100.00	-Inf	-100.00	0.05	673.97
Netherlands	-0.62	-2.02	9.84	20.44	9.43	18.99	-5.42	-24.71
Norway	-29.98	-50.12	-13.15	-12.21	-11.44	-13.30	-39.53	-95.18
Poland	-21.43	-40.48	5.87	6.41	-14.62	-14.99	-28.25	-85.60
Portugal	-0.44	-35.29	0.48	52.04	0.33	37.16	-1.75	-97.40
Romania	-0.00	-2.61	0.04	322.08	-0.05	-14.79	0.01	8.41
Slovakia	-0.13	-38.59	0.02	2.61	-0.07	-12.44	-0.17	-81.45
Slovenia	0.27	19.74	-0.29	-13.66	-0.67	-27.48	0.64	70.95
Sweden	-0.34	-38.87	0.49	46.57	-0.18	-11.63	-0.54	-82.68
United States	-17.78	-42.09	-16.14	-26.27	-6.63	-8.91	-21.35	-72.62
average	-5.50	-35.32	-0.75	-2.89	-2.63	-10.19	-7.28	-69.49
cumulative	-176.04	-35.32	-23.94	-2.89	-84.30	-10.19	-232.82	-69.49

Note: Losses are per month. Absolute losses are in millions of USD. Relative losses are in percent. "Total" is the average monthly loss since December 2013; "Conflict" losses are the average monthly losses incurred during the time of conflict before the imposition of financial sanctions in mid-March 2014; "Smart sanctions" are the monthly losses during the time of conflict and financial sanctions before the imposition of economic sanctions in late July/early August 2014; "Economic sanctions" are average monthly losses incurred since the imposition of trade and banking restrictions.

Table 12: Losses of non-embargoed products trade by period and country

	Total		Conflict		Smart sanctions		Economic sanctions	
Country	*absolute*	*relative*	*absolute*	*relative*	*absolute*	*relative*	*absolute*	*relative*
Australia	-0.70	-5.52	-0.13	-1.08	1.68	11.10	-1.51	-12.37
Austria	-31.03	-8.55	41.88	11.47	-34.91	-7.49	-42.75	-12.87
Belgium	-78.71	-18.06	-65.79	-13.86	-107.99	-19.10	-72.37	-18.52
Bulgaria	-4.21	-8.28	2.11	4.49	-3.74	-6.06	-5.47	-11.29
Canada	-13.82	-22.95	-17.51	-22.37	-12.27	-16.29	-13.62	-25.92
Czech Republic	-77.22	-17.74	-28.81	-6.18	-32.24	-6.27	-99.00	-24.33
Germany	-688.24	-20.78	-371.51	-10.73	-624.62	-15.18	-762.84	-25.01
Denmark	-16.54	-17.47	-19.60	-18.48	-13.89	-11.01	-16.77	-20.11
Spain	-26.56	-11.34	-8.57	-3.54	2.64	0.93	-38.32	-17.57
Estonia	30.06	23.83	58.44	49.25	55.81	36.67	17.48	14.59
Finland	-70.51	-15.26	-26.86	-5.48	-62.40	-10.89	-80.60	-18.99
France	-69.64	-12.12	-23.15	-3.54	-57.70	-8.06	-81.35	-15.67
United Kingdom	-134.39	-23.78	-48.15	-7.71	-100.51	-14.88	-159.57	-30.56
Georgia	8.44	104.47	13.66	176.50	14.59	170.53	5.72	71.41
Greece	-1.11	-4.18	-2.25	-9.17	-4.93	-14.27	0.22	0.90
Croatia	-5.46	-17.68	3.13	8.85	-5.58	-18.22	-6.95	-23.00
Hungary	-44.10	-19.00	-14.25	-5.50	-53.82	-18.96	-46.51	-21.93
Ireland	3.09	6.56	1.71	3.55	42.77	78.29	-8.34	-18.69
Italy	-55.86	-6.18	43.26	4.54	1.31	0.11	-90.16	-10.92
Japan	-112.75	-15.74	-31.91	-3.69	-37.12	-4.10	-149.26	-23.53
Lithuania	61.93	18.84	61.72	18.80	104.83	26.36	49.35	16.00
Latvia	-5.17	-5.04	2.33	2.17	-10.53	-9.14	-4.92	-5.01
Montenegro	-0.12	-26.27	0.10	17.85	0.03	8.16	-0.21	-44.34
Netherlands	-106.63	-16.40	-150.34	-20.20	-106.50	-13.28	-98.95	-16.80
Norway	-0.30	-1.43	-5.09	-21.99	-5.43	-17.40	2.05	11.57
Poland	-113.47	-15.80	-72.50	-9.68	-83.55	-10.02	-129.50	-19.09
Portugal	-0.88	-4.63	0.56	2.62	0.44	1.85	-1.53	-8.86
Romania	7.12	5.96	23.58	18.25	27.12	18.91	-1.67	-1.51
Slovakia	-44.80	-19.53	-22.59	-8.93	10.71	4.15	-65.04	-30.00
Slovenia	2.50	2.82	7.18	7.69	6.43	5.85	0.51	0.63
Sweden	-16.10	-7.33	31.59	14.45	-1.30	-0.47	-28.87	-14.19
United States	4.41	0.62	62.46	7.55	142.39	18.23	-46.42	-6.93
average	-50.02	-13.45	-17.35	-4.33	-29.63	-6.51	-61.79	-18.05
cumulative	-1600.77	-13.45	-555.32	-4.33	-948.26	-6.51	-1977.17	-18.05

