Journal Article

Procedural Fairness in Lotteries Assigning Initial Roles in a Dynamic Setting

Experimental Economics, 19(4): 819-841

We extend the study of procedural fairness in three new directions.

Firstly, we focus on lotteries determining the initial roles in a two-person game. One

of the roles carries a potential advantage over the other. All the experimental

literature has thus far focused on lotteries determining the final payoffs of a game.

Secondly, we modify procedural fairness in a dynamic—i.e. over several repetitions

of a game—as well as in a static—i.e. within a single game-sense. Thirdly, we

analyse whether assigning individuals a minimal chance of achieving an advantaged

position is enough to make them willing to accept substantially more inequality. We

find that procedural fairness matters under all of these accounts. Individuals clearly

respond to the degree of fairness in assigning initial roles, appraise contexts that are

dynamically fair more positively than contexts that are not, and are generally more

willing to accept unequal outcomes when they are granted a minimal opportunity to acquire the advantaged position. Unexpectedly, granting full equality of opportunity

does not lead to the highest efficiency.

Authors

Anirban Kar
Eugenio Proto

Info

Publication Date
JEL Classification
C78, C92, D63