Note: Losses are per month. Absolute losses are in millions of USD. Relative losses are in percent. "Total" is the average monthly loss since December 2013; "Conflict" losses are the average monthly losses incurred during the time of conflict before the imposition of financial sanctions in mid-March 2014; "Smart sanctions" are the monthly losses during the time of conflict and financial sanctions before the imposition of economic sanctions in late July/early August 2014; "Economic sanctions" are average monthly losses incurred since the imposition of trade and banking restrictions.

E Robustness checks

E.1 Firm-level estimation

Figure 5: Trend in the number of French exporters and export value to Russia and control group countries

(a) Number of French exporters



(b) Total export value



Table 13: Robustness check (1): Alternative control group

HS.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Embargoed		Non-Embargoed	
Estimator	PPML	LPM	PPML	LPM
Dep. var.	x_{idkt}	$x_{idkt} > 0$	x_{idkt}	$x_{idkt} > 0$
Russia × Dec '13 - Feb '14	-0.205	-0.035^{c}	-0.116^{a}	-0.028^{a}
	(0.151)	(0.020)	(0.044)	(0.002)
Russia × Mar '14 - Jul '14	-0.422^{b}	-0.092^{a}	-0.184^{a}	-0.028^{a}
	(0.195)	(0.020)	(0.041)	(0.002)
Russia × Aug '14 - Dec '14	-2.191^{a}	-0.339^{a}	-0.154^{a}	-0.047^{a}
	(0.327)	(0.022)	(0.054)	(0.002)
$\hat{\Theta}_{dk't}$	0.008	-0.001	0.103^{a}	0.011^{a}
	(0.017)	(0.003)	(0.014)	(0.001)
Nb. Obs.	102416	116316	4819491	5795280
R^2	-	0.642	-	0.629

Notes: All regression include Firm × Destination × HS4 and Firm × time × HS4 fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by Firm × HS4. Significance levels: ^{c}: p<0.1, ^{b}: p<0.05, ^{a}: p<0.01. The set of control group destinations includes 29 sanctioning and non-sanctioning countries, not in the set of control group destinations used in the benchmark regressions.

Table 14: Robustness check (2): Alternative estimators

HS.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Embargoed		Non-Embargoed	
Estimator	OLS	Logit	OLS	Logit
Dep. var.	$\ln x_{idkt}$	$x_{idkt} > 0$	$\ln x_{idkt}$	$x_{idkt} > 0$
Russia × Dec '13 - Feb '14	-0.057	-0.261^{b}	-0.073^{a}	-0.272^{a}
	(0.093)	(0.101)	(0.019)	(0.017)
Russia × Mar '14 - Jul '14	-0.097	-0.762^{a}	-0.099^{a}	-0.376^{a}
	(0.098)	(0.085)	(0.017)	(0.013)
Russia × Aug '14 - Dec '14	-0.609^{a}	-3.340^{a}	-0.150^{a}	-0.520^{a}
	(0.172)	(0.135)	(0.019)	(0.014)
$\hat{\Theta}_{dk't}$	-0.008	0.105^{a}	0.036^{a}	0.057^{a}
	(0.018)	(0.036)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Nb. Obs.	20986	55440	855144	2706192
R^2	0.890	-	0.875	-

Notes: Regression in columns (1) and (3) include Firm × Destination × HS4 and Firm × time × HS4 fixed effects. Regression in columns (2) and (4) include Firm × Destination × HS4 and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by Firm × HS4. Significance levels: ^{c}: p<0.1, ^{b}: p<0.05, ^{a}: p<0.01.